Philosophy (Gr. , loving, and , wisdom), the universal and absolute science, aiming to explain phenomena by ultimate causes; to grasp the nature of real as distinguished from phenomenal existence; to systematize the forces and the laws which prevail in the activities of God, man, and nature; to reduce the universe to a principle of unity; and to exhibit at once the impulse and the goal of destiny. The origin of the name is attributed, on questionable authority, to Pythagoras, who preferred to be called a philosopher, or lover of wisdom, rather than a sophist or sage. It was appropriated and first popularized by Socrates, who made it the distinctive appellation of his teaching in contrast with the arrogant designation of the sophists. Originally assumed in modesty, the term did not retain its etymological and Socratic meaning, but returned to that of or wisdom. Among the most significant definitions of philosophy are the following: "the knowledge of things divine and human " (attributed to Pythagoras); " a meditation of death " ( ), and " a resembling of the Deity in so far as that is possible to man," also " search after true knowledge" (Plato); "the science of being," or of that which underlies all other sciences (Aristotle); "that part of human learning which hath reference to the reason" (Bacon); "the science of things, evidently deduced from first principles" (Descartes); "the science of effects by their causes, and of causes by their effects " (Hobbes); " the science of sufficient reasons " (Leibnitz); " the science of things possible in so far as they are possible " (Wolf); "the science of the connecting principles of nature " (Adam Smith); " the science of truths, sensible and abstract" (Condillac); " the science of the relations of all knowledge to the necessary ends of human reason " (Kant); " the science of the original form of the Ego, or mental self " (Krug, with which that of Fichte substantially agrees); " the science of the absolute, or of the absolute indifference of the ideal and real" (Schelling); " the science of reason, in so far as the latter is the conscious idea of universal being in its necessary development " (Hegel); " the substitution of true ideas, that is, of necessary truths of reason, in place of the oversights of popular opinion and the errors of psychological science " (Ferrier); " the knowledge of effects as dependent on their causes " (Sir "William Hamilton); "the science of first principles, that, namely, which investigates the primary grounds, and determines the fundamental certainty, of human knowledge generally " (Morell); "the science of the ultimate principles and laws of nature and fredom, as also of their mutual relations " (Tennemann); " the science of the reason of things " (Alaux); " the explanation of the phenomena of the universe " (Lewes); " the thinking consideration of things," or "reflection" (Schwegler); "the science of principles " (Ueberweg). From these definitions it will be seen that the term philosophy, which first appears in Greek literature in Herodotus, has retained a generic significance, modified by special application.
According to Plato it is the search for wisdom, or true knowledge, which he distinguishes from belief or opinion founded on the evidence of the senses. With the reality underlying all sensible forms wisdom is alone concerned, and to ascertain and acquire this is the task of philosophy. This grasps what is immutable and eternal, in which are included alike all truths of'mathematics as well as of theology. Philosophers "set their affections on that which in each case really exists." Aristotle holds that, as all sciences deal with distinct departments of existence, there must be a science which deals with the reality that underlies them all, or being as such, and this science he terms his " first philosophy." Philosophy therefore is equivalent to a knowledge of things in their origin or causes, a view substantially accepted by Sir William Hamilton. The usage of the term, however, especially among the stoics and ethical writers, has been in the subjective sense of Plato, and has been applied to the sagacity or disposition best adapted to solve the problems of practical life. In this case the moral element has predominated over the intellectual.
But as applied to systems of thought or speculation, the term has been used in an objective sense, and has been equivalent to a theory for the explanation of phenomena, whatever these might be, whether related to God, the origin and order of the world, or the constitution, powers, and destiny of the human soul. In each instance there is an effort to trace things to their causes, to study them in their connections, to interpret them to the reason, and through their multiplicity to discover the higher unity that underlies them. - Method. The rational progress necessary to this end constitutes method in philosophy. This is the same whether we seek to discover causes or to resolve the manifold into unity, since as we ascend from cause to cause we approach the unity of which we are in search. Method then involves two correlative processes, known as analysis and synthesis; the first fundamental, and in order to the latter. Having before us the complex of phenomena, as they are presented to sense or consciousness, we analyze them, or examine the distinct elements of the complex object, that we may apprehend them individually. Synthesis receives these elements from analysis, and recomposes them, on the basis of common qualities or relations in the elements themselves.
Thus analysis selects from the infinity of objects those to be considered, from which a general law may be inferred, and this inference, known as induction, is pronounced by Hamilton to be " purely a synthetic process." Analysis and synthesis are dependent upon each other, and either alone would be incomplete. They answer, as terms, to Bacon's " observation and induction." A more minute statement of the actual procedure in philosophizing has been: 1, observation; 2, hypothesis; 3, questioning; 4, induction; but all are implied in analysis and synthesis. - Domain. The domain of philosophy is the universe of phenomena, including facts of consciousness, so far as they come or can be brought under human cognizance. Instead of being limited to a single department, like a special science, it includes all departments of knowledge. Theology, as Plato held, comes within its sphere, so far as its facts or doctrines are objects which reason can examine or explain. This is the case also with ethics. But a distinction must be made.
Philosophy is not to be identified with religion or science, while religious truth, as such, is addressed rather to the intuitions of the soul than to the speculative reason, and expounds the duty of man and the dogmas postulated by revelation, upon which that duty is based; and while science searches out facts in its own sphere, and by inductive processes discovers the law under which they are classified, or the theory to which they conform, the sphere of philosophy comprehends both, accepting their facts, intuitions, or laws as its data, and studying them in their causes and relations, in connection with the question of their ultimate significance. Science, limited to its special domain, where kindred facts are to be classified or coordinated, asks only what and how. Philosophy, accepting all facts and phenomena, whether as yet scientifically classified or not, passes beyond the sphere of science, asking the why of things, and searching out their causes, connections, and consequences, with a view to the "interpretation and justification of phenomena to the reason, showing their rational grounds, principles, laws, and ends." Thus resolving the manifold of phenomena into a higher unity, and directing its attention especially to what is most important and fundamental, it cannot be content, as Lord Bacon has said, but with the highest themes - God, nature, and man. - Divisions. A division of philosophy frequently adopted has been that of pure and applied, or speculative and practical.
It was adopted by some of the ancient philosophers, by Wolf and Her-bart among moderns, and in a peculiar sense by Kant, but was rejected by Hamilton, on the ground that the distinction is not always applicable, the theoretical being often practical also. AEsthetics has sometimes been classed with one, sometimes with the other, or with both; and in regard to other branches of philosophy, the same difficulty exists. With the stoics, all philosophy, as ethical, was practical. Plato himself adopted no uniform division of philosophy, although his commentators have endeavored to base one upon his distinctive discussions of the true, the good, and the beautiful, designated respectively as the critical, the practical, and the aesthetic. His subjective definition of philosophy as the pursuit of true knowledge led him to class together the most diverse departments, including mathematics, ethics, political science, theology, etc, under the same appellation. Aristotle likewise includes mathematics, physics, ethics, and politics together under the same generic term, reserving his " first philosophy," or science of being, for what is now termed metaphysics.
This he made to be the science which treats of the ultimate grounds or principles of everything that exists, considered in relation to its "four causes:" matter, form, efficient causes, and end. Yet mathematics, physics, and theology are with him the three " theoretical philosophies," while ethics, in the broad sense of the word including political science, belongs to the practical sphere. It is his " first philosophy" that goes back of all other philosophies, or rather philosophical sciences, which have their special spheres, and investigates what they must accept hypo-thetically, viz.: being as such. If there were only physical beings, physics would be the first and only philosophy. But if there is an immaterial and unmoved essence which is the ground of all being, there must be an earlier and therefore universal philosophy. This first ground of all being is God, and therefore Aristotle sometimes calls his "first philosophy" theology. While sometimes accepting the distinction of speculative and practical, he is less inclined than some of his commentators to any formal division. At different periods philosophy has limited or extended its sphere, and has essayed the solution of diverse problems, inconsistent with any uniform classification.
Subsequent to the rsvival of learning in Europe, and especially since the time of Descartes, there has been a growing disposition to limit philosophy to metaphysics, juid exclude from it much that it once embraced. The result has been that the number of subordinate distinct sciences has been multiplied, some of these taking the name of philosophy, as the philosophy of history, language, grammar, rhetoric, government, religion, etc. But philosophy proper still retains the superior sphere. Its themes are still, as Bacon held, God, nature, and man. Mental science and physical discovery have supplied it new material. Logic, which some would make a part of it, is considered by others as merely its instrument. By Wolf as well as by later German writers, it is considered as propaedeutic. He bases his distinction of speculative (metaphysics) and practical philosophy on the faculties of cognition and volition; moral philosophy, economics, and politics falling under the latter, and ontology, cosmology, psychology, and natural theology under the former. Herbart expressly isolates the particular philosophical sciences, and rigorously separates theoretical and practical philosophy.
He censures attempts at unity, ascribing to them a variety of errors, since logical, metaphysical, and sesthetical forms are in his view disparate. Hegel, with others, makes the distinction between the theoretical spirit (intelligence) and the practical spirit (will). Nevertheless the attempt boldly essayed by Spinoza to resolve the duality of philosophy (specially illustrated by the theories of Descartes and Kant) into a higher unity has been renewed during the present century by German philosophers, asserting the identity of subject and object (the Ego and the non-Ego), or constructing a philosophy of the absolute, which can find its developed application in all spheres, theoretical and practical. To the sphere of philosophy, however, by general concession, belong ethics (see Moral Philosophy), psychology, ontology, cosmology, and natural theology, each often so closely connected with the others as to be in some measure dependent upon them. Psychology investigates mental phenomena, the facts and laws of consciousness, and the constituent faculties of the soul in themselves and their relations. Ontology covers the ground of Aristotle's "first philosophy," and is a synonyme for the science of being.
Cosmology treats of questions concerning the contingency or necessity of the world, its eternity or its limitations in space and time, and the formal law of its changes, extending also to questions concerning human freedom and the origin of evil. As exhibited by Wolf, it professes to deduce from ontological principles a demonstration of the nature of the world, and the manner in which it is produced from simple substances. Natural theology considers questions pertaining to the existence and providence of God, and the moral order of the world. - Psychology, although a modern term, first employed in a technical sense by Otto Oasmann in 1594, dates from the time when the of Anaxagoras invited the attention of Socrates, who turned it from speculative to practical account. In the writings of the Old and the New Testament we have the germs of?, psychology, traceable also in other monuments of ancient literature. In these, as well as in the sacred writings, the distinction of body, soul, and spirit ( and ) is noted, the last term answering, as som contend, to the Aristotelian , while is equivalent to " the vital and Phantastic soul," and is vitalized matter. Plato, in several of his dialogues, discusses the nature and powers of the soul. One of Aristotle's works was entitled , and his view of its relation to accords with his theory which makes God supreme over the universe. From his time psychology made little advance for many centuries. The nature and destiny of the soul, rather than its faculties, engaged the attention of the early Christian writers. With the scholastics, who often blindly followed Aristotle, psychology, as well as philosophy generally, was made subordinate to the interests of faith. In England, during the 17th century, the leading writers on psychological questions were Sir John Davies, Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke. The last named had been preceded on the continent by Montaigne, Descartes, Pascal, Malebranche, Spinoza, and others of less note. From the time of Descartes, who posited as the starting point of philosophic certainty the argument, Cogito, ergo sum, and who emphasized the distinction between mind and matter, two tendencies have been manifest in philosophy, which there have been repeated attempts to harmonize, the idealistic and materialistic, to which reference will hereafter be made. - Ontology dates from the time of Aristotle. It has been defined by some as that part of philosophy which treats of what are now called categories, or radical notions of thought applicable to all objects.
