11. German v. Chapman, 7 Ch. Div. 271; Knight v. Simmonds (1896), 2 Ch. 295. See note in 17 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 138 criticizing Ocean City Ass'n v. Chalfant, 65 N. J. Eq. 156, 1 Ann. Cas. 601, 55 Atl 801.

12. See Richards v. Revitt, 7 Ch. Div. 224; Meredith v. Wilson, 69 Law Times 336. Seawright v. Blount, 139 Ga. 323, 77 S. E. 152; Newberry v. Barkalow, 75 N. J. Eq. 128, 71 Atl. 752. And see Ball v. Milliken, 31 R. I. 36, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 623. Ann. Cas. 1912B, 30, 76 Atl. 789.

13. Right v. Winters, 68 N. J. Eq. 252, 59 Atl. 770; Brigham v. Mulock Co.. 74 N. J. Eq. 287, 70 Atl. 185. And see Stewart v.

While the original promisee may release the restricted land from the burden of the restriction, so long as he is the only one interested in the observance thereof, he cannot so do to the detriment of one claiming under him, who shares with him the right to assert the restriction.16

If, by reason of the course of action pursued by the complainant, or of his predecessor in title, the character of the neighborhood has been so altered as to render impossible the attainment of the purpose which originally dictated the making of the restrictive agreement, equity will not enforce the agreement.17

Finkelstone. 206 Mass. 28, 28 L. R. A. (X. S.) 634, 138 Am. St. Rep. 370, 92 N. E. 37.

14. Curtis v. Rubin, 244 111. 88, 91 N. E, 84; Kneip v. Schroe-der, 255 111. 621, 99 N. E. 617; Compton Hill Improvement Co. v. Tower, 158 Mo. 282, 59 S. W. 239; Loud v. Pendergast, 206 Mass. 122, 92 N. E. 40; Olcott v. Sheppard K. & Co., 96 N. Y. App. Div. 281, 89 N. Y. Supp. 201. Sut-cliffe v. Eisele, 62 N. J. Eq. 222, 50 Atl. Rep. 69; Smith v. Spencer, 81 N. J. Eq. 389, 87 Atl. 158.

15. Western v. Macdermott, L. R. 2 Ch. 72; Meredith v. Wilson, 69 Law Times 336; Hooper v. Bromet, 89 Law Times 37; Bacon v. Sandberg, 179 Mass. 396, 60 X. E. 936; Stewart v. Finkelstone, 206 Mass. 28, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 634, 138 Am. St. Rep. 370, 92 N. E. 37; Morrow v. Hasselman, 69 N. J. Eq. 612, 61 Atl. 369. Hyman v. Tash (N. J. Eq.), 71 Atl. 742; Mcguire v. Caskey, 62 Ohio St. 419, 57 N. E. 53; Adams v. Howell, 58 Misc. 435, 108 X. Y. Supp. 945; Tripp v. O'brien, 57 111. App. 407.

16. Mackenzie v. Childers, 43 Ch. D. 265; Johnson v. Robertson, 156 Iowa, 64. 135 N. W. 585; Spahr v. Cape, 143 Mo. App. 114. 122 S. W. 379; Coudert v. Sayre, 46 N. J. Eq. 386. Bowen v. Smith, 76 N. J. Eq. 456, 74 Atl. 675; Duester v. Alvin, 74 Ore. 544, 145 Pac. 660. And see Landell v. Hamilton, 177 Pa. 23, 35 Atl. 242.

17. Bedford v. British Museum, 2 Myl. & K. 552; Star Brewery v. Primas, 163 111. 652, 45 N. E. 145; Ewertsen v. Gerstenberg, 186 111. 344, 51 L. R. A. 310, 57 X. E. 1051; Page v. Murray, 46 X. J. Eq. 325, 19 Atl. 11. Compare Hen-nen v. Deveny, 71 W. Va. 629, L. R. A. 1917A, 524, 77 S. E L42.

Thus in a leading English case it was decided that one who had, for the protection of the outlook from his mansion house, required one to whom he sold neighboring property to enter into an agreement as to the mode of improving the property sold, could not, after having torn down his mansion house, obtain an injunction against a breach of the agreement.18 And it is apparently on this theory that a restrictive agreement has occasionally been regarded as un-enforcible after the promisee had sold neighboring property free from any such restriction, it being considered that by the making of such sales he in effect made the agreement useless for the purpose of preserving the character of the neighborhood.19 Such is apparently the extent to which, in England, a change in the character of the neighborhood, subsequent to the making of the agreement, is regarded as operating to prevent the enforcement of the agreement, that is, the change in the neighborhood has this effect if, and only if, it is a result of the course of action pursued by the complainant or his predecessor in interest.20 In this country, on the contrary, a change of condition has not infrequently been regarded as precluding the enforcement of the restrictive agreement even though the change was not the result of the course of action pursued by the complainant or his predecessor in title. In one case, frequently referred to,21 it was decided

18. Bedford v. British Museum, 2 Myl. & K. 552.

So it was held that, if the owne. of a lot had, by building a wall, rendered a restriction upon the height of buildings on the next lot partially valueless to his lot, he could not enforce the restriction so as to prevent the construction of buildings no higher than the wall. Landell v. Hamilton, 177 Pa. St. 23, 35 Atl. 242.

