70. Harkness v. Lisle, 132 Ky.

767, 117 S. W. 264; Williams v. Duncan, 92 Ky. 125, 17 S. W. 330; Leiter v. Sheppard, 85 111. 242; Schaefer v. Schaefer, 141 111. 337, 31 N. E. 136.

See Rothwell v. Jamison, 147 Mo. 601, 49 S. W. 530; Mosby v. Pauls' Adm'r, 88 Va. 533, 14 S. E. 336.

71. 2 Jarman, Wills 1240; Wild's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 16; Byng v. Byng, 10 H. L. Cas. 171; Dryer v. Crawford, 90 Ala. 131, 7 Co. 445; Jackson v. Coggin, 29 Ga. 403; Biggs v. McCarty, 86 Ind. 352; 44 Am. Rep. 320; Annabie v. Patch, 3 Pick. (Mass.), 360; In re Mcintosh's Estate, 158 Pa. St. 528, 27 Atl. 1044, 1047, 1048.

And see cases cited post, this section, note 80.

72. Cooper v. Mitchell Inv. Co., 133 Ga. 769, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.), 291, 66 S. E. 1090; Carr v. Estill, 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) a09, 63 Am. Dec. 548; Sims v. Skinner's Ex'r., 118 Ky. 573, 81 S. W. 703; In re Keown's Estate, 238 Pa. 343, 86 Atl. 270; Simons v. Bryce, 10 S. C. 354; Shepard's Heirs v. Shep-ard's Estate, 60 Vt. 109, 14 Atl. 536.

See post, this section, note 81.

By the "rule in Wild's case,"73 so culled, the presumption that, in the case supposed, "children" is a word of purchase, gives way, if there are no children at the time of the devise, to a contrary presumption, that it is a word of limitation, the theory being that the children cannot take in such case as remaindermen, because this is not intended, and that consequently the only way in which any effect can be given to the word "children," is by giving to A an estate in fee tail.74

At common law, since the word "heirs" is necessary for the creation of an estate in fee simple or in fee tail by conveyance inter vivos, a deed to A and his children cannot create such an estate,75 and the word "children," to be given any effect, must be regarded as a word of purchase. Though by force of statute in most states, even in the case of a conveyance inter vivos, the word heirs is no longer necessary to the creation of an estate in fee simple,76 it is, it would seem, in states in which an estate in fee tail is still recognized, necessary for the creation of such an estate,77 and consequently a conveyance to A and his children cannot create an estate in fee tail. And it can create an estate in fee simple in A alone only by ignoring the word children,78 or by construing it as meaning heirs,79 an unusual construction. In accord with these views are the decisions that, in a conveyance to A and his children, the latter word is one of purchase, with the result that A and the children take as cotenants80 or that A has a life estate with remainder to the children.81 It appears to be beyond question that in the case of a devise to A and her children, if it is so intended, each after-born child, as he comes into being, may share in the gift as a cotenant of A,82-84 and consequently the assumption, on which the rule in Wild's case is based, that when there are no children born at the

73. Wild's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 16; Clifford v. Koe, 5 App. Cas. 447; Parkman v. Bowdoin, 1 Sumn. 359: Fed. Cas. No 10, 763; Shuttle v. Weaver Land and Imp. Co. v. Barker, 178 Ala. 366, 60 So. 157; Sumpter v. Carter, 115 Ga. 893. 60 L. R. A. 274, 42 S. E. 324; Moore v. Gary, 149 Ind. 51, 48 N. E. 630; Nightingale v. Burrell, 15 Pick. (Mass.), 104; Chrystie v. Phyfe, 19 N. Y. 344; Silliman v. Whitaker, 119 N. C. 89; 25 S. E. 742; Clark v. Baker, 3 Serg & R. (Pa.), 470; Willis v. Foltz, 61 W. Va. 262, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 283, 56 S. E. 473.

The rule is one of construction merely, and does not apply if a different intention is apparent. 2 Jarman, Wills, 1235 et seq.

The rule does not apply in the case of a devise by way of remainder to the children of one given a particular estate for life.

Goodrich v. Pearce, 83 Ga. 781, 10 S. E. 451; Ridgeway v. Lan-phear, 99 Ind. 251; Lancaster v. Flowers, 198 Pa. 614, 48 Atl. 896; Manning v. Bader, 224 Pa. 575, 73 Atl. 939; Turner v. Ivie, 5 Heisk. (Tenn.), 222; Grant v. Fuller, 53 Can. Sup. Ct. 34.

But see Sechler v. Eshleman 222 Pa. 35, 70 Atl. 910.

74. In some states there are decisions adverse to the acceptance of the rule in Wild's case See Davis v. Ripley, 194 111. 399. 62 N. E. 852; Connor v. Gardner, 230 111. 258, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.), 73, 82 N. E. 640; Carr v. Estill, 16 B. Mon. (Ky.), 309, 63 Am. Dec. 548; Chambers v. Union Trust Co., 235 Pa. 610, 84 Atl. 512; Mosby v. Paul's Adm'r, 88 Va. 533, 14 S. E. 336; But as to Illinois see Reed v. Wellborn, 253 111. 338, 97 N. E. 669.

75. Ante Sec. 21 (a) note 5. 6.

76. Ante Sec. 21 (a) note 19.

77. Ante, this section, note 63.

78. See Tygard v. Hartwell 204 Mo. 200, 102 S. W. 989.

79. See Dick v. Ricker, 222 111. 413; 113 Am. St. Rep. 426, 78 N. E. 823; Naville v. American Mach. Co., 145 Ky. 344, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.), 153, 140 S. W. 559; Dicken v. Dicken, 151 Ky. 438, 43 L. R. A (N. S.) 276, 152 S. W. 258.

80. Norton, Deeds, 427; Moore v. Lee, 105 Ala. 435, 17 So. 15; Brenham v. Davidson, 51 Cal. 352; Loyless v. Blackshear, 43 Ga. 327; Plant v. Plant, 122 Ga. 763, 50 S. E. 961;Faloon v. Simshauser, 130 111. 649, 22 N. E. 835; King v. Rea, 56 Ind. 1, modified 137 Ind. 411, 24 L. R. A. 489, 45 Am. St. Rep. 186, 37 N. E. 147; Bullock v. Caldwell, 81 Ky. 566, 5 Ky. L. Rep. 576; Heath v. Heath, 114 N. Car. 547, 19 S. E. 155; Melsheimer v. Gross, 58 Pa. St. 412; Livingston v. Livingston, 84 Tenn. 448.

See ante, this section, note 71.

81. Beacroft v. Strawn, 67 111. 28; Rice v. Klette, 149 Ky. 787, L. R. A. 1917 B 45, 149 S. W. 1019; Kinney v. Mathews, 69 Mo. 520; Fales v. Currier, 55 N. H. 392; Blair v. Osborne, 84 N. C. 417; Coursey v. Davis, 46 Pa. St. 25, 84 Am. Dec. 519; Hague v. Hague, 161 Pa. St. 643, 41 Am. St. Rep. 900, 29 Atl. 261; Scruggs v. May-berry, 135 Tenn. 586, 188 S. W. 207.

82-84. Jackson v. Coggin, 29 Ga. 403, Harkness v. Lisle, 132 Ky. 767, 117 S. W. 264; Annable v. Patch, 3 Pick. (Mass.)360; In re Keowns Estate, 238 Pa. 343, 86 Atl. 270; Shepherd v. Ingram, Ambl. 448; Oates v. Jackson, 2 Strange 1172; See 2 Jarman, Wills 1023, 1034; Theobald, Wills (6th ed.) 304, and post Sec. 160 note 23.