So, also, the purchaser may in Equity, under the covenant for further assurance, though not running with the land (c), require the vendor to perfect a defective title, even by conveying any interest in the estate which he may have subsequently acquired for valuable consideration (d) : and the right seems to exist independently of such a covenant (e) : and may be enforced against the vendor's representatives, and parties claiming under him for valuable consideration with notice (/) : and the rule seems to be the same even when he has no estate in the land at the date of the conveyance. It was, however, decided (g), that such an equity could not be enforced against the heir: but there seems to be no good ground for such a distinction, and it was later judicially disapproved of by Lord St. Leonards (h). So, the assignees of a bankrupt tenant in tail, who has professedly aliened the fee simple, have been required to bar the entail (i). And the covenant will entitle a purchaser for value to he relieved from an incumbrance of which he has not notice (k) : thus, where the owner of an estate, after mortgaging it, sold a moiety with a covenant for further assurance, the purchaser was held entitled to have his estate indemnified against the mortgage debt out of the remaining moiety (/).

May require vendor to convey subsequently-acquired interests under covenant for further assurance.

(y) See Ex p. Wright, (1812) 19 Ves. at p. 257 ; Collett v. Morrison, (1851) 9 Ha. at p. 176. In some parts of the West of England, there is a pernicious practice of stipulating that the vendor or his solicitor shall prepare the purchaser's conveyance.

(z) Per V.-C. Wigrain, Humphries v. Home, (1814) 3 Ha. at pp. 277, 278.

(a) S. C.

(b) Johnson v. Noll, (1G84) 1 Veru. 271.

(c) See Spencer v. Boycs, (1798) 4

Ves. 370.

{d) Taylor v. Debar, (1675) 2 Ch. Ca. 212; Otter v. Lord Faux, (1856) 6 D. M. & G. 638 ; 26 L. J. Ch. 129.

(e) See Noel v. Bewley, (1829) 3 Si. 103, 116; Seabourne v. Towel, (1686) 2 Vern. 11.

(f) Jennings v. Moore, (1708) 2 Vera. 609.

(g) Morse v. Faulkner, (1792) 1 Anst. 11.

(A) See Jones v. Kearney, (1842) 1 D. & War. 134, 159.

Where a man conveyed his contingent remainder in fee by way of mortgage, and covenanted for further assurance, and the remainder was afterwards destroyed by his mother, the tenant for life, (who was also the reversioner in fee,) he was held liable in Equity to perfect the security out of an interest in the estate which he took under her will (m). So, where a man who was supposed to have a reversion in fee, but in fact had no estate in the land, executed what purported to be a conveyance of the same for valuable consideration, he was held liable, under his covenant for further assurance, to convey the estate on its subsequently coming to him as heir at law (n). The cases seem, as observed by Lord St. Leonards (o), "to establish this, that if a man sells an estate, and the title is afterwards defeated, but subsequently he acquires the same lands under another title, there is an equity arising out of the contract to fasten it upon the new title:" but, in applying this rule, the word estate must be strictly construed ; for evidently no such equity could exisl where the contract had been for the purchase of a professedly contingent interest at a price fixed with a view to the contingency. And in one case, where a tenant in tail in remainder, by an unenrolled deed, mortgaged the land for his life " and all other his estate and interest" therein, and entered into the usual covenant for further assurance, it was held that this did not bind him subsequently to execute a disentailing assurance. But the Court admitted that such right would have existed if the tenant in tail had professed to convey the fee (p). But a purchaser cannot claim the subsequently acquired interest of a person who is present at and assents to the purchase, but is no party to the conveyance (q) or contract.

(i) Pye v. Daubuz, (1792) 3 Br. C. C. 595 ; Ex p. Fripp, (1846) De G. 293 (in each case there was a covenant for further assurance) ; and see judgment in Davis v. Tollemache, inf. ; and see sup. p. 796.

(k) Re Jones, 1893, 2 Ch. 461, 470; 62 L. J. Ch. 996.

(/) S. C.

(m) Noel v. Bewley, (1829) 3 Si. 103.

(n) Smith v. Baker, (1842) 1 Y. &

C. C. C. 223

(o) See Jones v. Kearney, (1842) 1

D. & War. 134, 159.

It seems probable that the purchaser could come into Equity for further assurance, even in the case of a conveyance by a mere expectant heir professedly selling the estate in the lifetime of his ancestor (r).

Though the sale were of a mere expectancy, semble.

A purchaser cannot, it would seem, file a bill to enforce the production of evidences of title which at the time of completion he treated as unimportant (s).

But cannot require further evidence.

