A conveyance should designate with certainty the name of the grantor, and this should regularly be done at the commencement. It is sufficient, however, if the name as given is sufficient to enable the grantor to be identified, and the fact that his name as it appears in the instrument differs from his actual name, or from the name signed thereto, does not invalidate the conveyance.38 A conveyance in terms by the "heirs" of a person deceased is sufficient, since they are capable of identification.39

32. Post, Sec. 437.

33. Post, Sec. 436.

34. Post, Sec.Sec. 449-456.

35. Post, Sec.Sec. 457, 458.

36. Post, Sec. 460.

37. Co. Litt. 7a; 4 Kent's Comm. 461.

38. Comyn's Dig. "Fait" (E 3); Erskine v. Davis, 25 I11. 251; Nicodemus v. Young, 90 Iowa, 423, 57 N. W. 906; Bierer v. Fretz, 32 Kan. 329, 4 Pac. 284; Wakefield v. Brown, 38 Minn.

361, 8 Am. St. Rep. 671, 37 N. W. 788; Houx v. Batteen, 68 Mo. 64; Rupert v. Penner, 35 Neb. 587, 17 L. R. A. 824, 53 N. W. 598; David v. Williamsburg City Fire Ins. Co., 83 N. Y. 265, 38 Am. Rep. 418; Jenkins v. Jenkins, 148 Pa. St. 216, 23 Atl. 985; Chapman v. Tyson, 39 Wash. 523, 81 Pac. 1066.

39. Blaisdell v. Morse, 75 Me. 542.

It has generally been held that, when two or more persons join in the execution of a conveyance, only such as are named in the body of the instrument will be regarded as parties thereto. This rule has usually been applied in the cases of conveyances by a husband, the joinder in the execution of which by the wife has been regarded as insufficient to release her dower, or otherwise divest her rights;40 but the rule has also been applied in the case of another person joining in the execution of a conveyance which does not name him as a party.41 In a number of jurisdictions, however, the rule referred to has been repudiated, more usually,42 but not exclusively,43 in connection with the question of the release of dower, it being considered that the signature alone serves not only to identify the signer as a grantor in the conveyance, but also to indicate an intention to join therein for the purpose of passing his or her interest. The requirement that the grantor's name be inserted appears, as is suggested in some of the cases last cited, to have been based on the necessity of having some means for his identification,43a at a time when but few people wrote, and a writing was ordinarily authenticated by sealing alone.

40. Agricultural Bank of Mississippi v. Rice, 4 How. (U. S.) 225, 11 L. Ed. 949; Batchelor v. Brereton, 112 U. S. 396, 28 L. Ed. 748; Harrison v. Simons, 55 Ala. 510; Cordano v. Wright, 159 Cal. 610, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 1044, 115 Pac. 227; Cox v. Wells, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 410, 43 Am. Dec. 98; Prather v. Mcdowell, 8 Bush (Ky.) 46; Beverly v. Waller, 115 Ky. 600, 103 Am. St. Rep. 342, 74 S. W. 264; Payne v. Parker, 10 Me., 178, 25 Am. Dec. 221; Stevens v. Owen, 25 Me., 94; Lothrop v. Foster, 51 Me. 367; Catlin v. Ware, 9 Mass. 218, 6 Am. Dec. 56; Leavitt v. Lamprey, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 382, 23 Am. Dec. 685; Greenough v. Turner, 11 Gray (Mass.) 334 Merrill v. Nelson, 18 Minn. 366; Stone v. Sledge, 87 Tex. 49, 47 Am. St. Rep. 65, 26 S. W. 1068; Laugh-lin v. Fream. 14 W. Va. 322.

41. Harrison v. Simons, 55 Ala. 510; Parsons v. Justice, 163 Ky. 737, 174 S.-w. 725; (Compare Hargis v. Ditmore. 86 Ky. 653,

7 S. W. 141); Peabody v. Hewitt.

52 Me. 33, 83 Am. Dec. 486; Marx & Sons v. Jordan, 84 Miss. 334, 105 Am. St. Rep. 457, 36 So. 386; See Batchelor v. Brereton, 112 U. S. 396. 28 L. Ed. 748; Stone v. Sledge, 87 Tex. 49. 47 Am. St. Rep. 65, 26 S. W. 1068.

42. Ingoldsby v. Juan, 12 Cal. 564; Johnson v. Montgomery, 51 I11. 185; Armstrong v. Stovall, 26 Miss. 275; Elliot v. Sleeper, 2 N. H. 525; Burge v. Smith, 27 N H. 332; Woodward v Leaver, 38 N. H. 29. And see Isler v. Isler, 110 Miss. 419, 70 So. 455.

A husband's authentication of his wife's deed by his joinder in the execution, has occasionally been regarded as sufficient under the statute, though he was not named in the instrument. Dentzel v. Waldie, 30 Cal. 138; Pease v. Bridge, 49 Conn. 58.

43. Sterling v. Park. 129 Ga. 309, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 298. 121 Am. St. Rep. 224, 12 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 201, 58 S. E. 828; Hrouska v. Janke, 66 Wis. 252, 28 N. W. 166. See Hargis v. Ditmore. 86 Ky. 653, 7 S. W. 141.

The grantee or grantees must be named in the conveyance, or means for their identification furnished thereby.44 It does not affect the validity of the conveyance that the name of the grantee, as inserted therein, is not that ordinarily borne by him, but one given to or assumed by him for the occasion is sufficient.45 A conveyance however to an absolutely fictitious person is a nullity.46

A conveyance to a person deceased is a nullity,47 and a conveyance to the "estate" of one deceased has likewise been so regarded.48 A conveyance to the "heirs" of one deceased is valid, since their identity is capable of immediate establishment.49

43a. Perkins, Conveyancing. Sec. 36; Sheppard's Touchstone, 233.

44. Wood v. Boyd, 28 Ark. 75; Wunderlin v. Cadogan, 50 Cal. 613.. Mcgrew v. Lamb, 60 Colo, 462, 154 Pac. 91; Simmons v. Spratt, 20 Fla., 495; Chase v. Palmer, 29 I11. 306; Clarke v. Butts, 73 Minn. 361, 76 N. W. 199; Henniges v. Paschke, 9 N. D. 489, 81 Am. St. Rep. 588, 84 N. W. 350; Hardin v. Hardin, 32 S. C. 599, 11 S. E. 102; Lund v. Thackery, 18 S. Dak. 113, 99 N. W. 856; Wright v. Lancaster, 48 Tex. 250.

45. Wilson v. White, 84 Cal. 239, 24 Pac. 114; Scanlan v. Grimmer, 71 Minn. 351, 70 Am. St. Rep. 326, 74 N. W. 146; Thomas v. Wyatt, 31 Mo. 188,

77 Am. Dec. 640; Chapman v. Tyson, 39 Wash. 523, 81 Pac. 1066; Staak v. Sigelkow, 12 Wis. 234. But in Barr v. Schroeder, 32 Cal. 609 it appears to be.assumed that a mistake in the grantee's name invalidated the conveyance.

46. David v. Williamsburg Fire Ins. Co., 83 N. Y. 265, 38 Am. Rep. 418; Muskingum Valley Turnpike Co. v. Ward, 13 Ohio 120, 42 Am. Dec. 191; Weihl v. Robertson, 97 Tenn. 458, 37 S. W. 274.