This section is from the book "The Principles Of Economics With Applications To Practical Problems", by Frank A. Fetter. Also available from Amazon: The Principles of Economics, With Applications to Practical Problem.
1. The union's first aim is to get control of all the labor force in the market, and to minimize competition among workers. Every labor federation aims to extend its control to every branch of its trade. A sense of wrong is one of the strongest forces to bring the workers into the organization. The appeal to a common interest is effective in times of great grievance, as it was effective in the dangerous times of the American Revolution, though failing during the Confederation. The unwilling are first persuaded, then coerced by threats, by petty persecutions, by the most cruel of all peaceful weapons, social ostracism, and finally by personal violence. The "public opinion" and class feeling fostered among workers by their organization are analogous to the sense of patriotism and loyalty in the country at large, and at times displace it, as is seen in the opposition to the militia land to the maintenance of public order at times of strikes. The individual who declines to enter the union is denounced as a traitor and made to feel the scorn of his associates. When all these measures fail, pressure is brought to bear upon the employer to. get him to force the unwilling workers into the union.
2. Its next aim is to use collective in the place of individual bargaining, to force as much as the competitive wage, and more if possible. The term collective bargaining has been much used to describe bargaining between a group of labor leaders, the delegated representatives of the workingmen, and a group of employers or directors. It is sometimes claimed that all the trade-union seeks is to put the workman on an equality with the employer in bargaining, enabling him to get all he would if competition were free on both sides. It is said that organized labor simply prevents the employer from following the maxim of Napoleon to "divide and conquer," from meeting his employees one by one and forcing his own terms upon them. But the most effective argument in organizing the trade-union is that it forces a higher wage, more than the market would warrant. It is sometimes assumed by labor leaders that competitive wages would be very low, almost starvation wages, and anything above that level is credited to the work of the union; while in other cases where the wages are already large, the purpose frankly avowed is to limit the labor supply in the particular trade and to force a monopoly wage by any means possible. One's opinion of trade-unions is likely to differ according as they work in one or the other of these ways. The impartial onlooker sympathizes with the efforts of the trade-unions in so far as they serve merely to put the workers on an equality with the employers in bargaining. The public wants to see "fair play," and up to a certain point the union is merely a device to get fair play. But if the union is a device to defeat competition, to force artificially high wages, it will be judged differently. The public readily sees that if the unions force more than a fair and open market affords, it is rarely at the expense of the employer; that in the long run it is at the expense of the purchasing public itself, including the unprivileged workmen shut out from the monopoly of labor.
The union seeks to secure the full competitive wage.
And as much more as possible.
3. In order to accomplish their ends, the trade-unions seek to control their employers' business in various ways. They demand, first, that no non-union men shall be employed even at union wages; they demand that the employer shall help them to force his employees into the unions. In this very usual demand for the "closed shop" or "union shop" the public can see very little justice. On this point, nearly always, unions forfeit in a strike the sympathy of the public; yet the unions assert that it is almost absolutely necessary to gain this point in order to carry out their objects. If a union and a non-union man work side by side there are many ways in which the employer may make the union man suffer. If business slackens, it is likely to be the union man that is discharged; if any preference is given, it is to the non-union man. Certainly all will agree that if the unions are to get the strength to enforce all their demands it is essential that they make good this claim which leaves the employer almost helpless. Yet it certainly is not essential to the accomplishing of valuable services for the members of the union. The educational and mutual-benefit features are attained without this means; and much experience shows that, if their cause is strong, the organized men can carry with them a large proportion of the workers and the sympathy of the public in a contest for higher wages. It never has seemed to any considerable portion of the public any more desirable that organized labor through its officers should be able to dictate to employees, than that employers should crush the workmen. It is by just this assumption that union advocates beg the question of the "union shop."
The issue of the closed shop vs. the open shop.
Other limitations put upon industry by unions.