A conveyance by lease and release, containing no precise recital of the vendor's seisin, but only a recital that he is "legally or equitably entitled to the property," cannot operate by way of estoppel so as to pass the after-acquired legal estate (t) : nor can a recital that the vendor "is seised or otherwise well and sufficiently entitled for an estate of inheritance in fee simple in possession free from incumbrances " (u) : nor recitals which merely lead to the inference that the vendors were seised in fee, e.g., on a sale by the trustees of a will a recital of the testator's seisin his will and devise to the trustees with a power of sale (.r) : but a particular recital of title, "precise and unambiguous," as e.g., that the vendor is seised of the legal estate (y), or even that the vendor is seised (z), has the effect of an estoppel, unless it be contradicted by other parts of the same deed (a). A covenant that a mortgagor has power to convey the legal estate is not such a precise averment that he has the legal estate as to create an estoppel; and it appears that an estoppel cannot in any case be created by a covenant for title (b).

No estoppel by doubtful recital.

(p) Davis v. Tollemavhe, (1856) 2 Jur. N. S. 1181 ; see and consider judgment, and Sug. 14th ed. 468 ; ef. Bankes v. Small, (1887) 36 Ch. D. 716 ; 56 L. J. Ch. 832.

(g) Thompson v. Simpson, (1845) 2 J. & L. 110.

(r) 1 Fonb. on Eq. b. i. ch. 4, s. 2; Wethered v. W., (1828) 2 Si. 183; Harwood v. Tooke, (1812) ib. 192 ; but see Carleton v. Leighton, (1805) 3 Mer. 667 ; Jones v. Hoc, (1789) 3 T. R. 93. An equitable charge upon an expected legacy was supported in Bennett v. Cooper, (1846) 9 Beav. 252 ; 15 L. J. Ch. 315.

(s) See Hallett v. Middleton, (1826) 1 Rus. 243, 256.

(t) Bight v. Bueknell, (1831) 2 B. & Ad. 278 ; and see Sug. 14th ed. 739, n. ; and Lloyd v. L., (1843) 4 D. & War. 354.

(u) Heath v. Crealoek, (1874) 10 Ch. 22, 30 ; 43 L. J. Ch. 169 ; but see and dist. Re Horton, (1885) 51 L. T. 420, a case of a marriage settlement.

The Fines and Recoveries Act, 1833, s. 38, provides that where a voidable estate has, either before or after the passing of the Act, been created by a tenant in tail in favour of a purchaser for valuable consideration, any subsequent assurance under the Act, (other than a lease not requiring enrolment,) whatever may be its object or the extent of estate intended to be thereby created, confirms the previous voidable estate to the extent to which the tenant in tail alone, or the tenant in tail with the consent of the protector, (if there be one, and he consent to such subsequent assurance,) could confirm the same under the Act: but this is not to affect any purchaser for valuable consideration, to whom such subsequent assurance may be made, without express notice of the previous voidable estate (c). So, before the Act, a fine by a tenant in tail confirmed his previous voidable conveyance (d).

Voidable estate created by tenant in tail; confirmation of by subsequent assurance.

(x) Onward Bldg. Soc. v. Smithson, 1893, 1 Ch. 1 ; 62 L. J. Ch. 138.

(y) Heath v. Crealoek, sup.

(z) Bensley v. Burdon, (1826) 2 S. & S. 519 ; on app. 8 L. J. (0. S.) Ch. 85. This case is said to be overruled by Right v. Bucknell, (1831) see 4 D. & War. 369 ; and 10 Ch. D. 22, per Jessel, M. R. See Carpenter v. Buller, (1841) 8 M. & "W. 209; Doe v. Stone, (1846) 3 C. B. 176 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 234 ; Wiles v. Woodward, (1850) 5 Ex. 557 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 261 ; Sort on v. Westminster J. Commrs., (1852) 7 Ex. 780; 21 L. J. Ex. 297 ; Fawcus v. Porter, (1852) 3 C. & K. 309; and see Heath v. Crealoek, sup.

(a) Crofts v. Middleton, (1856) 8 D. M. & G. 192 ; 25 L. J. Ch. 513 ; or quaere the conveyance has been obtained by fraud, see Onward Bldg. Soc. v. Smithson, 1893, 1 Ch. 1 ; 62 L. J. Ch. 138.

(b) General Finance Co. v. Liberator Benefit Soc., (1878) 10 Cb. D. 15 ; Onward Bldg. Soc. v. Smithson, sup. at p. 13.

(c) See, as to bankruptcy of a tenant in tail who has created a voidable estate, s. 62 of Act; and see, as to confirmation of the voidable estates of purchasers under the bankruptcy of a tenant in tail, ss. 60, 61, and 65 of Act; Sturgis v. Morse, (1860) 2 D. F. & J. 223; 29 L. J. Ch. 766.

Equity, it appears, will, after conveyance, enforce a verbal agreement, entered into by a purchaser of leaseholds, before the sale, to indemnify the vendor against the rent and covenants (e).

Verbal agreement for indemnity enforced.