Aristotle was not only the first to posit absolute being as the proper subject matter of the "first philosophy," but to draw up a table of principles, empirically derived, which were termed categories, and in accordance with which all conceptions must be formed. Among his modern imitators are Kant, Wolf, and Hegel. The ontological argument for the being of a God, hinted rather than drawn out by Augustine, is developed by Anselm, who holds that the very notion of a good, a greater than which cannot be conceived, existing in the mind, implies an objective reality. In this line of thought he is followed to some extent by Descartes, whose argument is substantially: Since I am finite, the idea of infinite substance could not be in me if this idea did not come from a really existing infinite substance. To this he added: I myself, who have the idea of God, could not exist without God; and this idea is innate in me, in the same sense as the idea I have of myself. In later times the a priori argument for the being of a God has been elaborated by Dr. Samuel Clarke (1704), W. Gillespie (1854), and others.
But it has been met by the objection that it is not strictly a priori, since antecedent existence of some kind is the postulate of the argument. - Cosmology, investigating the physical and moral order of the universe, has produced a large amount of speculation, and made large contributions to literature. At a very early period the relation of God to the world is shadowed forth in cosmogonies and popular religious systems. Zoroaster has been credited with an explanation (which may have been anterior to him) of the existence of evil in the world, which falls back on the theory of two superhuman principles, a good and an evil deity, for ever opposed. Something of a kindred nature is found in connection with Greek speculation, and is known as hylozoism. Matter is the impracticable resistant principle, which cannot easily be moulded, and has in it the elements of imperfection and evil. Hence, as Plato said, " Reason persuades necessity." Under a somewhat modified form, the Persian doctrine was revived by Mani, and has been since known as Manichseism. It supplied an element of the Gnostic systems, and previous to his acceptance of Christianity was embraced by St. Augustine. During the middle ages it exerted a limited influence, but toward the close of the 17th century attention was called to it by the speculations of Peter Bayle. The favor with which he was disposed to regard it led Archbishop King to write his famous work on the " Origin of Evil." On this and kindred topics Leibnitz soon after presented his views, and his work bore the title of "Theodicy." In that line of discussion which he pursued, and in which he has been followed by numerous more recent writers, were involved nearly all the leading cosmological questions, including liberty and necessity. - Natural theology, as a branch of philosophy, may be traced in Greek literature to the of Anaxagoras. Socrates gave it a moral and religious significance. Aristotle's speculations were necessarily theis-tic, from his philosophical standpoint and his theory of causes. Moreover, it came to be widely felt that back of all motion there must be a mover, himself unmoved, and back of all proximate causes, dependent in their nature, there must be a first cause. Of this cause, to meet the demand of philosophy, unity must be predicated; and to this fact may be attributed that tendency to monotheistic speculation which betrays itself among some ancient writers, even when surrounded by polytheistic influences and institutions. This is manifest in the writings of Plato, as well as of many of the stoics. Seneca identifies providence, nature, and fate with God. The natural theology of Socrates is substantially reproduced in Cicero's De Natura Deorum, in which also we meet the argument from design for the being of God, illustrated by a memorable passage which Cicero quotes from Aristotle. The theism of Epictetus and Plutarch is that which recognizes a supreme personal intelligence, while that of Antoninus approximates to pantheism.
The atomic philosophy, originating with Leucippus and Democritus, and adopted by Epicurus and his poetical expositor Lucretius, was regarded as atheistic, although Cudworth asserts strenuously that it may harmonize well with theism. Neo-Platonic as well as much of Gnostic speculation adopted the theory of emanations from the Supreme Deity who could not come in contact with matter or imperfection, and to the emanating seons the works of creation or providence were ascribed. Among some of the Arabian scholars, and also in a few of the scholastics, we discern pantheistic tendencies. These also assert themselves in some of the continental writers of the 15th and 16th centuries, but they reach their culminating point in Spinoza, by whom the previously asserted dualism of mind and matter is reduced to the one original universal substance which he calls God. From his time the writers on natural theology have been numerous. Howe, Boyle, Bentley, Ray, and several members of the royal society are among the authors of the closing part of the 17th century. Derham, Nieuwentyt, Cheyne, and many of the Boyle lecturers belong to the early part of the next century; while more recent authors in this department have been Paley, Fergus, Chalmers, Brougham, and the writers of the Bridgewater treatises.
Much of the matter which they have contributed to the literature of natural theology would have been classed as philosophical by ancient standards. The criticisms on the various kinds of argument urged for the being of a God have been numerous, and form an important element in modern philosophical literature. - Pantheism, as distinguished from theism, asserts the consubstan-tiality of God with nature. Its rudest form is a universal fetichism. In its philosophical development, it makes God the one substance, of which all phenomena of mind and matter are but the modes or attributes. He is the impersonal Absolute, who sleeps in the mineral, dreams in the animal, and wakes in man. God is nature, pervaded and inspired by an immanent principle; and nature is God, in the manifestation of his essence or the evolution of his power. - Development. The attempt has repeatedly been made to reduce philosophy, historically considered, to certain uniform laws of development. The actual progress which it has sometimes made, at certain periods in a marked degree, has favored this attempt; while its frequent relapse and resumption of antiquated positions and opinions has seemed to indicate that no such laws, even if they had actually operated, were discoverable.
Schelling held that the various parts of philosophy, and philosophy itself, must be exhibited in a single conformity as the advancing history of consciousness; while Eitter's professed object in his "History of Philosophy" was, while adhering strictly to facts, to present it as a " self-developing whole." This, however, does not come up to the idea of Hegel, who would regard the history of philosophy in the unity of a single process. He contends that the nature of things is such that the historical sequence of the various philosophical standpoints must, without essential variation, accord with the systematic sequence of the different categories of logic. In other words, free the fundamental thoughts of the various systems from what is adventitious, or formal and locally applicable, and we have the various steps that mark philosophical progress. In opposition to this, it is contended that history combines liberty with necessity, and presents a play of endless contingency; and moreover, that the historical and logical developments of philosophy do not, as a matter of fact, coincide; the logical process being from the abstract to the concrete, while the history of philosophy is from the concrete to the abstract, so that what is really first in itself is really last for us.
Rejecting therefore the assumption that the evolution of philosophy in history must correspond to the evolution of logical philosophy, we are compelled to recognize the physical, psychological, and ethical questions which it has raised, as marking the stages of its advancement. No exact order of philosophical development can be laid down a priori, and we find as a historical fact that no such order has been observed. Many of the gravest questions of modern philosophy were discussed in the early centuries, and sometimes with an acuteness which has perhaps never been surpassed; while, as noted by Rit-ter in his account of the Neo-Platonists, the progress of philosophical development, after reaching a certain point, has either become retrograde, or like a circle renewed its former round. Still, though philosophy has had assigned it various problems, often but remotely connected, and at the same period has been engaged in different spheres of thought, and though some of its questions not only are hitherto unsolved, but may prove ultimately insoluble to human reason, we can yet discern an order, although by no means logical or continuous, of progressive development. "Wonder," says Aristotle, "is the first cause of philosophy." Hence the heavenly bodies and the forces of nature are first to be considered, and the earliest philosophies are mainly the cosmogonies embodied in the ancient mythologies.
But as the operation of natural causes is discerned, the mind is impelled to the study of conditions proximate to the result observed, and here we have the explanation of the earliest Greek (Ionic) philosophy. As the proximate causes are found to be not self-originating, or are seen to be inadequate, their existence and operation must be explained, and we thus pass from Ionic speculation to the vovg of Anaxagoras. This, at first regarded as a deus ex machina, rises into special importance in the teachings of Socrates, when he connects it not merely with the physical but the moral order of the world. Thus he legitimates the theory of his predecessor by putting it to broader and better use, and justifies the claim made in his behalf that he had brought down philosophy from heaven to earth. In him, but eminently in his pupil Plato, the reaction against the sophists - denying moral distinctions, and representing all things as illusive - is distinctly seen. Plato asks after the reality underlying all phenomena, but in doing this he has to consider the capacity of man to know the real.
The relation of the constitution and. powers of the soul to sensible phenomena, or to actual cognition, must necessarily be taken into account, and a line of discussion is entered upon which Aristotle also follows up. The result is twofold: on one side, doubt and distrust, as illustrated by the academics, or even a despair and surrender of all philosophy as futile; and on the other, a restriction of reason, which has speculated to little purpose, to matters of practical life. Here again there are two classes of thinkers: one finding wisdom, with Epicurus, in practical prudence and a shrewd calculation of the utilities, of pleasure and pain; while another (the stoics), retaining the high sense inspired by the earlier teachings of philosophy of the dignity of the soul, are indisposed to capitulate to obstacles and hardships, and count that disposition of mind and heart which defies them in the strength of virtuous resolve to be the highest philosophy. At this point we find speculation modified by contact with Christianity and oriental elements.
The relation of the Supreme Deity, as transcendental and absolute, to creation is a new problem, which gives birth to Gnosticism, and determines the development of Neo-Platonism. Christian dogmas, authoritatively proclaimed, limit the sphere of speculation, and present their solution of the gravest problems of providence and human destiny, which are declared to be above the sphere and capacity of human reason. But in the conflict with paganism, Christianity sometimes accepts the alliance of Platonism, and in the writings of St. Augustine we have, along with the attempted refutation of pagan, the introduction of what may be considered the first approximately perfect scheme of Christian philosophy. Until the revival of learning, the ancient philosophies, imperfectly apprehended, are studied, often with little original thought, and are modified to meet the demands of reason, silent and submissive before dogma, but intent to settle the conditions and terms of its submission. Studied under the new conditions of mental activity in the 15th and 16th centuries, the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle were accepted as bases of speculation, but in the 17th century they began to give place to original thought.
Bacon broke the way in which others were ready to follow, indicating the true methods of philosophy, rather than constructing a system of his own. Descartes broke still more completely with the past, taking skepticism as his starting point. From his time the psychological element has predominated in philosophy. He laid the foundation for the later idealism, and, in his dual division of the existent into mind and matter, prepared the way for the monism of Spinoza, the preestab-lished harmony of Leibnitz, and the speculations of Locke. Conditions of race, climate, and natural scenery, as well as forms of government and religion, and national tastes and capabilities, have all exerted their influence in determining the order of philosophical development; and yet, as a rule, each generation has built on the foundation laid by its predecessor, but reconstructed often to meet its own necessities. - Schools. The term school, as applied to philosophy, is sometimes used in a specific, but often also in a more general and indefinite sense. "When its application is local or national, as when we speak of the Hindoo, Greek, scholastic, Scottish, French, German, or Italian philosophy, the unity that is predicated of each belongs not to the views maintained by the different thinkers who composed it, so much as the class of topics which they , discussed.
