529; Moore v. Moore, 38 N. H. 382; Parker v. Bowles, 57 N. H. 491; Otis v. Sill, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 102; Dodson v. Dodson, 26 Ore. 349, 37 Pac. 542; Burgwyn v. Jones, 113 Va. 511, 75 S. E. 188; Bird v. Morrison, 12 Wis. 138; Richtman v. Watson, 150 Wis. 385, 136 N. W. 797.

85. Lindley, Partnership (7th Ed.) 381; Darby v. Darby, 3 Drew 495.

86. Scott & Callaway v. Dixie Ins. Co., 70 W. Va. 533, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 152, 74 S. E. 659; Miller v. Ferguson, 107 Va. 249, 122 Am. St. Rep. 840, 13 Ann. Cas. 138, 57 S. E. 649. Such seems to be the rule in Connecticut. See Sigourney v. Munn, 7 Conn. 11, 324; Dickinson v. Dickinson, 29 Conn. 600; and see Western Securities Co. v. Atlee, 168 Iowa 650, 151 N. W. 56; as to Virginia, however, see Mann v. Paddock, 108 Va. 827, 62 S. E. 951.

87. Lenow v. Fones, 48 Ark. 557, 4 S. W. 56; Mallory v. Russell, 71 Iowa, 63. 60 Am. Rep. 776, 32 N. W. 102; Lowe v. Lowe, 13 Bush (Ky.) 688; Maddock v. Astbury, 32 N. J. Eq. 181; Darrow v. Calkins, 154 N. Y. 503, 48 L. R. A. 299, 61 Am St. Rep. 637, 49 N. E. 61; Buckley v. Doig, 188 N. Y. 238, 80 N. E. 913; Ludlow v. Cooper, 4 Ohio St. 1.

88. Rovelsky v. Brown, 92 Ala. 522, 25 Am. St. Rep. 83, 9 So. 182; Coolidge v. Burke, 69 Ark. 237, 62 S. W. 583; Dupuy v. Leavenworth, 17 Cal. 262; Breen v. Richardson, 6 Colo. 605; Loubat v. Nourse, 5 Fla. 350; Hartnett

Real Property.

[ Sec. 196

The courts usually speak of partnership land as being converted, or partially converted, into personalty, and we have, in what has been said above in regard to the matter, followed this usage. Such language is however, misleading. Land belonging to a partnership is land, and not personalty, as clearly appears from the consideration that it cannot be transferred by an instrument adapted for the transfer of personalty only, even though the transfer is for the purpose of paying partnership debts,89 and it is, as land, subject to a lien for such a debt.90 It is the share of a partner, and not the land, which is personalty, and such a share is personalty for the reason that what a partner has as regards the firm property is merely a right of action for his share of such surplus assets as remain after an adjustment of the partnership affairs, a mere chose v. Stillwell, 121 Ga. 386, 104 Am. St. Rep. 151; Trowbridge v. Cross, 117 111. 109, 7 N. E. 347; Dickey v. Shirk, 128 Ind. 278, 27 N. E. 733; Carter v. Flexner, 92 Ky. 400, 17 S. W. 851; Shearer v. Shearer, 98 Mass. 107; Com-stock v. McDonald, 126 Mich. 142, 85 N. W. 579; Woodward Holmes Co. v. Nudd, 58 Minn. 236, 27 L. R. A. 340, 49 Am. St. Rep. 503; Scruggs v. Blair, 44 Miss. 406; Young v. Thrasher, 115 Mo. 222, 21 S. W. 1104; Uhler v. Semple, 20 N. J. Eq. 288; Buchan v. Sumner, 2 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 199; Greenwood v. Marvin, 111 N. Y. 423, 19 N. E. 228; Buckley v. Doig. 188 N. Y. 238, 11 Ann. Cas. 263, 80 N. E. 913; Foster's Appeal, 74 Pa. St. 391; Account of Welles, 191 Pa. 239, 43 Atl. 207; Allen v. Withrow, 110 U. S. 119, 28 L. Ed. 90; Sprague Mfg. Co. v. Hoyt, 29 Fed. 421.

The Uniform Partnership Act, Sec. 25 (2) (3) provides: A partner's right in specific partnership property is not subject to dower, curtesy, or allowances to widows, heirs, or next kin. One of those who took part in the framing of the act says in effect that this involves a treatment of "firm realty as personalty for all purposes." Burdick, Partnership (3rd Ed.) 112. If this is what is meant, it is perhaps to be regretted that it was not so stated in the act.

89. Butts v. Cooper, 152 Ala. 375, 44 So. 616; Black v. Black, 15 Ga. 445; Duncan v. Duncan, 93 Ky. 37, 40 Am. St. Rep. 159; Fooks v. Williams, 120 Md. 436, 87 Atl. 692; Davis v. Christian, 15 Gratt. 11.

90. In re Codding 9 Fed. 849; Lauffer v. Cavett, 87 Pa. 479; Pitts v. Spotts, 86 Va. 71, 9 S. E. 501.

The theory of conversion has been applied, or its application suggested, as a ground for holding that the partnership land may be transferred without the joinder of the wives of the partners for the purpose of releasing dower,92 that a partner's interest in the firm assets, including land owned by the firm, may be transferred as personalty,93 and that a judgment against a partner is not a lien on the partnership land.94 The

91. See Burdick, Partnership (3rd Ed.) pp. 107, 146, 270; Parsons, Partnership (4th Ed.) p. 360, Beale's notes; Lindley, Partnership, (7th Ed.) 377; 1 Bates Partnership, Sec. 180; Editorial notes 13 Columbia Law Rev. p. 13; 28 Harv. Law Rev. 553, 30 Id. 90; Farley v. Moog, 79 Ala. 148; Van Broklen v. Smeallie, 140 N. Y. 701, 35 N. E. 415; Henry v. Anderson, 77 Ind. 361.

This is probably the meaning of the statement in the Uniform Partnership Act, Sec. 26, that "a partner's interest in the partnership is his share of the profits and surplus, and the same is personal property."

92. Woodward Holmes Co. v. Nudd, 58 Minn. 236; 59 N. W. 1010; Willet v. Brown, 65 Mo. 138, 27 Am. Rep. 265; Welch v. Mc Kenzie. 66 Ark. 251, 50 S. W. 505; Huston v. Neil, 41 Ind. 504; Dickey v. Shirk, 128 Ind. 278, 27 N. E. 233; Mallory v. Russell, 71 Iowa 63, 60 Am. Rep. 776; Dawson v. Parsons, 10 N. Y. Misc. 428, 31 N. Y. Supp. 78..

93. Greenwood v. Marvin, 111 N. Y. 423, 19 N. E. 228; see McKee v. Covalt, 71 Kan. 772, 81 Pac. 475.

94. Merly v. Wood, 71 Pa. St. 488, 10 Am. Rep. 719; Contra Hewitt v. Rankin, 41 Iowa, 35.

Real Property.

[Sec. 196 theory that the conversion is but partial has been applied for the purpose of determining that, as regards any land not needed for firm purposes, a partner's share therein passes to his heirs and devisees and not his personal representatives,95 and that his widow is entitled to dower therein.96 Although, in this country, the actual conversion is, under certain circumstances, but partial, it may perhaps be questioned whether, as above indicated the notional conversion should not be regarded as total rather than partial, subject, however. to "reconversion,"97-99 by force of law, if the land is not needed for firm purposes, such reconversion relating back to the time of the death of a partner, for the purpose of determining the persons entitled to take his share.