108. An estate on limitation is one which is created to continue until the happening of a contingency upon which it comes to an end without an entry.
The phrase, "words of limitation," has already been used to designate the clause in a conveyance which determines the quantity of an estate. For instance, the use of the words "heirs of his body," in creating a fee tail. The meaning of the word "limitation" in estates on limitation is practically the same; that is, it defines the time at which an estate comes to an end.39 An estate on limitation is therefore one which is determined, rather than defeated, by the happening of a contingency, "as when land is granted to a man so long as he is parson of Dale, or while he continues unmarried, or until out of the rents and profits he shall have made £500, and the like." 40 The words used to create an estate on limitation all refer to time; for example, "until," "while," "during," "as long as," etc.41 But neither the use of these words, nor their absence, is con-elusive.42
An estate on limitation differs from one on condition chiefly in that no entry is necessary to terminate the former; for it comes to
28 See ante, p. 147.
39 These are by some writers called "estates on conditional limitation." That term is also used to designate estates which vest on the happening of a contingency. As we shall see later, such estates can take effect only as springing uses, post, p. 299, or executory devises, post, p. 300. Still other writers use "conditional limitation" as meaning the event which terminates an estate, rather than the estate which is terminated, or the one coming into existence on the happening of the event. See Leake, Prop. Land, 214.
40 2 Bl. Comm. 155.
41 Henderson v. Hunter, 59 Pa. St. 335; Bennett r. Robinson, 10 Watts (Pa.) 348; Vanatta v. Brewer, 32 N. J. Eq. 268.
42 Chapin v. Harris, 8 Allen (Mass.) 594; Owen v. Field, 102 Mass. 90; Wheeler v. Walker, 2 Conn. 196; Camp v. Cleary, 76 Va. 140; Stearns v. Godfrey, 16 Me. 158
Real Prop.-12 an end absolutely by the happening of the contingency, because it was not created for any longer time. Conditions cut short an existing estate. Limitations do not, but mark its natural end. A third person may take advantage of the happening of the event on which the estate is limited to end.43
100. A base or determinable fee is a fee simple, which may be terminated by the happening of a contingency.
A fee which is liable to be terminated by a limitation is called a base or determinable fee. This is the kind of an estate which passed when a tenant in tail attempted to convey a fee simple by a conveyance which barred the issue under the entail, but not the remainder-men. The grantee took a fee determinable on the extinction of the issue who were entitled under the entail.44 A base fee dependent on a collateral condition may also arise by express provision of the conveyance.45 The most usual cases at the present time are where land is granted for a specified use, to revert to the grantor when that use ceases.46 Mr. Gray, however, takes the position that a valid determinable fee cannot be created since the stat43 scheetz v. Fitzwater, 5 Pa. St 126; Henderson v. Hunter, 59 Pa. St 335; Ashley v. Warner, 11 Gray (Mass.) 43; Miller v. Levi, 44 N. Y. 489; Stearns v. Godfrey, 16 Me. 158. An example of the importance of this distinction arises in connection with conditions in restraint of marriage. Thus an estate to A. until she marries is valid as an estate on limitation. But an estate to A. provided she does not marry is void because it is an estate on condition, and the condition is in restraint of marriage. Bennett v. Robinson, 10 Watts (Pa.) 348; Mann v. Jackson, 84 Me. 400, 24 Atl. 886; Jones v. Jones, 1Q.B Div. 279.
44 For a discussion of these base fees, see Challis, Real Prop. 264.
45 Leonard v. Burr, 18 N. Y. 96.
46 As for school purposes, Board of Education of Village of Van Wert v. Inhabitants of Village of Van Wert 18 Ohio St 221; or for public streets, Gebhardt v. Reeves, 75 111. 301; Helm v. Webster, 85 111. 116. And see People v. White, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 26; Morris Canal & Banking Co. v. Brown, 27 N. J. Law, 13; Henderson v. Hunter, 59 Pa. St. 335; Boiling v. Mayor, etc., 8 Leigh (Va.) 224; Thayer v. Mcgee, 20 Mich. 195.
Ute of quia emptores.47 The point has not, it seems, been raised in any reported case, but the validity of such limitation has been assumed without question.48
47 since the grantor has only a possibility of reverter. Gray, Perp. 19. Contra, Graves, Real Prop. 135.
48 See cases cited in the preceding notes, and Slegel v. Lauer, 148 Pa, St 236, 23 Atl 996; Sheets v. Fitzwater, 5 Pa. St 126; Pennsylvania R. Co. v Parke, 42 Pa. St 31; Rowland v. Warren, 10 Or. 129,