§ 9. The various modes of Specific Reproduction. (a) Complication.—Being reproduced is something different from being produced again. Repeated production involves a renewal of the producing conditions. But reproduction exists only in so far as the original conditions of production are inoperative (see § 7 Association and Reproduction). Apart from the renewal of these, the previous occurrence of the reproduced experience of itself constitutes the possibility of recurrence. This necessarily implies that the previous occurrence has left behind a persistent trace or disposition. But previous occurrence constitutes only the general possibility of recurrence. The exciting cause, in so far as the revival depends on association,* is found in the occurrence of another presentation, A, which has previously existed in some kind of psychological relation to B, the presentation which is reproduced. In the main, the relations which operate as conditions of association consist in the union of the two modes of consciousness, as parts or phases of the same continuous cognitive process. The readiness with which associations are formed, and their strength, depend largely on the importance of the presentations in relation to the whole activity of which they form a part. The strength of the association is also, to a very great extent, dependent on the number of times the connexion between the associated presentations has been repeated.
* This is by no means always the case.
Specific reproduction may assume a great variety of forms and degrees. Let us call the reproducing presentation, A, and that with which it has been associated, B: the reproduced presentation may be denoted by b. Now, the various forms of reproductive process depend (1) on the varying relation of b to A, (2) on the varying degrees of completeness in which b corresponds to B. These points of view are intimately connected. b ay be either an integral part of A, or it may have a distinct individuality, so as to be capable of persisting when A has vanished. In the second case, the process is one of free reproduction : when b is an integral part of A and incapable of independent existence, the process is called complication, because the result is merely a change in the constitution of A, and for the most part an increase in its complexity. The facility and clearness with which b can be distinguished and separately attended to in the whole complex A admits of many gradations. It may be as intimately interfused with the whole as the red and blue which interpenetrate each other in purple. On the other hand it may be as easily disengaged as colour is from form. In general, the more intimate is the union of b with the other constituent characters of A, the more partial and the more profoundly modified is the reproduction of B, so that in some cases it is hard to decide whether or not there is any reproduction. We may take as a typical example of complication the peculiar differences of quality which attach to sounds according to the various modes in which they are produced. We distinguish clapping, crashing, clashing, hissing, bursting, splitting, rending, grinding, rushing, and whistling noises. Now these sounds doubtless have distinctive qualities, considered merely as auditory sensations. But it seems clear that they also have acquired modalities due to association. In producing them we have in each case certain distinctive experiences of movement and resistance, and in seeing them produced similar experiences are excited in a partial and inchoate way. When the sounds are merely heard their quality is partly constituted by a partial and modified reproduction of these sensations. The reproduced element is not usually distinguished without an express act of analytic attention. But it is none the less present as a peculiar modality of the auditory experience. Perhaps this will be most clearly brought out by considering the imitative words by which the nature of such sounds is commonly expressed. The word "clap" resembles the sound of clapping, the word "hiss" the sound of hissing, and the word "tear" the sound of tearing. But on examination it soon appears that the resemblance by no means lies wholly in the sounds considered merely as earsensations. It depends also on the movements of articulation. In saying "clap," the lips are clapped together; in saying "hiss," the breath is driven through a narrowed aperture; in saying "tear," the tongue is pulled away from the palate. In these and similar instances we do not ordinarily distinguish between the motor and the purely auditory imitation. So in the original experiences which are imitated the two factors are combined without distinction, constituting a complex sensory quality which escapes analysis until the reflective scrutiny of the psychologist is brought to bear upon it. In this complex quality the sound as such is the dominant constituent, and the associated motor element appears as a modification of the sound.
For further illustration we may refer (1) to the qualification of sight by touch and resistance, and (2) to the qualification of touch and resistance by sight.
"The sight of a suit of polished armour," says Dr. Ward, "instantly reinstates and steadily maintains all that we retain of former sensations of its hardness and smoothness and coldness*1." The armour looks hard, smooth, and cold. But this peculiar appearance to the eye does not necessarily involve any distinct representation or idea or separate sensation of hardness, smoothness, or coldness. The corresponding tactile and other experiences are not reproduced as separate and distinct modes of consciousness. They are not discriminated from the visual experience itself. The reproduction manifests itself rather as a modification of the visual experience—an addition to its unanalysed complexity. Similarly, ice looks cold because we have felt it to be cold. If it had been always warm to the touch, it would have looked warm. Yet its cold look is not a suggested idea; nor is it a distinct temperature-sensation. It is something which is presented as if included in the visual appearance as an integral part of it. Any attempt to separate it destroys both its own specific character and that of the visual experience.
*Article "Psychology," EncyclopaediaBritannica, 9th edition, part xx., p 57.