This section is from the book "The Law Of Real Property and Other Interests In Land", by Herbert Thorn Dike Tiffany. Also available from Amazon: A Treatise on the Modern Law of Real Property and Other Interests in Land .
Metallic Paint Co. v. Prince Mfg. Co., 133 Pa. St. 474, 19 Atl. 411, Collins v. Crownover (Tenn. Ch. App.), 57 S. W. 357.
56b. Co. Litt. 341b; Miller v. Manwaring, Cro. Car. 397; Jones v. Verney, Willes, 169; Ludford v. Barber, 1 Term R. 95; Doe d. Simpson v. Butcher, 1 Doug. 50.
A contrary assumption appears to be made in Lake Erie Gas. Coal & Coke Co. v. Patterson, 184 Pa. St. 364, 39 Atl. 68. In Mat-lack v. Kline (Mo. App.), 190 S. W. 408, it is in effect said that the remainderman can make the lease his own lease by assenting to its execution, or ratifying it before the life tenant's death.
56c. Post Sec. 60.
56d. Doe d. Tucker v. Morse 1 Barn & Adol. 365; Doe d. Pennington v. Taniere, 12 Q. B. 998; Doe d. Martin v. Watts, 7 Term R. 83.
57. Boseman v. Bishop, 94 Ga. 459, 20 S. E. 11; Thompson v. Murphy, 10 Ind. App. 464; Mc-Cormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Gates, 75 Iowa 343, 39 N. W. 657; Anderson v. Briscoe, 12 Bush (Ky.) 344; McClure v. Melendy. 44 N. H. 469.
[ Sec. 33 apply in connection with other estates, as well as those for life, discussion of waste will be reserved for another part of this work.58
- Emblements. On the termination of a life estate by the death of the tenant, or by any other event, the time of the occurrence of which could not have been foreseen, the tenant or his representative is entitled to reap crops, previously sown by him, of such products as are the result of annual planting and labor. This right of "emblements" exists whenever the estate for life is terminated by the act of God or the act of the law, and not when it is terminated by the voluntary act of the tenant himself.59
- Repairs and improvements. A tenant for life must, according to some decisions, make, at his own expense, such ordinary repairs as are necessary to prevent the structures on the land from passing into a state of dilapidation; neglect to make such repairs being regarded as "permissive waste."60 He is under no obligation to make improvements, and if he does so he cannot, apart from statute at least, demand that the owner of the inheritance pay any part of the cost thereof.61 But he may, it seems, complete improvements be58. Post Sec.Sec. 279-292.
59. Co. Litt. 55b; 2 Blackst. Comm. 122; 4 Kent, Comm. 73. See, for a further consideration of the law of emblements, post Sec. 263.
60. Hooker v. Goodwin, 91 Conn. 463, Ann. Cas. 1918D 1159, 99 Atl. 1059; Stansbury v. Ingle-hart, 9 Mackey (20 D. C.) 134, 19 Wash. Law Rep. 594, Appeal dismissed 151 U. S. 68, 38 L. Ed. 76; Kline v. Dowling, 176 Ind. 521, 96 N. E. 579; Shelangowski v Schrack, 162 Iowa 176, 143 N. W. 1081; Prescott v. Grimes, 143 Ky. 161, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 669, 136 S. W. 206; Smith v. Blind-bury, 66 Mich. 319, 33 N. W. 391;
St. Paul Trust Co. v. Mintzer, 65 Minn. 124, 32 L. R. A. 756, 60 Am. St. Rep. 444, 67 N. W. 657; Wilson v. Edmonds, 24 N. H. 517, 545; Kearney v. Kearney, 17 N. J. Eq. 59, aff'd 17 N. J. Eq. 504; In re Steele, 19 N. J. Eq. 120; Perrine's Ex'rs v. Newell, 62 N. J. Eq. 14, 49 Atl. 724; Thurston v. Thurston, 6 R. I. 296; Ballen-tine v. Spear, 2 Baxt. (Tenn.) 269; Brough v. Higgins, 2 Grat. (Va.) 408; Stahl v. Schwartz, 81 Wash. 273, 142 Pac. 651 (dictum); Ni-land v. Niland, 154 Wis. 514, Ann. Cas. 1915B 1127, 143 N. W. 170.
