In accordance with the rule that a limitation will, if possible, be construed as creating a vested rather than a contingent remainder, a limitation in favor of a named class will be construed as intending the members of the class to be ascertained at the time the instrument takes effect rather than at a future time. So in the case of a limitation in favor of the testator's heirs, the word "heirs" will prima facie be regarded as meaning those who are the heirs at the time of testator's death rather than

223; Inches v. Hill, 106 Mass. 575; Bredell v. Collier, 40 Mo. 287; Roome v. Phillips, 24 N. Y. 463; Linton v. Laycock, 33 Ohio St. 128; Storrs v. Burgess, 29 R. I. 269, 67 Atl. 731.

98. 1 Jarman, Wills, 762; Bo-raston's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 16; Carter v. Carter, 234 111. 507, 85 N. E. 292; Meyer v. Eisler, 29 Md. 28; Hooker v. Bryan, 140 N. Car. 402, 53 S. E. 130.

99. 1 Jarman, Wills, 759; Lux-ford v. Cheeke, 3 Lev. 125; Gordon v. Adolphus, 3 Brown, Pari. Cas. 306; Farmers' Bank v. Hooff, 4 Cranch C. C. 323, Fed. Cas. No. 4, 659; Gibson v. Land, 27 Ala. 117; Klingman v. Gilbert, 90 Kan. 545; 135 Pac. 682; Maddox v. Yoe, 121 Md. 288, 88 Atl. 225; Ferson v. Dodge, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 287; See Green v. Hewitt, 97 111. 113.

This rule of construction does not, however, it seems, apply if there is an estate for life given to the widow without any special limitation with reference to marR. P.-32

Real Property.

[Sec. 139 those who are the heirs at the time at which the heirs will acquire possession.1

Where a remainder is limited in favor of a class of persons, and the members of the class are not necessarily ascertainable at one time, as in the case of a remainder in favor of children, grandchildren, issue, or brothers and sisters, it is ordinarily regarded as vesting, in the first place in any person or persons within the class at the time the instrument takes effect, the benefit of the remainder being extended to other persons who subsequently become members of the class before the termination of the particular estate, with the result that the shares of the previous members of the class are proportionally diminished.2-3 Thus in the case of a devise to A for life, and after his death to his children, or to the children of B, all such living at testator's death take a vested remainder, and, likewise those afterwards born before the termination of A's riage, subject to a devise over in case of her marriage. 1 Jarman, Wills, 760; Sheffield v. Orrery, 3 Atk. 283; Prey v. Thompson's Adm'r, 66 Ala. 28.

1. 2 Jarman, Wills, 931; Doe v. Spratt, 5 B. & Ad. 731; Bunting v. Speck, 41 Kan. 424, 3 L. R. A. 90; 21 Pac. 288; Merrill v. Woos-ter, 99 Me. 460, 59 Atl. 593; Wel-ler v. Kolb, 128 Md. 221, 97 Atl. 542; Welch v. Howard, 227 Mass. 242, 116 N. E. 492; McDaniel v. Allen, 64 Miss. 417, 1 So. 356; Smith v. Allen, 161 N. Y. 478, 55 N. E. 1056; Jenkins v. Lambeth, 172 N. C. 486, 90 S. E. 513; In re Fuller's Estate, 255 Pa. 626, 74 Atl. 623; Kenyon's Petitioner, 17 R. I. 149, 20 Atl. 294; McFadden v. McFadden, 107 S. C. 101. 91 S. E. 986; Stokes v. Van Wyck, 83 Va. 724, 3 S. E. 387.

2-3. 2 Jarman, Wills, 1011, 1012, 1015; Doe d. Willis v. Martin, 4 Term R. 39; Ayton v. Ayton, 1 Cox, 327; Doe d. Lessee of Poore v. Considine, 6 Wall (U. S.) 458, 18 L. Ed. 869; Cooper v. Mitchell Inv. Co. 133 Ga. 769, 66 S. E. 1090; Field v. Peeples, 180 111. 376, 54 N. E. 304; Archer v. Jacobs, 125 Iowa, 467, 101 N. W. 195; Downes v. Long, 79 Md. 382, 29 Atl. 827; Hills v. Simonds, 125 Mass. 536; Dexter v. Atty, Gen. 224 Mass. 215, 112 N. E. 946; Lariverre v. Rains, 112 Mich. 276, 70 N. W. 583; Wad-dell v. Waddell, 99 Mo. 338, 17 Am. St. Rep. 575; Corse v. Chapman, 153 N. Y. 466, 47 N. E. 812; Irvin v. Clark, 98 N. Car., 437, 4 S 3. 30; In re Edwards Estate, 225 Pa. 358, 99 Atl. 1010; Moore v. Diamond, 5 R. I. 129; Gourdin v. Deas, 27 S. Car. 479, 4 S. E. 64.

The rule referred to, that the remainder is vested so soon as one of the class is in existence and ascertained, no doubt originated, as is stated by a writer of authority,8 in the consideration that there is, in such case, a person in whom the seisin can be regarded as vested. At the present day it appears to involve an illustration, in a somewhat extreme form, of the preference of the courts for vested as against contingent remainders. Such a remainder is not, however, it seems, to be regarded as a vested interest for the purpose of the Rule against Perpetuities. The rule can obviously have no application when the persons constituting the class are necessarily all ascertained at the same time, as in the ease of a remainder to all those who survive a particular person named, or to all the heirs of a living person. The remainder is in such case contingent until the time arrives at which the remaindermen can be ascertained.

4. Craig v. Rowland, 10 App. D. C. 402; Cooper v. Mitchell Inv. Co., 133 Ga. 769, 66 S. E. 1090, 29 L. R. A. N. S. 291; Flanner v. Fellows, 206 111. 136, 68 N. E. 1057; Amos v. Amos, 117 Ind. 19, 19 N. E. 539; Coots v. Yewell, 95 Ky. 367, 25 S. W. 597; Dorr v. Lovering, 147 Mass. 530, 18 N. E. 412; Doerner v. Doerner, 113 Mo. 399, 61 S. W. 801; Ross v. Adams, 28 N. J. L. 160; Anthracite Sav. Bk. v. Lees 176 Pa. St. 402; Woodruff v. Pleasant, 81 Va. 37.

5. Doe v. Perryn, 3 Term Rep.

484; Carver v. Jackson, 4 Peters, 1; Winchell v. Winchell, 259 111. 471, 102 N. E. 823; Mercantile Bank v. Ballard, 83 Ky. 492, 4 Am. St. Rep. 160; Anthracite Sav. Bank v. Lees, 176 P. 402, 35 Atl. 197; Cooper v. Hepburn, 15 Gratt, 1 (Va.) 559.

6. Post Sec. 140, note 25.

7. But see Simonds v. Sim-onds, 199 Mass. 552, 85 N. E. 860. criticized, Gray, Perpetuities (3rd Ed.) Sec. 927.

8. Gray Perpetuities Sec. 110 a, note.