Statutory power not exhausted by single notice.

(h) Gibson v. Hammersmith R. Co., (1863) 11 W. R. 299; 32 L. J. Ch. 337; and as to what is a "manufactory," see Barker v. N. S. R. Co., (1847) 2 De G. & S. 55; Dahin v. L. & N. W. R. Co., (1849) 3 De G. & S. 414.

(i) Brook v. Manchester, etc. R. Co., 1896, 2 Ch. 571; 64 L. J. Ch. 890.

(k) 1910, 2 Ch. 105.

(l) Furniss v. M. R. Co., (1868) 6 Eq. 473; and cf. Sparrow v. o. W. & W. R. Co., (1852) 2 3. M. & G. 94; 21 L. J. Ch. 731; Spackman v. G. W. R. Co., (1855) 1 Jur. N. S. 790; Richards v. Swansea, etc. Co., (1878) 9 Ch. D. 425; but see Reddin v. Met. Board of Works, (1862) 4 D. F. & J. 532; 31 L. J. Ch. 660; Regent's Canal etc. Co. v. L. C. C, 1912, 1 Ch. 583.

(m) Stamps v. B. & S. V. R. Co., (1848) 2 Ph. 673; 17 L. J. Ch. 431; and see Simpson v. Lanc. & C. R. Co., (1847) 15 Si. 580; Errington v. Met. Dist. R. Co., (1882) 19 Ch. D. 559, 570.

(n) Ashton Vale Co. v. Bristol Corp., 1901, 1 Oh. 591; 70 L. J. Ch. 230.

(o) Eversfield v. Mid-sussex R. Co., (1858) 3 D. & J. 286; 28 L. J. Ch. 107; Dodd v. Salisbury R. Co., (1859) 1 Giff. 158; Galloway v. London Corp., (1864) 4 N. R. 77; 35 L. J. Ch. 477; Stockton, etc. R. Co. v. Brown, (1860) 9 H. L. C. 246; Errington v. Met. Dist. R. Co., (1882) 19 Ch. D. 559, 571; 51 L. J. Ch. 305; and compare Simpson v. South Staffordshire Waterworks Co., (1864) 5 N. R. 70; Wood v. Epsom, etc. R. Co., (1860) 8 C. B. N. S. 731; 30 L. J. C. P. 82; Webb v. Manchester R. Co., (1839) 4 My. & C. 118; Flower v. L. B. & S. C. R. Co., (1865) 2 Dr. & S. 330; 34 L. J. Ch. 540; A.-g. v. G. E. R. Co., (1871) 6 Ch. 572; Lewis v. Weston-super-mare Local Board, (1888) 40 Ch. D. 55; 58 L. J. Ch. 39; Morris v. Tottenham, etc. R. Co., 1892, 2 Ch. 47; 61 L. J. Ch. 215; Donaldson v. South Shields Corp., (1899) 68 L. J. Ch. 162.

(p) Ystalyfera Iron Co. v. Neath, etc. R. Co., (1873) 17 Eq. 142: 43 L. J. Ch. 476.

(q) Loo v. London and Croydon Canal Co., (1839) 1 R. C. 257; 8 L. J. N. S. Ch. 200; R. v. Birmingham R. Co., (1850) 15 Q. B. 634, 647, n.; 20 L. J. Q. B. 304.

(r) See Regent's Canal Co. v. Ware, (1857) 23 Beav. 575; 26 L. J. Ch. 566; Leominster C. Co. v. Shrewsbury R. Co., (1857) 3 K. & J. 672; 26 L. J. Ch. 764.

The fact that the assessment of compensation has been commenced and possession of the land taken, in the absence of a mortgagee of the property, does not preclude the company from subsequently serving a notice on the mortgagee (s). The notice given by the company to the landowner cannot operate for an indefinite time; it must be acted on within a reasonable period, or it will be deemed to have been abandoned. Thus, where a railway company, within the time limited for the exercise of their compulsory powers, served notice on the landowner, but no agreement was entered into, and the time fixed by the Act for the completion of the line expired before any further steps were taken, the company was restrained from proceeding under the notice (t). Lord Cairns expressed the view that where the time limited for the completion of the works has expired, the company can no longer exercise their compulsory powers of purchasing (u); and in a later case Lord Cairns said: - "There have been cases in which a railway company has given notice to a landowner to treat for the purchase of land, and no further step has been taken either by the company or the landowner, and the extended period for completing the works has expired, and the question has been raised, Could the company in that state of things proceed with its notice to treat, and assess the compensation under the Lands Clauses Act? Were such a case now to arise, I should be disposed to think, as I was disposed to think in Richmond v. North London Rail. Co., that if nothing more was done, and the company have slept upon their rights, and certainly if the delay cannot be explained, they should be held to be disabled from going on with any compulsory purchase, and in such a case the landowner should, as I think, be held to be disabled also. Both parties have been content to let the time run out. There is no rei interventus, no change of the status quo ante, nothing which requires to be undone. The whole matter has been a project merely; and, as a project, it has come to an end" (x).

Notice must be acted on within reasonable time.

(s) Cooke v. L. C. C, 1911, 1 Ch. 604.

(t) Richmond v. N. L. R. Co., (1868) 3 Oh. 679; 37 L. J. Ch. 886; explained by Jessel, M. E., in Ystalyfera Iron Co. v. Neath, etc. R. Co., (1873) 17 Eq. 142; 43 L. J. Ch. 476; and consider Pinchin v. L. & Blackwall R. Co., (1854) 5 D. M. & G. 851; 24 L. J. Ch. 417.

(u) Richmond v. N. L. R. Co., (1868) 3 Ch. 681; 37 L. J. Ch. 886; and see Ch. XVI. as to the remedy by mandamus.

Where a statute which authorises the construction of a railway provides that if the railway be not completed within a certain period the powers by the Act given to the company for making and completing the railway are to cease, this provision only applies to powers which the company could not exercise except by virtue of the Act. If the company before the expiration of the time limited, has acquired the right to use the land, they can make the railway under their Common Law powers, notwithstanding the lapse of time (y).

(x) Tiverton, etc. R. Co. v. Loosemore, (1884) 9 A. C. at p. 489; 53 L. J. Ch. 812.

(y) G. W. R. Co. v. M. R. Co., 1908, 2 Ch. 455; ib. 644; 1909, A. C. 445.

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