61. Taylor v. Kemp, 86 Ga. 181, 12 S. E. 296; Hagan v. Varney, 147 111. 281, 35 N. E. 219; Kline gun by the donor of the estate, and demand contribution therefor.62 And, in some states he has been regarded as entitled to compensation under the betterment or occupying claimants' act, if he makes the improvements in the belief that he has title in fee simple; the fact that he has a life estate not affecting his rights to compensation under the statute,63 though in others a different construction has been placed on such act, by reason of the fact that the holding of a life tenant is not adverse to the remainderman.64
- Incumbrances and taxes. The life tenant is usually bound to pay the interest on incumbrances on the property, but is under no obligation to pay any part v. Dowling, 176 Ind. 521, 96 N. E. 579; Shelangowski v. Schrack, 162 Iowa 176, 143 N. W. 1081; Stovall v. Mayhew, 173 Ky. 212, 190 S. W. 675; Weber v. Lauman, 91 Md. 90, 45 Atl. 870; Sohier v. Eldridge, 103 Mass. 345; Stroh v. O'Hearn, 176 Mich. 164, 142 N. W. 865; Stewart v. Matheny, 66 Miss. 21, 14 Am. St. Rep. 538, 5 So. 387; Missouri Central Building & Loan Ass'n v. Eveler, 237 Mo. 679, Ann. Cas. 1913A 486, 141 S. W. 877; Moore v. Simonson, 27 Ore. 117, 39 Pac. 1105; Datesman's Appeal, 127 Pa. St. 348, 17 Atl. 1086, 1100; Trimmier v. Darden, 61 S. C. 220, 39 S. E. 373; Stahl v. Schwartz, 81 Wash. 293, 142 Pac. 651.
But one who was sole tenant for life, being also a cotenant with others as regards the estate in remainder, has been allowed com pensation for improvements in a proceeding for partition. Kill-mer v. Wuchner, 79 Iowa 722, 8 L. R. A. 289, 18 Am. St. Rep. 392, 45, N. W. 299; Broyles v. Wad-del, 11 Heisk. (Tenn.) 32.
And when the life tenant was an infant, and the income was by order of court invested in improvements, the cost thereof was apportioned between the life tenant and the remainderman. Gray's Adm'x v. McConnell, 144 Ky. 603. 139 S. W. 838.
62. Sohier v. Eldredge, 103 Mass. 345; Corbett v. Laurens, 5 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 301, 316; Broyles v. Waddel, 11 Heisk. (Tenn.) 32; Weber v. Lauman, 91 Md. 90, 45 Atl. 870.
63. Fee v. Cowdry, 45 Ark. 410, 55 Am. Rep. 560; Plimpton v. Plimpton, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 458.
Compare Elam v. Parkhill, 60 Tex. 581.
64. Smalley v. Isaacson, 40 Minn. 450, 42 N. W. 352; Merritt v. Scott, 81 N. C. 385; Deanes v. Whitfield, 107 Miss. 273, 65 So. 246; Falck v. Marsh, 88 Wis. 680, 61 N. W. 287.
But even these courts concede that a tenant pur autre vie wrong fully holding over, who makes improvements, might be entitled under the act. See cases supra and Barrett v. Stradl, 73 Wis. 385. 9 Am. St. Rep. 795, 41 N. W. 439. of the principal, and if he does so he may claim contribution from the owner of the remainder or reversion.65 The life tenant is ordinarily under an obligation to pay the taxes as they accrue from year to year,66 to the extent, at least of the income which he receives from the property.67 Being thus under an obligation to pay taxes, he cannot acquire a tax title based on his failure to pay them, and assert it as against the re-remainderman.68