In other Cases, as when we speak of the nominalists or realists, idealists or materialists, Platonists or Aristotelians, stoics or Epicureans, the term has a more specific and exclusive significance. It belongs to a class of thinkers who are agreed as to the method and tendency of a system. - History. In connection with the following brief outline of the course of philosophy, a much more complete and somewhat continuous history may be obtained, by consulting in this work the numerous biographical and other articles bearing upon the subject. In India, speculation on the great problems of philosophy, if not the most ancient, is, among the ancient, the best known. As among other early nations, we here find philosophy combined with theology, or involved in myths. The germs of it must be sought in the Vedas (probably composed before 1000 B. C), the laws of Manu, and other sacred writings. Associated with much that is superstitious, it possesses elements indicative of patient and profound thought. With a gross idolatry it combines an ideal pantheism, not unlike that wrought out by German thinkers. Its standard of human perfection is abstraction from matter and absorption in God. Creation is an illusion, and spirit is the only substance.
Appearances in nature are manifestations of God, and all life, even in the worm, is sacred. The Upani-shads speak of the Divine Self, the Eternal "Word, not to be grasped by reason, but only by him whom He himself grasps. In the beginning was the Self alone, concealed in his own qualities. In the first book of the laws of Manu we have a Hindoo cosmogony. The Self-existing Power created the waters with a thought. A productive seed placed in them becomes an egg from which heaven and earth are developed, while from the Supreme Soul mind is produced. The last book of the laws of Manu presents the doctrines of transmigration and final beatitude. With these common features, Indian philosophy develops into the three systems, the Sankhya, Nyaya, and Ve-danta. All agree in proposing the same speculative problem: How did the universe come to be? and in aiming at the same practical end, the deliverance of the soul from the evil of the world, or from an existence conditioned by time and sense. All make the visible and sensible a delusion and a snare, accounting the ideal the only reality. A perfect knowledge of the real is the means of deliverance from the unreal and from restless transmigration.
The Sankhya philosophy accepts two eternal and uncreated substances, soul and nature; the Nyaya three, atoms, souls, and God; while the Vedanta, or Mimansa, that orthodox and probably oldest system, teaches that Brahm is all, the one being in the universe, and that all else is rnaia or illusion. The wise man is he who by knowledge escapes the snare of the unreal, and triumphs over his own desires. By pure contemplation he attains to freedom and repose, becoming united at last with Brahma, in whom he is only conscious of himself as the eternal and universal Brahma, while life and death, with all their changes, are but phantasies. To this result worship may be tributary, but it is subordinate to knowledge. Action, inasmuch as it implies desire, is vain. The substance of the soul is from Brahma, and it is neither born nor does it die; yet not all souls return to him. Those only who attain to the knowledge of him will be absorbed in him; others are doomed to ceaseless transmigration. In absorption, or the total loss of personal identity, is the highest bliss. This is reached by entire abstraction, not only from the senses, but from the thinking intellect.
Consciousness of some sort, however, would seem to remain, since the delivered soul can say, I am Brahma; I am Life. The Sankhya philosophy, recognizing soul and nature, denies that a perfect being could create the universe. This would imply desire on his part, and consequently imperfection. The names of the gods are retained, but they are finite, though superior beings. Nature has a plastic creative force, but is not intelligent. Souls are intelligent, but do not create. Both are eternal, and from their union proceeds the visible universe. The Nyaya doctrine recognizes a supreme soul, Brahma, all-mighty and all-wise. It holds all souls to be eternal and distinct from body. It introduces atoms, a third eternal and indestructible element, as the basis of matter. - Buddhism was a rationalistic revolt from Brahmanism with its superstitious rites and burdensome ceremonies. Its founder, Sakyamuni (probably about the middle of the 6th century B. 0.), rejected the authority of the Vedas, sacrifices, and all Brahmanic rites. It retained and popularized the principles of the Sankhya philosophy, by which it was largely shaped. It held that all existence, as subject to change and decay, is evil; but this evil, springing from desire, is not inevitable, since desire may be extinguished.
Thus, if men choose, they may arrive at or attain to Nirvana, or the perfect rest. What this is, whether the extinction of existence or of all passions and desires, has been disputed, and plausible arguments have been urged on both sides. But whatever the end, the moral precepts of religion direct to its attainment. The loftiest conception of Buddhism is the deified man who has entered Nirvana. He becomes the object of adoration, to whom prayer is addressed. The metaphysical doctrines of the system are dharma or the law of consequences, which attends being like its shadow until the final and changeless is reached, and the Nirvana, which to the Buddhist means the absolute eternal world, beyond space and time, identified with an end of transmigration, as well as of the restlessness of desire. - Of Chinese philosophy we know nothing anterior to the time of Confucius. The oldest Chinese writings recognized one Supreme Being, commanding good, forbidding evil, and extending his providence over men. In the course of ages this ideal had become obscured and lost, or associated with superstitions which Confucius declined to recognize.
Although silent as to the existence and attributes of God, as well as the immortality of the soul, he says: " Worship as if the Deity were present." His philosophy was mainly ethical. It was given, or at least preserved, in detached aphorisms, inculcating virtuous actions and pure morals. The first marked period in the development of his philosophy closes with the death of Men-cius about 300 B. C. Its second extends from A. D. 1034 to 1200; it arose in connection with the teachings of Choo-tsze, through which it assumed a more definite form. It held that there is one supreme and ultimate principle of all existence, which is absolutely immaterial, and the basis of the moral order of the universe. From this, eternally operating, comes all animate and inanimate nature. Creation is a perpetual process, and matter and spirit are opposite results of the same force, now pulsating actively and now passively. The highest and most perfect result is man, originally good, while evil results from conflict with the. outer world. If he follows the dictates of his nature, his actions are right and his life is har- -monious. He may finally conquer all obstacles to his perfection, since by solitary persistent thought one may penetrate at last to the essence of things.
Another system of philosophy, more speculative than that of Confucius, at least in its original form, is that of Lao-tse. It starts with the Tao, or unnamable, the origin of heaven and earth, "the mother of all things." It is universally present, invisible, inexhaustible, before the gods, without desires, and into it all beings return. With this attempt to grasp the ideal absolute are associated other paradoxes, as: everything proceeds from its opposite, being is the source of non-being, together with other apophthegms, that remind us of Plato's " Phaodo" or the speculations of Hegel. - Among the Perso-Median races, philosophical speculation is closely connected with religious belief. Its germs are found in the fundamental doctrines of the sacred writings, the Zend-Avesta, ascribed to Zoroaster, but of uncertain though very ancient date. The world, in which evil is in perpetual conflict with good, is the great problem to be solved. The evil cannot come from the good deity, Ahura Mazda (Ormuzd), and hence an evil principle, temporarily of approximately equal power, must exist by whom the good is opposed and the evil introduced and favored. This evil deity, Ahriman, serves to explain the problem of the origin of evil, and emphasize the moral as well as the physical antagonisms of creation.
The conflicting elements of present existence throw their shadow over the future, where the reward is as blissful as the retribution is bitter. It is not strange that long after Zoroaster, and in the 3d century of the Christian era, his main doctrines should have been adopted by Mani as the basis of the sect which he founded. - Egyptian philosophy, whatever it may have been, has left few traces of the speculative element. "We must seek "the wisdom of Egypt" in theosophy and ethics. The first eight Egyptian gods seem to represent a process of divine development or emanation. They constitute something like a transition from the absolute spiritualism of India to the religion of nature and humanity of the western nations. There is some ground for regarding Egyptian mythology as a compound of which the elements were contributed by a native and an invading race. Ammon, the chief god of Upper Egypt, is the head of a cosmogony which proceeds from spirit down to matter; while Ptah, the chief god of Lower Egypt, is at the beginning of a cosmogony which ascends by a process of evolution from matter up to spirit. Ptah is heat, and from this proceeds light; from light, life; and from life, gods, men, plants, animals - all organic existence.
Of the third order of the gods, the circle of Isis and Osiris, Herodotus says, " They are the only gods worshipped throughout Egypt." They are supposed to represent the original religious belief of the native element of the population, and as such symbolize the forms and forces of outward nature. In the time of Plutarch this symbolism was a profound study, and was not without its influence on the development of the Alexandrian school. It was closely connected with the Egyptian view of the moral order of the world, the immortality and transmigration of the soul, and retribution after death. The Osiris worship was elevated by the priests to a moral significance, and made an allegory of the struggles, sorrows, and self-recovery of the human spirit. It was connected moreover with a severe practical morality. This morality is set forth in a papyrus supposed to be nearly 4,000 years old, and written by one who calls himself the son of a king. Its practical philosophy is not unlike that of the Proverbs of Solomon. It glorifies wisdom, represents the. bad man's life as a living death, and enforces its precepts by the consideration of the divine presence even with the solitary soul. - Hitherto philosophy had been in close alliance with mythology.
In Greece that alliance, after giving an impulse and direction to speculation, was weakened or dissolved. Pre-Socratic philosophy had for its special problem an explanation of nature, independent of the poetic cosmogonies. Under the manifold phenomena of the physical universe it sought the first principle, the primitive ground of things. Of the physicists of the Ionic school, Thales (about 640-546 B. 0.), Anaximander (differently classed by Lewes), and Anaximenes are the most noted. Thales, however, advanced formally but little beyond the Homeric cosmogony, which ascribed to Oceanus and Tethys the origin of all things, when he represented the beginning of things to be water. His explanation simply eliminated the mythical element. Anaximander of Miletus, sometimes spoken of as his disciple and sometimes as his contemporary, substituted for water (as or beginning of things) , the unlimited, to which it is difficult to attach a definite significance, but which may be supposed to be a kind of primitive substance, with latent, commingled, but undeveloped forces. Anaximenes, who accepted this "unlimited," but made it the all-embracing, all-moving air, scarcely passed beyond the line of his predecessors, who limited themselves to the theory of a primitive substance out of which the universe was developed. Pythagoras of Samos (flourished 540-500 B. C), founder of the school that bears his name, regarded the universe in its quantitative rather than its qualitative relations. He asked after the form and order, rather than the substance of things. The secret of his philosophy was in number, and in the One he found that which was most perfect. Proceeding from the One, identified with God, he found the universe a scheme of numerical proportions and harmonies, in his own language a kosmos. By numbers the quantitative relations of things are determined. Forms and proportion may be resolved into number. Much that Pythagoras taught is left obscure, and some things doubtless are credited to him which belong to his disciples. His philosophy, in its ethical and religious aspects, shows a marked advance.