Further, the unions direct and control the employment of labor, often limit the number of apprentices in a trade, and assume to determine who shall enjoy the privilege of learning it. They limit the output, fix the maximum amount, and forbid the use of labor-saving machinery. Whenever the unions are charged with these acts, labor leaders either deny the facts or avoid giving a direct answer, but there is no doubt that the charge is true in many ways and in many cases. The requirement that each special kind of work shall be controlled by a special trade, and disputes between rival trades, for which their jealousies are responsible, give rise to great annoyance, expense, and loss to employers and to the entire public.
4. The strike is a threat and a mode of attack to enforce the demands of the union. To most newly organized laborers the union appeals mainly as an instrument for striking, for threatening the employer or for making him suffer. When a new union is formed, it is nearly always dedicated by a strike, which is the simultaneous stopping of work by a number of workers. A strike is intended to force the employer to grant the wages and conditions demanded. Its effectiveness lies in the injury which it occasions or threatens in the stopping of machinery, the ruin of material, the loss of custom, and the failure to complete contracts undertaken. Its success being dependent on the inability of the employer to fill the places of the strikers, their energies are bent on persuading or coercing other workers from taking employment. There are many ways of coercing workers without personal violence. Public opinion does much, and probably the severest of all coercive measures is the social ostracism of the worker. What may be called the endless-chain boycott is an excommunication, without measure or limit, of the non-union worker and of every one in any way befriending him or the employer. So far as in their power lies, the enraged strikers dissolve the very bonds of society, brother casts off brother, and mother disowns son. The unhappy conditions in the coal regions in 1902 rivaled the tragedies of civil war. A reasonable use of the boycott, refusal to maintain social relations with the person who offends one, is doubtless a part of personal liberty; but the boycott, as experience shows, has moral limits, and it should have strict legal limits. Its use beyond the moderate limit of the first degree of personal relations is anti-social to the degree of criminality, whether it be used as the weapon of organized workers or of organized wealth.
When peaceable means fail, often there is a recourse to violence both against the employer and his property and against the non-union men. The evils of violence in strikes often are tardily recognized by the public, whose sympathy up to a certain point is with the striker as "the under dog." It is slow to realize that strike violence is mob-law. Whenever men of one group assume the right to coerce forcibly and to wreak their hatred against one of their fellow-workers, it is a blow at political liberty. No free society can safely go the first step in permitting one group of men to usurp control over others in this way.
'The strike and the boycott.
Violence in strikes is mob law.
Costliness of strikes.
5. The great losses caused by strikes are the penalty of an unsolved industrial problem. The losses to workers in wages, to employers and to investors in income and property, and to the public in interruption of business, aggregate,an enormous sum. It is, however, impossible to estimate it at all exactly, as the losses are in many cases indirect and intangible. The strikers are concerned not with the balance of total losses and total gains to society as a whole, but with the net gain that in the long run accrues to them. It is true that there are indirect gains not easily calculable, as the advance of wages made to avoid a strike while the lesson of the consequences is still fresh. Opinion among workingmen is not a unit as to the value of strikes. A few years ago it seemed safe to say that strikes were declining as compared with the period of the early eighties. It is probably true, as is often said, that as laborers become educated they put less faith in strikes. The epidemic of labor troubles, marking the years from 1899 to 1903, gave no evidence of a decrease in the use of strikes, yet many of these were due to the recent organization in various trades. The coal strike of 1902, though doubtless due to real grievances, was opposed by the officers of the union, an unusually capable set of men, but the more violent and discordant elements overruled the more pacific counsels. The public is perhaps as favorable as it has ever been to the cause of labor, but it appears to have less patience with strikes than it had fifteen years ago, and strikes usually fail if not backed by public opinion. The public has not as yet thought out consistent conclusions on the question of the rights of the union. It is just now much impressed with the value of arbitration. As experience destroys the unsound sentiments, and divides the wise from the unwise measures, a peaceable solution of industrial differences must and will be found.
 
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