19. Duncan v. Central Pas senger Rwy. Co., 85 Ky. 525, 4 S. W. 228; Jenks v. Pawlowski, 98 Mich. 110, 22 L. R. A. 863, 39 Am. St. Rep. 522, 56 N. W. 1105.

20. Sayers v. Collyer, L. R. 28 Ch. D. 103; Osborne v. Bradley (1903), 2 Ch. 446. Craig v. Green (1899), 1 Ir. Ch. 258. But see dicta in Sobey v. Sainsbury (1913), 2 Ch. 513; German v. Chapman, 7 Ch. D. 279; Knight v. Simmonds (1896), 2 Ch. 297.

21. Columbia College v. Thachthat a change of conditions which could not have been foreseen at the time of the making of the agreement, the construction of an elevated railway in front of the restricted property, was a sufficient defense to the enforcement of a restriction, imposed for the purpose of fitting the property for high class residences; and in a number of cases even an alteration in the character of the neighborhood which could have been foreseen, such as the encroachment of business upon a residence neighborhood, has been regarded as justifying the refusal of equitable relief,22 especially when the enforcement of the restriction would materially injure the defendant without benefitting the complainant.23 Such a change in the character of the neighborhood has however been decided not to be a defense to the suit to enforce the restriction, if the restriction continued to be of value to the property sought to be benefitted.24 It would seem probable that the courts, in regarding an alteration in the neighborhood, which might have been foreseen, as ground for refusing er, 87 N. Y. 311, 41 Am. Rep. 365.

22. Los Angeles Terminal Land Co. v. Muir, 136 Cal. 36, 68 Pac. 308; Kneip v. Schroeder, 255 111., 621, 29 Ann. Cas. 426, 99 N. E. C17; Mcarthur v. Hood Rubber Co., 221 Mass. 372, 109 N. E. 162; Amerman v. Deane, 132 N. Y. 355, 28 Am. St. Rep. 584, 30 N. E. 741; Mcclure v. Leaycraft, 183 N. Y. 36, 75 N. E. 961, 5 Ann. Cas. 45. Misch v. Lehman, 178 Mich. 225, 144 N. W. 556. But not the mere anticipation of such a change. Evans v. Foss, 194 Mass. 513, 80 N. E. 587, 9 L. R. A. N. S. 1039, 11 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 171; Spahr v. Cape, 143 Mo. App. 114, 122 S. W. 379.

23. Star Brewery Co. v. Pri mas, 163 111. 652, 45 N. E. 145;

Equitable relief, have been moved by the consideration that otherwise such restrictions might operate to hamper municipal development.25

Jackson v. Stevenson, 156 Mass.. 496, 31 N. E. 691, 32 Am. St. Rep. ' 476; Rowland v. Miller, 139 N. Y. 93, 22 L. R. A. 182, 34 N. E. 765; Mcclure v. Leaycraft, 183 N. Y. 36, 5 Ann. Cas. 45, 75 N. E. 961; Batchelor v. Hinkle, 210 N. Y. 243, 104 N.e. 629; Page v.murray, 46 N. J. Eq. 325, 19 Atl. 11.

24. Codman v. Bradley, 201 Mass. 361, 87 N. E. 591; Zipp v. Barker, 40 App. Div. 1, 57 N. Y. Supp. 569, 166 N. Y. 621, as explained in Batchelor v. Hinkle, 210 N. Y. 243, 104 X. E. 629; Brown v. Huber, 80 Ohio St. 183, 88 N E. 322; Landell v. Hamilton. 175 Pa. 327, 34 L. R. A. 227, 34 Atl. 663. See Witherspoon v. Hurst, 88 S. C. 561, 71 S. E. 232.

25. See 14 Columbia Law Rev. at p. 438, and the full discussion of the various New York decisions in 6 Bench & Bar 56, 96, by Adolph Sieker, Esq. In a note in 31 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 877, it is suggested that the view referred to may be supported on the theory of a presumed intention to that effect in the creation of the restriction.