His contrast of the paths and results of virtue and vice has become memorable. lie insisted upon a pure and pious life, urged the duty of perfect submission in all things to the will of God, and made a striving after the divine likeness the standard of duty. For his doctrines of the immortality and transmigration of the soul he is said to be indebted to Egyptian sources. The Eleatics exalted the One of Pythagoras into the All. They sought to apprehend pure being, changeless and independent of the forms and conditions of time and space. According to Xenophanes, a younger contemporary of Pythagoras, the one is all, and the all one. God is the universal supreme intelligence, and the mythological extravagances of the poets and the anthropomorphism of the popular religion are by him sharply denounced. Par-menides embodied his philosophy in an epic poem, in which he sets forth his notion of being, contrasting it with all that is changeful and phenomenal. It is pure thought, and thought and being are identical. Yet in the realm of the phenomenal change prevails, and opposite forces, like heat and cold, come in conflict, but meet in unity when body and soul are combined in man.
Zeno of Elea, a disciple of Parmenides, developed the paradoxes of his predecessor, seeking to expose the contradictions in which the ordinary beliefs in a phenomenal world become entangled. He thus earned the title of originator of dialectic. Pushing his antithesis of being and non-being to an extreme, he develops from the One of Xenophanes an ill-concealed dualism. Herac-litus (about 513 B. 0.) sought a principle of reconciliation in the idea of becoming, the bridge from being to non-being, from the one to the many. The totality of things is in perpetual flux, and their permanence is illusive. All comes and goes. Out of all comes forth all, life from death, and death from life. The circling alternation of birth and decay is incessant. Unity presupposes duality, harmony discord, and " strife is the father of all things." Heat is the all-vivifying, all-transforming element; it seems to combine in itself the properties of matter and force. The world from time to time resolves itself into the primeval fire. The soul is fire-vapor, in its perfection freed from the grosser elements.
The practical bearing of his philosophy was to emphasize search for the true, and acquiescence in the fixed order of things. - At the head of the later natural philosophers stand Empedocles (born about 500 B. 0.) and Anaxagoras, nearly his contemporary. The former differed from Heraclitus in adding necessity as a third principle, along with love and hate, to explain existing phenomena. He superseded the hylo-zoism of the earlier philosophers by the severance of the moving cause from matter. Anaxagoras gave a more definite shaping to this theory. He assumed, as ultimate elements, an unlimited number of primitive substances, or " seeds of things," the chaotic mixture of which was reduced to order by the intelligent principle, the or divine reason. - The most noted atomists were Leucippus and De-mocritus. The former asserted the existence of space-filling matter, by the division of which we reach the atom, the element of what is real and invariable. Round atoms possess the property of motion, and as they unite or separate all originates or dissolves. Democritus, about 40 years the junior of Anaxagoras, deriving the worlds from the multiplicity of atoms, explained sensuous perception by the efflux of atoms from things perceived. Thus images are produced, not always veracious, and ever to be distinguished from genuine knowledge. The soul, he taught, is the noblest part of man, and happiness, which consists in an equality of temperament, is to be obtained through justice and culture. - In the sophists we note a transition in the sphere of philosophy from nature to man. Protagoras, applying the doctrine of Heraclitus to the knowing subject, made man the measure of all things, as well of what is not as of what is. All truth is consequently relative. Of the existence of the gods there can be no certainty. Gorgias taught that nothing exists; or if it existed, it could not be known; or if existing and knowable, the knowledge of it could not be communicated.
Hippias pretended to universal knowledge. Some later sophists identified right with interest, made instinct, caprice, or force the principle of obligation, denied moral distinctions, and justified the severest criticisms of Socrates. The latter, by elevating the practical over the speculative, by giving the of Anaxagoras a moral significance, by asserting moral and religious obligation, turned philosophy into a new channel. He emphasized knowledge or moral insight, either identifying virtue with it, or making it dependent on it. - Two" tendencies, the ethical and the dialectic, were developed from the Socratic principle of knowledge as related to virtue. The first of these was represented by the cynic school of An-tisthenes and the Oyrenaic school of Aristip-pus; the other by the Megaric of Euclid and the Elian of Phsedo. In the cynics we have the foreshadowing of stoicism, and in the Cy-renaics the predecessors of the Epicureans. Euclid gave a new edition of the Eleatic doctrine, and is supposed to have modified Plato's views. Phsedo was one of the most genuine disciples of Socrates, but he was less gifted than that master's favorite pupil Plato, the ablest expounder of his doctrines, which he modified and enriched with his own illustrations. His philosophy deals with dialectics, physics, and ethics. To the first of these the Platonic theory of ideas is fundamental. The idea was the spaceless, timeless archetype of individuals.
It is the universal, the real and eternal, existing per se; the unity underlying all phenomena of the same class. The highest idea is that of the good, which is represented as the originating cause of being and cognition. In physics Plato held that matter is eternal, originally chaotic and formless, but along with this is the ideal world. The cosmos was produced by the best artificer, the moving deliberative principle, after an eternal pattern. Plato's explanation of nature, in contrast with the earlier ones, is thoroughly teleological. The human soul, kindred to the world-soul, which mediates ideas, and is the invisible dynamical principle of order and motion, is a dualism of forces, the one culminating in the pure thought of reason, the other impulsive and gravitating downward, thus attesting man's apostasy from his preexistent state. Of this state, by a pure and reasonable life, he awakens reminiscences, and by it also he may hope to escape the evil, and attain to the blessedness of those whose lives please God. Plato's life is marked by three stages of philosophical progress. To the last belongs his founding of the Academy, and the application of his principles to nature and the state.
His philosophy, when not identified with dialectic, as it sometimes is, is reached by it; for this discriminates; it teaches to divide and to combine; and beneath the tangible and visible, which are but shadows of the reality, it searches out the true and real. By dialectic the soul attains to true knowledge; it is emancipated from its bondage to body and to sense, and restored to its preexistent perfection. - While Plato esteemed only abstract types, Aristotle laid stress on concrete individualities, assailed the theory of ideas as baseless and fantastic, and proposed instead the theory of causes. He recognized four metaphysical causes or principles, matter, form, motive power, and end, which all resolve themselves into the fundamental antithesis of matter and form. The form, which is life, being added to matter, to which also is ascribed an element of desire, transforms potentiality into actuality; thus a statue results from matter in the quarry and form in the mind of the artist, and nature is but an evolution of the forms of divine intelligence. These forms, unlike the Platonic ideas, are not accomplished, self-subsistent, and permanent entities, but constitute at once an eternal energy or entelechy and its eternal product.
The actual does not follow, but coincides with the potential; the form or essence of nature is nothing else than the way to nature, its realizing activity and also its proper end. The ideal and real elements which Plato had set apart were thus closely bound together. Forms, as motive principles pervading the universe, have their source in God the first mover, who is being in perfect activity, and bears nothing m himself which is merely potential. As Platonism culminated in the conception of ideas, Aristotelianism culminated in that of motion, energy, or life, working in all things, and the ground of their existence and development. Reality belongs only to particulars; complete knowledge requires complete experience; but all possible determinations of being are contained in ten categories, their relation to which may be discovered by syllogistic reasoning. The Aristotelian system of logic was scarcely improved until the present century. The systems of Plato and Aristotle (often designated respectively as the academic and the peripatetic philosophy) are illustrious examples of the ideal and real, or a priori and a posteriori schools, which have existed in every age of speculation. - The decline of the Greek spirit and civilization was marked by three systems of philosophy, conceived with indifference to speculative truth.
The skepticism of Pyrrho denied the possibility of certitude concerning anything objective, and proposed a thoughtless and aimless acquiescence in the impulses of nature as the law of life. His system was maintained by the leaders of the new academy, Arcesilaus and Carneades, and anticipated the absolute doubt of AEnesidemus and Sextus Empiricus. Epicurus proposed as the goal of philosophy a scheme of morals that should inevitably lead to happiness. The aim of his physics was to rid mankind of the terrors that come from belief in God and immortality, and the aim of his logic was to banish the troubles that come from error. The universe is an aggregation of atoms, moving by chance; the soul terminates with death; and in a remote space the gods lead a changeless, careless life, ignoring all management of things. Plutarch reproached this system with total sterility of great men and great actions. Stoicism, on the contrary, was' recommended by its heroes. Founded by Zeno, a native of Cyprus, and developed by Cleanthes and Chrysippus, it sought to establish a discipline of virtue in an age of degeneracy.
Assuming that all the materials of knowledge are furnished by sense, it maintained that assent or the free exercise of reason is also required to constitute opinion, and thus proposed a subjective criterion of truth. Nature is composed of passive matter and active ruling reason, and to live harmoniously with nature or conformably to reason is the moral law. Intellectual or rational existence is thus alone recognized; passions, pleasures, and pains are to be ignored and despised. - The Romans, to whom the results of the Greek schools were made known by Cicero, originated nothing in the progress of philosophy. Epicureanism was represented among them by Lucretius, and stoicism by Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, but neither acquired new speculative elements; the former inspired the lower, and the latter, which was an anticipation of the national genius, inspired the higher qualities of Roman life. Seeking only a rule of conduct and government, excelling only in the arts of legislation, the Romans aimed to apply rather than discover principles, and borrowed the ideas not only of Greece, but also, through the Ptolemies and Seleucidae, of Egypt and Asia. - The Alexandrian school originated in the collision of Christian, Jewish, and pagan thought.
Its problem, suggested by Philo Judseus, and by oriental dualism, which ascribed evil to matter, was to mediate between the infinite and the finite, the perfection of God and the imperfection of creation. Hence the Gnostic scheme of emanations, which interposed successive intermediate ranks of being, a demiurge, or world-builder, and countless eeons. This scheme was almost infinitely varied. Analogous to it was the speculation of the Neo-Platonists, whose aim was a philosophical monism that should put an end to the dualism of subjectivity and objectivity. They borrowed freely from Plato, and to some extent from Aristotle; but their hope and effort to obtain absolute truth was based, not on the methods of objective knowledge, or any dialectic process, but on an inner mystic subjective exaltation, which amounted to immediate vision or ecstasy. Plotinus, the chief thinker of the school, was at once a Platonist and a mystic. His pantheism harmonized with his theory of the possibility of attaining to that vision of the eternal reason, or universal soul, which he claims repeatedly to have enjoyed. Porphyry and Iamblichus were his successors, combining their philosophy with theurgy and applying it to the defence of pagan ritual.
Proclus, in whose time the school had been removed to Athens, was more a pagan hiero-phant and mystic than a philosopher. Before the decree of Justinian (A. D. 529) forcibly suppressed Neo-Platonic speculation, it had run its course, and demonstrated its lack of the elements of permanent vitality. ' The power of Julian and the genius of Hypatia could only temporarily arrest its decay. - Scholasticism was the result of a variety of cooperative elements, which united to mould the philosophy that bears this name. The early Christian fathers, with the exception of Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen, repelled rather than courted the alliance of philosophy. Some, like Tertullian, were violent in its rejection. But the defence of dogma, especially against Arius, taught them the necessity of a more subtle logic. Augustine was inclined to Platonism, in accordance with which he systematized or defended Christian doctrine. Aristotle commanded increased respect, and Boethius was regarded as an authority. Yet for centuries philosophy existed scarcely in name. Except among the Saracens and Jews, it experienced no marked revival till the rise of scholasticism.
