Acquiescence. It has been quite frequently said that the grantor must repudiate or disaffirm his conveyance within a reasonable time after his arrival at majority, and that his failure so to do involves a ratification of the conveyance,41 a view which is based on the possible hardship upon the grantee involved in the by her failure, during the continuance of her coverture, to avoid a conveyance made by her during infancy, be regarded as affirming it.45

S. 688, 42 L. Ed. 326 an infant having, by his trust deed, procured money which he applied to improving the property and paying off incumbrances, it was held that, on disaffirmance of the deed, the lender could follow the money into the property, in so far as this did not place the grantor in a worse position than when he made the deed.

38. Davidson v. Young, 38 111. 145; Ward v. Ward, 143 Ky. 91, 136 S. W. 137; Keegan v. Cox, 116 Mass. 289; Allen v. Poole, 54 Miss. 323; Lacy v. Pixler, 120 Mo. 383, 25 S. W. 206; Emmons v. Murray, 16 N. H. 385; Cox v. Gowan, 116 N. C. 131, 21 S. E. 108; Tolar v. Marion County Lumber Co., 93 S. C. 274, 75 S. E. 545.

39. See 18 Am. St. Rep. 700, note to Craig v. Van Bebber.

40. Black v. Hills, 36 111. 376, 87 Am. Dec. 224.

41. Hastings v. Dollarhide, 24 Cal. 196; Kline v. Beebe, 6 Conn. 494; Bentley v. Greer, 100 Ga. 35, 27 S. E. 974; Keil v. Heal-ey, 84 111. 104, 25 Am. Rep. 434; Sims v. Bardoner, 86 Ind. 87, 44 Am. Rep. 263; Goodnow v. Empire Lumber Co., 31 Minn. 468, 47 Am. Rep. 798, 18 N. W. 283; Ward v. Laverty, 19 Neb. 429, 27 N. W. 393; Weeks v. Wilkins, 134 N. C. 516, 47 S. E. 24; Dolph v. Hand, 156 Pa. St. 91, 36 Am. St. Rep. 25, 27 Atl. 114; Scott v. Buchanan, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 468; Ferguson v. Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. Co., 73 Tex. 344, 11 S. W. 347; Bigelow v. Kinney, 3

3 R. P. - 5 continued possibility of disaffirmance, and perhaps, to some extent, upon the desirability, as a matter of public policy, of removing, so far as possible, any uncertainty as to titles. A contrary view has, however, been asserted by a number of courts, to the effect that the grantor's mere failure to act does not, in the absence of other circumstances, affect his right to repudiate the conveyance, and that there is no restriction in this regard as to the time within which he must repudiate it, other than that imposed by the statute of limitations.42 In a few states there is a statutory provision requiring the repudiation to take place within a reasonable time.43 Apart from any question of intentional ratification, or of repudiation within a reasonable time, it has been recognized that if the grantor, after arriving at majority, stands by without asserting any claim, though knowing that his grantee or another is expending money on the supposition that the conveyance is valid, he may be estopped thereafter to deny its validity.44

If one is under the disability of coverture at the time of her arrival at the age of majority, she cannot,

Vt. 353, 21 Am. Dec. 589; Tor-maehlen v. Kaeppel, 86 Wis. 378, 56 N. W. 1089.

42. Sims v. Everhardt, 102 U. S. 300, 26 L. Ed. 87; Eureka Co. v. Edwards, 71 Ala. 248, 46 Am. Rep. 314; Putnal v. Walker, 61 Fla. 720, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 33, 55 So. 844; Syck v. Hellier, 140 Ky. 388, 131 S. W. 30; Davis v. Dudley, 70 Me. 236, 35 Am. Rep. 318; Donovan v. Ward, 100 Mich. 601, 59 N. W. 254; Shipp v. McKee, 80 Miss. 741, 92 Am. St. Rep. 616, 31 So. 197; Peterson v. Laik, 24 Mo. 541, 69 Am. Dec. 441; Lacy v. Pixler, 120 Mo. 383, 25 S. W. 206; Emmons v. Murray, 16 N. H. 385; McMurray v. McMurray, 66 N. Y. 175; Cresinger v. Welch, 15 Ohio, 156, 45 Am. Dec. 565. See notes 18 Am. St. Rep. 675, 15 Harv. Law Rev. 749, 9 Columbia Law Rev. 362.

43. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, Sec. 6602 (C).

44. Sims v. Bardoner, 86 Ind. 87, 44 Am. Rep. 263; Logan v. Gardner, 136 Pa. St. 588. 20 Am. St. Rep. 939, 20 Atl. 625; Davis v. Dudley, 70 Me. 236, 35 Am. Rep. 318; Lacy v. Pixler, 120 Mo. 383, 25 S. W. 206; Dolph v. Hand, 156 Pa. St. 91, 36 Am. St. Rep. 25, 27 Atl. 114; Wheaton v. East, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 41, 26 Am. Dec. 251. See Terrell v. Weymouth, 32 Fla. 255, 37; Am. St. Rep. 94, 13 So. 429; Burkhard v. Crouch, 169 N. Y. 399, 62 N. E. 431.

Statute of limitations. The right to disaffirm a conveyance made by an infant may be barred by the statute of limitations.45 Occasionally the courts have referred to the statute limiting the time for the recovery of land as controlling in this regard,46 but the character of the proceeding by which the right of disaffirmance is asserted would presumably, in some jurisdictions, be regarded as the controlling consideration.47

Since the grantor cannot disaffirm his conveyance until his arrival at majority,48 it would seem that his right of action to assert his rights cannot be regarded as accruing until then, and that consequently the case is not one of the accrual of a cause of action during infancy, within the provision of the statute giving an infant in favor of whom a right of action has accrued a limited period after his arrival at majority in which to sue.49 In accord with this view are occasional statements that the statute begins to run against the grantor only upon his arrival at majority.50 There are, however, decisions in which the grantor's right of action to assert his rights is regarded as limited by the statute defining the period within which one can sue after attaining his majority on a cause of action which accrued during his minority.51 And occasionally it has been decided that such statute should be referred to, as covering an analogous case, for the purpose of ascertaining the "reasonable time"52 within which the conveyance must be disaffirmed.53

45. Sims v. Everhardt, 102 U. S. 300, 26 L. Ed. 87; Stull v. Harris, 51 Ark. 294; Wilson v. Branch, 77 Va. 65, 46 Am. Rep. 709; Sims v. Bardoner, 86 Ind. 87, 44 Am. Rep. 263; Linville v. Greer, 165 Mo. 380, 65 S. W. 579; Epps v. Flowers, 101 N. C. 158, 7 S. E. 680; Gaskins v. Allen, 137 N. C. 426, 49 S. E. 919.