When land is dedicated for a public use of such a character as to render its continued extension to the water desirable, as for instance for a highway leading to the water or for a park, the dedication is presumed to ex36. Chicago v. Ward, 169 111. 392, 38 L. R. A. 849. 61 Am. St. Rep. 185, 48 N. E. 927; Hughes v. Birney's Heirs, 107 La. Ann. 664, 32 So. 30; Mulry v. Norton, 100 N. Y. 424, 3 N. E. 586, 53 Am. Rep. 206; State v. Muncie Pulp Co., 119 Tenn. 4, 104 S. W. 437; Stockley v. Cissna, 119 Fed. 812.

37. Ante, Sec. 534, note 2.

38. Wallace v. Driver, 61 Ark. 429, 31 L. R. A. 317, 33 S. W. 641; Holcomb v. Blair, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 974, 76 S. W. 843; Cox v. Arnold, 129 Mo. 337, 50 Am. St. Rep. 450, 31 S. W. 592; Vog-elsmeier v. Prendergast, 137 Mo. 271, 39 S. W. 83; Frank v. God-din, 193 Mo. 390, 112 Am. St Rep. 493, 91 S. W. 1057; In re City of New York, 206 N. Y. 319, 99 N. E. 850; editorial notes, 7

Columbia Law Rev. 370; 16 Harv. Law Rev. 527.

In St. Louis v. Rutz, 138 U. S. 226, 34 L. Ed. 941, in which it was held that one whose land was washed away re-acquired land formed in the same place, it was explicitly stated that such washing away was "rapid and perceptible in its progress." A like statement might be made in regard to the disappearance of the land in Fowler v. Wood, 73 Kan. 511, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 16, 117 Am. St. Rep. 534, 85 Pac. 763, and such appears to be the meaning of the statement in Lord Hale's De Jure Maris, cap. 4. See Hall, Foreshore (2nd Ed.) at p. 130, as quoted In Ocean City Ass'n v. Shriver, 64 N. J. Law 550, 51 L. R. A. 425, 46 Atl. 690.

Tend as far as the water, although this, by reason of accretions to the land, becomes more distant after the dedication is made.39 "The presumption is that the intent was that the way would reach the water so as to enable the public to enjoy the navigation of the stream."40 Likewise, it has been decided that when a highway was, by statutory proceedings, laid out extending to the water, or to some particular feature of the water, it continued to extend thereto in spite of any change that might occur in the water.41 The grant of a private right of way extending to the water would no doubt ordinarily be construed in the same way as is a dedication for highway purposes.42 And a restrictive covenant in regard to shore land has been regarded as applying to land added thereto by accretion.43

A lease for years of land, bounding on water, is, like a conveyance in fee simple, presumed to intend the water to remain the boundary, in spite of any gradual change in the location thereof.43a And this is likewise the case when a mortgage is made of such land.44

39. Doe v. Jones, 11 Ala. 63 Town of Freedom v. Norris, 128 Ind. 377, 27 N. E. 869; Cook v. Burlington, 30 Iowa, 94, 6 Am. Rep. 649; Godfrey v. Alton, 12 111. 29, 52 Am. Dec. 476; Mayor of Jersey City v. Morris Canal & Banking Co., 12 N. J. Eq. 547; Hathaway v. City of Milwaukee, 132 Wis. 249, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 778, 122 Am. St. Rep. 975, 111 N. W. 570, 112 N. W. 455. That a contrary intention may be inferred from the circumstances, see Mark v. West Troy, 151 N. Y. 453, 45 N. E. 842.

40. State v. Yates, 104 Me. 360, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 592, 71 Atl. 1018, per Savage, J.

41. Newark Lime & Cement Mfg. Co. v. Newark, 15 N. J.

Eq. 64; Hoboken Land & Imp. Co. v. Mayor, etc., of Hoboken, 36 N. J. L. 540; State v. Yates, 104 Me. 360, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 592, 71 Atl. 1018; Dana v. Crad-dock, 66 N. H. 593, 32 Atl. 757.

42. See Lock wood v. New York & N. H. R. Co., 37 Conn. 387.

43. Bridgewater v. Ocean City Ass'n, 85 N. J. Eq. 379, 96 Atl. 905.

43a. Cobb v. Lavalle, 89 111. 331, 31 Am. Rep. 91; Rutz v. Kehr - (111.) - , 25 N. E. 957; Williams v. Baker, 41 Md. 523.

44. Cobb v. Lavalle, 89 111. 331, 31 Am. Rep. 91; Cruik-shanks v. Wilmer, 93 Ky. 19, 18 S. W. 1018; Allen v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 137 Mo. 205, 38 S. W. 957.

A lien or incumbrance on the land, which is created by operation of law, such as a right of dower,45 binds subsequent accretions to the land, for the reason, it seems, that it is necessarily co-extensive with the ownership of the land, and the latter is presumed to extend to the water without reference to any gradual change which may take place in the location of the water.45

It has been decided that if, after the statute of limitations has partially run in favor of one in adverse possession of land bounding on the water, land is added thereto by accretion, he acquires, upon the subsequent running of the balance of the limitation period, the title to the newly formed land as well as to that originally existing. This is for the reason, it is said, that "the indicia of the actual possession of him who held on the main land are extended over the forming accretion and bring it within his actual possession."46 Presumably a like view would be taken in the case of adverse user of land by the public or an individual for passage to the water, that is, the user would be regarded as in theory extending over the accretion then forming or liable to form in the future, for the purpose of giving a right by prescription.47