This was the adaptation of eclectic principles to the conditions of dogma that had crystallized to a fixed form under the influence of tradition and authority. At first its aim was to elucidate and vindicate doctrine, then to harmonize speculation with faith, and finally, by the aid of reason, to suppress the opposition of reason to dogmas too inviolable to be questioned. In doing this, it broke with the spirit of the age, and fell under its assaults. Its first period dates from John Sco-tus Erigena (died about 880), who translated the Pseudo-Dionysius, through him imbibed Neo-Platonic views, and pronounced philosophy the science of the principles of all things, and inseparable from religion. In his system are found the germs of mediaeval mysticism and dialectic scholasticism. Although disapproved by the leading authorities of the church, he found adherents, and furnished a point of departure for that conflict between nominalism and realism which thenceforth runs through the whole history of the scholastic philosophy.
A realist himself, he could invoke Platonism in his defence; but he thereby provoked his opponents to exalt the exclusive authority of Aristotle. The doctrine ascribed to Plato, and involved in his theory of ideas, that universals have an existence anterior to individual objects (Universalia ante rem), was the ground of conflict between the two parties. Nominalism contended that only individuals have real existence; that universal notions are mere names, conceptions without reality. They denied genera and species apart from the concrete individual. Their motto was, Universalia post rem, and they appealed to Aristotle as authority. The disputes of the time prepared the way for a more careful study of the works of the Stagirite, soon to be supplied from Arabian sources. Meanwhile speculation took its course, and philosophical antagonisms became more pronounced. Anselm (died in 1109) planned a system of philosophy mainly accordant with that of Augustine. While harmonizing religion with reason, fixed religious convictions were presupposed. By some he has been regarded as the inventor of scholastic metaphysics, while others have given the preference to Abelard, and still others have pronounced Alexander of Hales the first schoolman.
It was when William of Champeaux had become the champion of the realists, and nominalism (under Roscellinus, on account of his free speculations on the Trinity) was falling into disrepute, that the latter was reen-forced by a new impulse from an unexpected quarter. Aristotle, through the channel of Arabian learning, shaped the philosophy of Christendom. Through the Nestorian and Syrian Christians Arabian scholars had become acquainted with the writings of Aristotle. The patronage of the caliphs encouraged their translation and study. A philosophy was developed, which was a form of Aristotelianism, tempered with Neo-Platonic conceptions. Its most distinguished representatives were, in the East, Alkindi, Alfarabius (died about 950) with his doctrine of emanations, Avicenna, a stricter Aristotelian, noted for his physical speculations, and Algazzali; while in the West were Avempace, Abubacer (Ibn Tophail), and Aver-roes, the celebrated commentator on Aristotle, pantheistic in speculation, and rejecting the notion of individual immortality.
Mystical tendencies were combined with philosophic speculation, and Ibn Tophail of Cordova anticipates Rousseau in his sketch of the " man of nature," self-developed, and rising by degrees of contemplation to union with the Deity.
Through the close connection of. the Jews and Moors in Spain, Jewish and Arabic philosophy were at some points correlated. The Jewish Cabala was a system of emanations, reflecting the influence of Plato and Aristotle, making the idea of God transcendent, and exalting him above space and time. Avicebron (Solomon ben Gabirol) wrote (1059) under Neo-Platonic sympathies. A reaction favorable to Aristotle followed, and the attempt was made to reconcile his philosophy with Jewish theology. Moses Maimonides (1135-1204), a pupil of Averroes, ascribed to Aristotle unconditional authority in science. Levi ben Gerson distinguished himself as a commentator on Averroes; and when Arabian philosophy was proscribed by Mohammedan rulers, it found an asylum among Spanish Jews. By their translations, the Aristotelian philosophy was more fully brought to the knowledge of the scholastics. This better acquaintance with Aristotle contributed to the ascendancy of nominalism. His philosophy was applied to natural theology, and its theistic character favored its spread. But its ascendancy was not secured without a conflict. Albertus Magnus (died in 1280) first shaped scholasticism in harmony with the Aristotelian system.
Blending Neo-Platonist notions with those of Aristotle, he originated disputes on matter and form, essence and being. Thomas Aquinas (died in 1274), the greatest thinker of his age, followed Augustine on some points, and anticipated Leibnitz on others. Like his great opponent Duns Scotus (died in 1308), the founder of the Scotists, he was a realist, blending Platonism with his Aristotelian philosophy. Scotus asserted that the universal is contained in the individual, that it is not created by the understanding, but communicated to it; while in theology he sought to fortify the cosmological proof of the existence of God. He excluded philosophy from the sphere of dogma, thus going beyond Aquinas, who denied that the non-eternity of the world was demonstrable on philosophical grounds. William of Occam (died in 1347), without constructing a positive system, was the powerful assailant of realism, denying its fundamental doctrine, or that ideas can exist except in the understanding, and, while refuting at length the theory of objective images, unintentionally perhaps gave an impulse to empiricism and skepticism.
His opponents were numerous, but nominalism, under Gerson and D'Ailly, held its ground at Paris; and when the French theologians returned from the council of Constance, they boasted that in the sentence of Huss their philosophy had triumphed over realism. But dissatisfaction with the dubious results of speculation had encouraged mystical tendencies. John Bonaventura had set an example which was followed by the illustrious Gerson. Scholasticism was weakened by its internal discords and the secession of the mystics. Its dictatorial tone provoked opposition; the philologists of the renaissance attacked it; the reformers did not spare it; the revival of the Platonic philosophy in Italy contributed to its discomfiture; the mathematicians and natural philosophers openly broke with it; and bold and sometimes rash speculators, like Paracelsus, Cardan, and Pomponatius, undermined the old philosophical strongholds. Although the credit of Aristotle was maintained by Melanch-thon (in his riper years) and Camerarius, and commanded respect in England as well as on the continent, far on into the 17th century, it was already on the wane.
He was opposed by Telesius, refuted by Patrizzi, rejected by Bruno, who in some of his theories of God and nature anticipated Spinoza, and confronted also by the skepticism of an age that found its expositors in Montaigne and Charron. - The 16th century stimulated thought, but gave to philosophy no systematic development. Science made great progress, and daring speculators were not wanting. But in the early part of the 17th century the foundations of two systems, the objective and subjective, or empiricism and idealism, were laid by Bacon and Descartes. Bacon's attention was strongly attracted to physical science. He rejected the mysteries of alchemy, and all the a priori assumptions which anticipated the conclusions of science. These conclusions, he held, must be reached, not by Aristotelian logic or submission to the dicta of speculatists, but by a careful investigation and comparison of phenomena. This method is induction, the key to natural philosophy, and the only proper method to extend the solid foundations of knowledge. Nature must be interpreted, not anticipated, and anterior to experience there is no place for hypothesis. In this empiricism was the skeptical element of the Baconian philosophy, of which Hobbes made effective use in his manifold ethical and metaphysical speculations.
The result was a materialism which derived all knowledge from sense; and although sharply attacked by the Cambridge Platonists, More and Cudworth, it did not fail to leave its impress upon the philosophy of Locke. Bacon had excluded from the field of investigation preconceived notions which might put a false interpretation on the facts of nature. Locke, rejecting the theory of innate ideas, made the mind a tabula rasa, but capable of reflecting upon the impressions received through the sense. Of outward things it knows only the qualities that impress the sense, not the nature or the substance of the things. Upon the knowledge thus acquired the mind operates, and all its knowledge is from the two sources of sensation and reflection. In Italy Campanella, a half century before Locke, had more than anticipated him in making sensation the source of knowledge. He resolved into sensation all the operations of the mind. Two years (1637) before his death appeared the Discoursde la methode of Descartes, the text book which laid the foundations of modern idealism. Like Campanella, he had passed through an experience of skepticism, but he was not satisfied to overcome doubt by the testimony of the senses. His object was to constitute philosophy a demonstrable science.
To this end he begins with doubt. He admits the illusory nature of the phenomenal. The basis of valid knowledge is that consciousness which gives evidence of the ego and the non-ego, spirit and matter, subject and object: Cogito, ergo sum. His theistic argument has already been cited. He made clearness and distinctness the criteria of true thought. As the certainty of the self-conscious spirit was the foundation of his philosophy, the superiority of mind to matter and the peculiar idealism of his system was the necessary result. By his doctrine of assistentia he accounts for the communion between soul and body. Fatal as the speculations of Descartes were to the lingering authority of scholasticism, they were weakened by their connection with groundless scientific theories. Pascal and Huet gave evidence of more sympathy with his original doubt than his philosophical assurance. Gassendi was one of his opponents, and Geu-lincx and Malebranche materially modified his system. Malebranche, followed to some extent by John Norris of Bemerton, indulged in mystic tendencies, making knowledge the result of the union of the soul with God, or of a constant divine indwelling by which divine ideas are made apprehensible to us.
The most pregnant apophthegm of his philosophy was, We see all things in God. - The theory of Descartes supplied Spinoza with a scientific form for his system. From the postulates of substance and causality, he deduces his conclusions after the mathematical method. His postulate of substance is that of one absolute essence, an infinite being, with infinite attributes of extension and thought. In this unity the dualism of mind and matter is swallowed up. Finite beings are only modes of the infinite attributes. All exist in the Deity, their inherent cause, natura naturans, and all necessarily proceed therefrom. Here is the base of Spinoza's imposing pantheism and universal necessity. Leibnitz, a universal acholar and an acute critic, reached his ideal standpoint by spiritualizing matter, and increasing to infinitude the number of substances. He identifies matter with active force, and in his universe composed of "monads" bestows perception, more or less distinct, upon every atom, each of which in its own way represents and reflects the universe. To meet the objection that each monad has its own law, and that it is impracticable to combine it with another, as soul with body, over which it can have no control, he devised his doctrine of preestablished harmony.
God is the monas primitiva, from whom all finite monads are derived; and besides these and phenomena, which are perceptions of monads, nothing exists. In contending for certain necessary truths, not mathematical but metaphysical, which must be sought in the soul itself, and not certified by experiment, Leibnitz prepared the way for the categories of Kant. Wolf rejected indeed his notions of monads and preestablished harmony, retaining his optimism and determinism, and sketching out for the first time a complete encyclopaedia of the philosophical sciences. - In Germany and France the influence of Locke was powerfully felt. In the latter country Con-dillac reduced Locke's two sources of knowledge to sensation alone, 'and in transformed sensations explained all the high attainments of human intelligence developed in his ideal statue. His system fell in with the French reaction of his time, and was in sympathy with the theory of self-love advanced by Hel-vetius, the moralist of sensationalism. Another stage of progress was reached in the materialistic atheism of La Mettrie and D'Hol-bach. To this result the writings of Hume had contributed, but in England and Scotland the philosophy of Locke had not been subjected altogether to an exclusively sensualistic interpretation.
In rejecting innate ideas, and positing qualities, as color and sound, in the perceiving subject, he prepared the way for Berkeley to assert that only minds and their ideas exist, and that the permanence of ideas is the proof of an Eternal Mind to which they are uninterruptedly present. But this position, in connection with Locke's sensationalism and empiricism, gave occasion to the skeptical philosophy of Hume, who applied the principles thus evolved, denying the possibility of knowing the nature and mode of the objective connection between cause and effect, and thus disputing the philosophical legitimacy of the attempt to transcend by means of the causal idea the field of experience, or thus conclude the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. This skepticism, destructive not only of speculative philosophy, but of the foundations of all real knowledge, was combated in Scotland by Reid, who sought to establish against it his "philosophy of common sense," in which he rejected representative ideas; while in Germany it stimulated Kant to an examination of the foundations and conditions of human knowledge.
Educated in the school of Wolf, but sympathizing more with Descartes than with Leibnitz, he produced his "Critique of Pure Reason," in which he assumes that our first step must be to scrutinize the processes of the mind, and thus determine, not what is the nature of things, but what can man know. All cognition is the product of two factors, the cognizing subject and the cognized object. One of these contributes the matter, the other gives it form. Perceptions without notions are blind, and notions without perceptions are void. Yet we do not know things as they are in themselves, but in their perceptions, while the forms native to the mind, the categories on which thought is conditioned, add to the given manifold of perception, and to us modify the objects. Thus criticism sets insurmountable bounds to the speculative reason, and might seem to favor an absolute skepticism. But against this result Kant guards in his "Critique of Practical Reason," where he begins with moral principles, and from the moral law, attested by conscience, conducts us to God, the source and author of the law, without whom the law could not exist. Here is the ground of the certainty of a rational faith.
Jacobi objected to Kant that his philosophy destroyed itself by an intrinsic contradiction, since to come to the "critique" of reason, one must first have a causal nexus, uniting the thinking subject and its object. Reinhold at first found this in consciousness, but Jacobi, averse to dogmatical theories which admitted no truth without demonstration, and which led logically to determinism and pantheism, sought to avoid the difficulty by founding all philosophical knowledge on belief, which he describes as an instinct of reason. The external world is revealed to us by the senses, and things imperceptible, as spiritual truths, by an internal sense; and by this twofold revelation man is awakened to consciousness and a sense of free will. Schleiermacher followed Kant only to a limited extent, and, as a student of Plato and Spinoza, as well as of contemporary thinkers, was rather a critic of the systems of others than the author of one of his own. His position, while not without deep philosophical significance, was more important in the religious sphere. Fries, following Jacobi's line of thought, developed the doctrine that the sensible is the object of knowledge, the supra-sensible the object of faith.
He held also that only a posteriori, or through internal experience, can we become conscious that, and how, we possess cognitions a priori. Fichte, adopting some of Kant's peculiar opinions, pushed to an extreme their subjective idealistic tendency. The Ego was made to take the place of the absolute principle. The matter of representations, as well as the form, was the result of its activity, and the manifold contents of experience, like the a priori forms of cognition, are produced by a creative faculty in us. The Ego posits both itself and the non-Ego, and recognizes itself as one with the latter. But with these results of his speculative philosophy Fichte connects the positive conclusions of his practical philosophy. The individual is deduced from the absolute Ego, for morality demands the distinction of individuals; yet the rise of the limits of the individual is pronounced incomprehensible. The world is the material of duty in the forms of sense, and God is identified with the order of the world. In his later speculations Fichte, making the absolute his point of departure, approximated to the position more distinctly taken by Schelling. The latter transformed Fichte's doctrine of the Ego, accepted by him, through combination with Spinozism, into the doctrine of identity.
He made subject and object, ideal and real, spirit and nature, identical in the absolute. He designated as the soul of the world a vital principle residing in nature, and uniting all inorganic and organic existences in one complete organism. By successively incorporating into his system various elements, he developed a syncretistic doctrine approximating to mysticism. Rejecting these elements, yet in agreement with the original position of Schelling, Hegel held that it is not anything individual, not the Ego, that is the prius of all reality, but, on the contrary, something universal which comprehends in it every individual, and in which the principle of difference is immanent. Finite things are not simply phenomena for us, existing only in consciousness, but phenomena per se, having the ground of their being not in themselves, but in the universal divine idea. This idea, the absolute, is the unity of life and cognition, the universal that thinks itself, and thinkingly realizes itself in an infinite actuality. It reveals itself in nature and spirit, not only underlying both as their substance, but as rational subject returning through them, by means of a progressive development from the lowest to the highest stages, from its state of self-alienation to itself.
Its self-development is threefold: 1, in the abstract element of thought; 2, in nature; 3, in spirit - following the order of thesis, antithesis, synthesis. The aim of Hegel's philosophy is, first to elevate consciousness to the point of absolute knowledge, and then to develop the entire contents of this knowledge by means of the dialectical method. Herbart took his point of departure, not from Kant, but from Fichte, to whose subjective idealism he opposed the fundamental doctrine of the plurality of simple real essences, somewhat akin to the monadological doctrine of Leibnitz. This, from its predominant character, he named realism. His logic agrees in principle with Kant's. Conceptions must be modified or transformed, so that they shall not contradict being, and this is the proper work of speculation. But this necessity requires us to admit the doctrine of a multiplicity of essences. Beneke (died about 1854), opposing Hegel and Herbart, and following Kant, emphasized internal experience. His guiding thought is, that through self-consciousness we know ourselves psychically as we are, but are able only imperfectly to know the external world through the senses, its true nature being apprehensible only as we suppose analogies of our psychical life to underlie the phenomena of the world of sense.
Schopenhauer (died in 1860) taught, with Kant, that space, time, and the categories have a purely subjective origin, valid only for phenomena which are merely subjective representations in consciousness. He denies, however, that the real is unknowable, and finds it in will, taken in a broad sense, so that it includes not only conscious desire, but also unconscious instinct, and the forces which manifest themselves in inorganic nature. The absolutely real cannot be termed a transcendental object, since each object has its corresponding subject, and all objects are simply representations in the subject, and hence phenomena. Weakened by internal contradictions, Schopenhauer's system is most noted for its development of pessimism, in which the results of his subjective experience have been supposed to be reflected. Trendelenburg (died in 1872) represents the new phase of German philosophy resulting from the reaction which followed the growing distrust of the absolute idealism of Hegel. He could accept no speculative principle from which the sciences could be developed dialectically, by an a priori process. Hegel's "pure thought," without content, was impossible. To become a starting point at all, it must subsume a posteriori conceptions.
The fancied demonstration of the identity of thought and being was unsound. From these (each of them nothing or repose) becoming, or motion, is assumed to be derived. But in this space and time are involved, yet it is successively assumed in Hegel's designation of the steps in the progress of pure thought. External motion is thus the postulate of a logic that would postulate nothing. With Kant also Trendelenburg joins issue, claiming, against his assumption, that time and space are not merely subjective, but objective and subjective at the same time. In the neglect of the history of philosophy, Trendelenburg found one explanation of the unsoundness of the views he opposed. With Plato he made philosophy the sentinel over the bounds of the sciences, developing their underlying unity. The existence of a real objective world does not need to be proved. It is the grounds of our belief in this reality that belong to philosophy. Now in cognition the antithesis of thought and being is involved. The principle that shall mediate between these must be one common to both. It must be active, primitive, simple. Let motion be hypothetically assumed as such principle. On examination, it meets the conditions required. It may be regarded as the prius of experience.
From it result eight categories, the first of which is causality. If motion is the first energy of thought and being, the resulting categories express relations at once objective and subjective. The chasm between the real and the ideal is bridged over. The notion of purpose, for Trendelenburg the second fundamental notion in philosophy, enables him to pass from the physical into the organic and ethical realm. Thought takes motion into its service. The final cause controls the efficient cause in identifying itself with it. The inadequacy of the efficient is the indirect proof of the designing cause. From these principles Trendelenburg develops his ethical and theistic doctrines. Ul-rici (born in 1806), one of the most eminent of living German philosophers, aims to construct a philosophy of idealism on a realistic basis. His object is almost identical with Kant's. He agrees with Trendelenburg in pronouncing a delusion the pretension of Hegel that his philosophy assumed nothing. There are certain laws that control every mental operation, and to these the skeptic as well as the dogmatist is subject. Nothing can be known except as differentiated from something else. Hence all knowledge is relative. There are certain modes in which we must differentiate things, and these are the logical categories.
These are the a priori conditions of knowledge, and are implicitly given in the nature of the mind itself. The notion of the absolute implies them, and hence cannot be the starting point of philosophy. In like manner, the experience philosophy that would trace everything back in sensation is seen to be untenable. But the modes of conception to which we are compelled by the laws of thought have not a merely subjective validity. There is an external world, forcing itself upon us through the senses, the existence of which no idealist can deny. External objects exist, and when we study them scientifically we are forced to differentiate and classify them according to the logical categories. We find laws of thought, which are also laws of things, and yet neither derived from the other. Nature's methods are rational, and nature is intelligible only as the work of a rational mind. By this line of thought, Ulrici seeks to confute at once sensational philosophy, atheism, and pantheism, and to establish the connection between the objective reality and the cognizing mind. E. von Hartmann (born in 1840) has recently made a step in a new direction. He attempts to reach speculative results by inductions from physical science.
He examines the phenomena of the unconscious, appearing in the actions of the body and soul of man, plants, and animals, and, taking the sum of the individual instances as the one principle underlying all, he designates by the term of "the unconscious " what Spinoza calls the sole substance of all things, Hegel the idea, and Schopenhauer the will. He employs the term only provisionally and temporarily, understanding the unconscious to be: 1, that which forms and maintains organisms, repairs their external and internal injuries, adapts their movements, and places them at the disposal of the conscious will; 2, that which in the instinct is needed for the preservation of a being, and for which conscious thought is insufficient; 3, that which preserves the species through sexual and maternal love, perfects them through selection in sexual love, and leads mankind to the goal of the highest possible perfection; 4, that which determines the actions of man through apprehensions and sentiments wherever he is not able to make a choice by conscious thought; 5, that which assists the process of conscious thought through intuitions, and which in mysticism aids man toward the apprehension of higher and supersensual unities; 6, that which blesses man with the sentiment for the beautiful and for artistic production. - French philosophy, during the closing part of the last century, was completely under the influence of the school of Oondillac. Metaphysics was regarded as nothing but the analysis of sensations.
As these might be considered with reference either to the organs of sensation or to the mind, the school was divided into two branches, one represented by Cabanis, so thorough a materialist that he pronounced thought a secretion of the brain, and the other by De-stutt de Tracy, who sought to derive from the experience of volition notions not given in sensation. A reaction followed, in part theological, represented by Bonald, Lamennais, and De Maistre, and in part psychological, represented by Maine de Biran and Royer-Collard. Lamennais followed Pascal in emphasizing the illusions of sense and the weakness of reason, to find in universal consent a better basis for religious certitude; while De Maistre, the founder of modern ultramontanism, framed a philosophy of history in harmony with his creed. Maine de Biran objected to the sensationalists, that they formed their notions of internal after the analogy of external causes. Royer-Collard introduced into France the Scotch philosophy, especially insisting upon Reid's distinctions and principles. His most distinguished disciple was Victor Cousin (1792-1867), who originated the eclectic school, designed to occupy a middle place between the German and the Scotch philosophy.
For a time attracted strongly by German idealism, and approximating to pantheistic views, his later course, especially after his historical studies, was more in the line of the Scotch philosophy. In close sympathy with him, as the most celebrated of his disciples, was Theodore Jouffroy (1796-1842), really his superior in a spirit of method and precision, who from his psychological standpoint, which he never deserted, extended his speculations into aesthetics and moral philosophy. The peculiar circumstances of French social life meanwhile drew large attention to questions of social philosophy, in connection with which the elements of human nature, including the passions and affections, were studied, and the relations of individualism to social order were investigated. In this sphere Saint-Simon, Fourier, Leroux, and some writers on questions of political economy, have won distinction. Auguste Oomte (1798-1857) is known as the founder of the positivist school, the fundamental doctrine of which is the denial of all metaphysics, and the limitation of positive knowledge to the exclusion of all assertion of first or final causes.
Allied to this is the position of the three states, theological, metaphysical, and positive, through which the individual mind and the human race alike must pass in their progressive development. Of recent French writers on different branches of philosophy may be mentioned Bouillier, the historian of Cartesianism; Paul Janet, a critic of Biich-ner's materialism; Jules Simon; Damiron; T. H. Martin; E. Vacherot, author of numerous philosophical works, among them a "Dictionary of Philosophical Sciences;" and E. Saisset, whose edition of Spinoza has taken its place as a classic in philosophical literature. - In Italy the name of Vico (1668-1744) is the most illustrious among the philosophical thinkers of the 18th century. His Scienza nuova produced a deep impression beyond the bounds of his own country. In the comprehensiveness of his survey of the philosophy of history, he embraced all science and all elements of human progress. He has been pronounced "the founder of the philosophy of history, and of the psychology of races or nations." In more recent times philosophical development has been influenced mainly by two diverse tendencies, that of Descartes and Malebranche (idealism) on one side, and that of Locke and Oondillac (sensationalism) on the other.
With the revival of national aspirations, a native and more independent philosophy sprang up. The representative of empiricism was Melchiorre Gioja (1767-1829), a follower of Oondillac in psychology, of Bacon in method, and of Bentham in morals. He was followed by Romagnosi, who however rejected the notion that ideas are but transformed sensations, and held that the harmony between the faculties of the mind and the forces of nature is the foundation of all philospphy. He opposed Rousseau's views of civil society, and maintained that right is subordinate to duty. Galuppi (1770-1846) sought to establish the validity of knowledge by the analysis of thought, directing his attention mainly to psychology, which, with ideology, he made to embrace all metaphysical science. Dividing philosophy into subjective and objective, he inclined to Kant rather than to Locke, and his views of duty and of theism were Kantian. Rosmini (1797-1855) was the founder of modern idealism in Italy. He rejects all the generally accepted solutions of the problem of knowledge, in part admitting Kant's views, but excepting to his extreme of subjective perception. He holds the primitive and necessary intuition to be the idea of possible being.
To matter he concedes a primitive sensibility, holding with Campanella that chemical atoms are endowed with a principle of life, and with Bruno that a universal soul exists in nature, whose sphere is indefinite space. Creation is the result of that divine love which is the necessity of absolute being. It is God in its ideal essence, but not in its realization, which is finite. Mamiani (born in 1799) is an ontologist, holding immediate perception as the only foundation of the knowledge of reality. But combined with perception in the unity of mental action is intellection, which consists in the relation of the mind to ideas, which are intellectual symbols of the absolute reality, and in the divine mind are real objects. The existence of God is thus founded on the very nature of primitive intuition, and its demonstration a 'priori is a simple process of induction from the principle of identity. Combined with these views is Ma-miani's elaborate scheme of cosmology. To the ontological school also belongs Gioberti (1801-52). He dissented radically from Eos-mini, to whom he bears somewhat of the relation of Plato to Aristotle. He commends the sobriety of English and Scotch philosophy, but recognizes no true modern philosophers after Malebranche and Leibnitz. While the starting point of Rosmini's speculations is psychological, that of Gioberti is ontological.
He begins with the idea, asserting that we see directly and immediately the ideal being, which can be no modification or subjective form of the human spirit; and this ideal being we regard as identical with absolute being. Only as this is made objectively real can we fully conquer sensism, nominalism, and skepticism. Plato's ideas are but abstractions unless they be concrete in the idea of the being. Revelation alone can assist us to decipher the grand enigmas of man and the universe, and avoid the extremes of pantheism or dualism. The philosophy of Scripture is founded upon a single axiom, expressible in one word, creation: " the Being creates existences." This, properly conceived, fully resolves the question of the origin of ideas. Insisting upon the intimate union of philosophy and religion, Gioberti exclaims: "I establish philosophy upon a formula as ancient as the creation." Augusta Vera (born about 1817) is the recognized head of the Hegelian school in Italy, to the exposition of the views of which he has devoted his pen.
Ventura (1792-1861) was the representative of scholasticism, placing the authority of the church above reason and all else, and holding that philosophy culminated in Aquinas. Positivism, implying the negation of all metaphysical science, is represented by G. Ferrari, who makes experience the only foundation of true knowledge, and asserts that Hegel only produced a philosophy of contradictions, and that his failure shows the futility of all metaphysical speculation. Sympathizing with him are Franchi (whose real name is Francesco Bona-vino) and others, who, asserting the relativity of knowledge, pronounce all questions as to the absolute and infinite insoluble, and limit philosophy to natural science. - In Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, the Scandinavian and Slavic countries, and Hungary, the various schools of German philosophy have exerted successively a not inconsiderable influence. At Ghent a modernized Gartesianism has been defended by Huet, a pupil at Paris of Dumoulin. In Lou-vain, Ubaghs, as a disciple of Bonald, taught a doctrine of supernatural ontologism, which was opposed by the Jesuits. In Holland the recent names most significant in the history of philosophy are Hemsterhuis, Wyttenbach, Van Heusde, and Opzoomer. In Norway, Hegelianism is represented by Monrad, and in Sweden the Kantian philosophy by Boethius, and that of Fichte and Schelling by Hoijer, while Bostrom follows Leibnitz, and Borelius, Hegel. - In England, the history of philosophy in the 18th century, after Berkeley, is illustrated by the speculations of Hume, already referred to; Andrew Baxter, who wrote in defence of the immateriality of the soul, asserting against Berkeley the reality of the external world, and also that it is neither eternal nor uncreated; David Hartley, who by his doctrine of vibrations prepared the way for the materialism of Priestley, and by his theory of association for the speculations of Adam Smith; Joseph Priestley, who maintained the doctrines of the materialism of the soul and philosophical necessity, in which he was sustained by Thomas Belsham, and opposed by Richard Price; Erasmus Darwin, who, holding the dualism of matter and spirit, derived ideas from physical impressions on the fibres which constitute the immediate organs of sense; and Abraham Tucker, who in the broad range of his speculations aimed to harmonize extreme views, and to be himself conservative, while sometimes giving a free scope to philosophical fancy, and discussing a great variety of topics theological and philosophical, including the relations of the spirit to matter, liberty, and necessity.
In Scotland, Oswald, Beattie, and Campbell united with Eeid in opposing and refuting the skeptical philosophy of Hume. At the commencement of the present century, Dugald Stewart modified Beid's technology, conceding more than he did to the laws of association, while approaching nearly to Hume's position in his estimate of the notion of causality. He was succeeded by Thomas Brown, who, following Reid and Stewart in the doctrine of original intuitions taking the place of unproved first principles in a system of knowledge, rejected their doctrine of consciousness, and, though agreeing with Hume in resolving cause into invariable antecedence and consequence, differed with him in ascribing our notion of it, not to mere custom, but to irresistible intuitive belief. In closer sympathy with Stewart was Sir James Mackintosh. More eminent than any of these was the late Sir William Hamilton, the annotator of Reid, whom he follows in asserting that consciousness makes us immediately cognizant of the non-Ego, at the same time maintaining the relativity of all knowledge, that the infinite and absolute are simply inconceivable, and that an uncaused and self-existent being can be only the object of faith.
While a disciple of Hamilton, Mansel differed from him, as from Kant, on certain points of immediate knowledge, while he pushed Hamilton's principles beyond the point at which Hamilton had left them, contending that thought and knowledge are limited to conditioned and finite objects; that the unconditioned can be only negatively known; that while the " limits of religious thought " may be fixed, the sphere of faith transcends reason, and suffices to resolve difficulties which reason cannot overcome. From both Hamilton and Mansel Henry Calderwood dissents with respect to their theory of the knowledge of the infinite, making a positive theism the condition of our knowledge of the finite, and denying the opposition of faith to knowledge. James F. Ferrier, disclaiming idealism, adopted idealistic positions, asserting that the only material world which truly exists is one along with which intelligence also exists, so that the mere material would have no real and absolute existence; at the same time it is not a mere entity, since there is no non-entity, any more than entity, out of relation to intelligence.
The associational psychology, which in some of its elements may be traced back to Hartley, received a new impulse from Thomas Brown. It was adopted in part by Alison, and more fully by James Mill, who confounded the doctrines of Hartley and Hume, making sensation a kind of feeling, and the idea its permanent residuum. By means of association, memory, voluntary states of mind and the moral sentiments are explained. John Stuart Mill extended this principle of inseparable association, announced by his father, to the solution of many philosophical problems, although admitting that it was inadequate to account for belief. The idea of causation is indispensable in analyzing our conceptions of matter and mind. The axioms of mathematical and physical science are the results of induction, and in other worlds, or to other minds than ours, might cease to be valid. Matter is defined as "a permanent possibility of sensation," and mind is resolved into "a series of feelings with a background of possibilities of feeling." The real existence of the external world cannot be philosophically proved. As to human freedom, the law of causality applies in the same strict sense to human actions as to other phenomena.
Alexander Bain, in treating of the senses and the intellect, the emotions, will, etc, follows in the line of Hartley and James Mill, but makes use of the results of modern physiology, and applies them with much acuteness to mental phenomena. In his view of the close relations of matter and mind, he seems to approach the doctrine of their identity in a single substance.' Herbert Spencer, like J. S. Mill, agreeing with Hamilton as to the relativity of knowledge, admits that by the necessities of finite and conditioned thinking we are compelled to assume an infinite and absolute, and also to form approximately definite notions of the same, although these notions must be progressively modified. The object of religious sentiment is, and will ever continue to be, the unknown source of things. The ethical sentiment in man is explained as the consolidated experience of generations, transmitted and accumulated. By his scheme of a general system of philosophy, in which he rivals the comprehensiveness of Comte, Spencer has commanded for his speculations the attention of both admirers and critics in England and this country. His starting point is the doctrine of evolution. Progress in organic development is from homogeneity to heterogeneity. Many of his conclusions are the results of this principle.
As to matter and .mind, they are sometimes presented as simple series of phenomena, and sometimes as permanently real, since persistence in consciousness supposes correspondence in permanent forces. Science and religion alike agree in assuming a permanent all-pervading force; but revealed religion or scientific theology is impossible, because, under the law of development or evolution, there must be endless modification in human conceptions of that force. Herbert Spencer's able French translator, Dr. E. Gazelles, sums up his philosophical method thus: " Starting from positive science, the different branches whereof he traces in their concentric progress up to their widest generalizations, he attaches these generalizations to the loftiest abstract conceptions that they all suggest, and brings them back together to the principle which officiates in the double capacity of supporting all the truths, and expressing an intuition of consciousness. He thus welds the most advanced results of experience to the legitimate and inevitable results of a priori speculation.
Finally, by way of reduction, he derives from this first principle the laws which sum up the movement of things, and founds on an undeniable truth a theory of development which he afterward verifies by the different orders of knowledge, and by the history of the cosmos." As the predominant characteristic of Mr. Spencer's method is the coordination and synthesis of hitherto disunited branches of thought, he designates his system a synthetic philosophy. In regard to the great conflict between the intu-itionalists and the experientialists regarding the origin of ideas, Mr. Spencer maintains that each school holds a partial truth. All knowledge is derived from experience, but all knowledge of the individual is by no means derived from his own experience. From this point of view of evolution the mental faculties are the products of the intercourse of the organism with its environment under the operation of the principle of heredity. The experiences of the race become organized and transmitted by inheritance, and thus have the effect of intuitions or a priori elements in the hereditary intellect and conscience of mankind.
Among many recent English philosophical writers, the influenceof Coleridge and of German andFrench philosophers, as well as of physiologists and scientists, may be distinctly traced. The course of speculation has been modified largely by the publications of Darwin, Huxley, and Tyndall. Antagonistic in tendency to these, in many points, are the writings of a considerable class of thinkers who were trained under the spiritualistic philosophy of Coleridge, and who belong rather to the sphere of literature than of philosophy. Some of these, however, are memorable as ethical or metaphysical thinkers. "Whewell traced the history not only of the sciences but of moral philosophy in England; and Maurice, who like him rejected the philosophy of Paley, has written elaborately on ethics and metaphysics. The same may be said of Martineau, the leading representative of intuitive morality, which Lecky has ably defended. Recent philosophical development in England has thus been modified by influences quite diverse: some, represented by G. H. Lewes, physiological or scientific, cooperating to some extent with the positivism of Oomte, or the speculations of Mill and Spencer; others spiritualistic or religious, and represented by men like Martineau and the duke of Argyll. - The first and greatest name in the history of philosophy in America is that of Jonathan Edwards. His views of the will, controversially presented in the interest of Calvinistic theology, although in a line with those of Leibnitz, closely approximated on some points to those of Anthony Collins. His theory of virtue, as love to universal being, was elaborated under the influence of Hutcheson and Turnbull. Eminent among his followers, though somewhat modifying his views, were Stephen West (" Essay on Moral Agency," 1772); Samuel Hopkins, noted for his doctrine of disinterested love; Nathanael Emmons, who made "the heart" a series of exercises of which God is the direct and efficient author (answered by Asa Burton, 1824, who argued for what is known as the "taste" scheme); and Jonathan Edwards the younger, who in answer to Samuel West published his essays, on liberty and necessity.
Enoch Pond and Samuel Spring are noted among the followers of Hopkins and Emmons, the latter of them engaging in controversy with David Tappan. One of the earliest opponents of Edwards in his views of the will was James Dana (1735-1812). Later critics of his theory, or advocates of counter theories, have been numerous, including H. P. Tappan (1839), Asa Mahan (1846), A. T. Bledsoe (1845), D. D. Whedon (1864), and R. G. Hazard (1864). In a line of thought mainly accordant with Edwards may be named Timothy Dwight, Jeremiah Day (who commented on Edwards and produced an original work on the will), and Charles Hodge. Nathanael W. Taylor and Charles G. Finney have written largely on moral government. Toward the close of the last century Locke's philosophy, in connection to some extent with French speculation, widely prevailed in this country. Early in the present century it was displaced by Stewart's "Disquisitions" and Brown's "Lectures," and from that time the Scottish philosophy, through the publications among others of T. C. Upham, has exerted great influence upon American thought.
Up to that time the philosophical questions made most prominent concerned the freedom of the will, the nature of virtue, and the moral government of God. Upham's " Elements of Mental Philosophy" (1831), including the two departments of the intellect and the sensibilities, has been extensively used as a text book; he subsequently became the biographer and admirer of Mme. Guion. The writings of Coleridge have been brought to the notice of American readers by James Marsh and W. G. T. Shedd, and have exercised an important influence on American philosophy. President Marsh, while assailing the current philosophy of England and America, drew attention to what he proposed to substitute, the more profound spiritual philosophy of Coleridge, Kant, and Jacobi. At nearly the same time, following upon the influence of W. E. Channing, not himself a speculative thinker, but a bold and eloquent asserter of the rights of reason and conscience, what has been called the transcendental school of Boston sprang into being, the leading spirits of which were R. W. Emerson, Theodore Parker, Margaret Fuller, J. F. Clarke, and George Ripley; the last, in editing " Specimens of Foreign Standard Literature," rendered accessible select works of Cousin and Jouffroy. Identified also at first with this school was Orestes A. Brownson, who conducted a review devoted to the new speculations and containing original philosophical articles, mostly from his own pen, but who subsequently devoted himself to the discussion of the profoundest problem of ontology and psychology from the standpoint of the Roman Catholic church.
C. S. Henry contributed editorially and critically to the dissemination of Cousin's views, some of whose works were translated by himself, Lin-berg, and Wight. More recently increased attention has been devoted to German and Scottish philosophy. James McCosh is a leading representative of the latter; he is to some extent a follower, but at the same time a critic of Hamilton, whose writings have been widely studied in this country. German thought has been made familiar by translations of German writers, and histories of philosophy by Schweg-ler (translated by J. H. Seelye) and Ueberweg (edited by H. B. Smith and Philip Schaff, and translated by George H. Morris, all of whom have made in critical articles independent contributions to philosophy). Special attention has been given to German speculation by " The Journal of Speculative Philosophy," conducted for the past eight years by W. T. Harris, himself a leading contributor and an eminent Hegelian. Among original American works on philosophy may be mentioned treatises on logic by W. D. Wilson (1856), Asa Mahan (1857), and H. K Day (1867); and works on psychology by F. A. Rauch (1840), S. S. Schmucker (1842), Francis Bowen ("Essays on Speculative Philosophy," 1842), Joseph Haven ("Mental Philosophy," 1857), E. V. Ger-hart (" Introduction to Philosophy and Logic,"' 1858), J. T. Champlin ("Text Book of Intellectual Philosophy," 1860), Noah Porter (" Human Intellect," 1868, and "Elements of Intellectual Science," 1871), Samuel Tyler ("Progress of Philosophy," 1868), John Bascom ("Elements of Psychology," 1869), O. S. Mun-sell (" Text Book in Psychology" 1871), James McCosh ("Intuitions of the "Mind"), D. H. Hamilton ("Autology," 1873), James Walker, editor of Keid's works and president of Harvard college, Laurens P. Hickok (" Rational Psychology," 1848; "Empirical Psychology," 1854; "Rational Cosmology," 1858; "Logic of Reason, Universal and Eternal," 1875), and John Fiske, " Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy " (2 vols., 1875). Of these, President Porter and President Hickok may be named among the foremost of elaborate original contributors to philosophy, while Dr. Krauth, Dr. H. B. Smith, and W. T. Harris are eminent especially in the critical sphere.
President Porter in his "Human Intellect," while presenting a critical and historical exposition of the leading systems, teaches a philosophy "pronounced and positive in the spiritual and the-istic direction, as contrasted with the materialistic and anti-theistic tendency" of the time, and is in strong sympathy with the methods of Trendelenburg; while President Hickok, familiar especially, among other German systems of thought, with that of Kant, aims by his peculiar philosophy to establish certainty on inexpugnable grounds, to this end seeking to establish the coincidence of the subjective idea with the objective law. President McCosh, while making original contributions to a philosophy in the main coincident with that of Reid and Hamilton, is also the historical critic of the Scottish philosophy. - The principal general histories of philosophy are: Brucker, Historic Critica Philosophic (5 vols., Leipsic, 1742-'4); Tiedemann, Geist der speculation Philosophic (6 vols., Marburg, 1791-'7); Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie (11 vols., Leipsic, 1798-1819; an English translation of an abridged edition was made by Arthur Johnson, Oxford, 1832, and revised by J. D. Morell, London, 1852); Windischmann, Die Philosophie im Fortgang der Weltgeschichte (3 vols., Bonn, 1827-'34); Hegel, Geschichte der Philosophie (3 vols., Berlin, 1833-'6); Bitter, Geschichte der Philosophie (12 vols., Hamburg, 1829-53; partly translated by Morrison, 4 vols., London, 1838); Schwegler, Geschichte der Philosophie (Stuttgart, 1848; translated by Seelye, New York, 1856); Lange, Geschichte des Materialismus, etc. (Iserlohn, 1866; 2d ed., 1873); Ueberweg, Geschichte der Philosophie (Berlin, 1871; translated by Morris, 2 vols., New York, 1872); De Getando, Histoire comparee des systemes de philosophie (2d ed., 4 vols., Paris, 1822-3); Cousin, Cours de philosophie morale (1840-'41); Enfield, " History of Philosophy," derived from Brucker (2 vols., London, 1791); Lewes, " Biographical History of Philosophy " (London and New York, 1847; 2d ed., 1871); Maurice, " Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy " (2 vols., London, 1872). The best special history of occidental philosophy is by Roth, Geschichte unserer abendlandischen Philosophie (2d ed., 2 vols., Heidelberg, 1862). The principal special accounts of ancient philosophy are: Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen (Tubingen, 1844); Jules Simon, Histoire de Vecole d'Alexandrie (2 vols., Paris, 1844-'5); Vacherot, Histoire critique de Vecole d'Alexandrie (3 vols., Paris, 1846-'51); and W. A. Butler, "Lectures on the History of Ancient Philosophy," edited by Thompson (2 vols., Cambridge, 1856; revised ed., 1 vol., London, 1874). Special works on the scholastic philosophy are: Rousselot, Etudes sur la philosophie dans le moyen age (3 vols., Paris, 1840-42), and Haureau, Le la philosophie scholastique (2 vols., Paris, 1851). The principal histories of modern philosophy are: Kuno Fischer, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie (3 vols., Mannheim, 1854-'60); K. L. Michelet, Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland (2 vols., Berlin, 1837-'8); Chalybaus, Entwichelungsgeschichte der Philosophie (translated into English, Edinburgh, 1854); Remusat, De la philosophie alle-mande (Paris, 1845), and Histoire de la philosophie en Angleterre depuis Bacon jusqu'd Locke (2 vols., 1875); Taine, Les philosophes francais au XIXe Steele (Paris, 1856; 2d ed., 1860); Debrit, Histoire des doctrines philo-sophiques dans Vltalie contemporaine (Paris, 1859); and Morell, "An Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the 19th Century" (2d ed., 2 vols., London, 1857). The most valuable cyclopaedias of philosophy are: Krug, Allgemeines Hand-wbrterbuch der philosophischen Wissenschaften (4vols.,Leipsic, 1827-8); and Franck,Diction-naire des sciences philosophiques (6 vols., Paris, 1844-'52). The principal periodical devoted entirely to metaphysics is the Zeitschrift far Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, founded at Bonn under a slightly different title in 1837, and published at Halle since 1847.