This section is from the book "The Law Of Land Contracts", by Asher L. Cornelius. Also available from Amazon: Michigan Law Of Land Contracts.
It is understood and agreed between the parties that E. M. O'Roark, real estate agent, who held a prior option on this property, dated March 10th, 1914, which said option has expired, is to receive from the first payment of twelve thousand two hundred dollars ($12,200) the sum of seventeen hundred dollars ($1700), which amount is to be paid in full of all claim on his part for commission or otherwise, against either of the parties hereto, or against said property, and said E. M. O'Roark has this day signed this agreement as evidence thereof. It is provided further that if said purchaser shall fail to pay the sum of twelve thousand two hundred dollars ($12,200) thirty days from the date hereof as agreed, then said payment of five hundred dollars this day made shall be retained by the seller as liquidated damages and this agreement shall at once be cancelled and the purchaser shall forfeit any interest she may have or may claim in said premises. It is understood and agreed that the purchaser has examined Burton abstract, that the title is satisfactory and that upon the completion of the terms of this option and payment of the purchase price for said property, she shall receive a deed warranting said title against the acts of the seller and a Burton abstract as now brought down and certified.
"In witness whereof, the parties have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year first above written. John A. Bryant, Catherine Tattan, E. M. O'Roark."
The $500 payable "on the signing of this agreement" was then paid by the plaintiff as provided. But the plaintiff never paid the $12,200 which was due, according to the terms of the agreement, thirty days after the signing thereof.
The plaintiff contends that this instrument is a present agreement between the parties for the sale and purchase of land, and not a mere unilateral option contract giving the plaintiff the right to elect to purchase, on or before a certain date. Council for plaintiff further urges that this is a land contract because the agreement contains certain terms, such as "seller" and "purchaser" and that "said seller does hereby agree to sell to the said purchaser" and etc., which are common to land contracts.
The court held: There was no provision in this agreement whereby the plaintiff agreed to purchase; it was provided that she was to receive a deed on compliance with "the terms of this option." After paying the $500 upon the execution of the agreement there was nothing further imposed upon the plaintiff. She was free to perform the agreement and enforce it or to forfeit payment and abandon it. She was under no obligation to purchase. Furthermore the time limit of thirty days was made the essence of the agreement in clear and unequivocal terms. By failing to make payment of the $12,200 within the thirty days specified, plaintiff forfeited her rights under the agreement. Specific performance of this agreement will not be enforced as this is merely an optional agreement.
In Holland v. Holland, 195 Mich. 513, the plaintiff brought a bill to enforce the specific performance of the following written agreement between himself and the defendant:
"I hereby agree to deed Gottlieb Holland half interest in the Hotel Smalley property at any time that he may demand a deed. (Signed) Edward Holland. Witness: S. H. Cochran."
The plaintiff contended that this agreement was an agreement to convey land or a land contract and that he was entitled to the specific performance of same.
Held: This memorandum is not suffcient to satisfy the statute of frauds. A memorandum to be sufficient under the statute must be complete in itself and leave nothing to rest in parol. It must contain a description of the property to be conveyed, and the consideration to be paid therefor, and also express definitely the time or times of payment. Applying these requirements as a criterion the above agreement is found to be fatally defective. Even assuming that the description of the property contained in the writing is sufficient, still there is no consideration named and no time mentioned within which said consideration shall be paid. Therefore since no time is fixed for the performance and no consideration mentioned this is not a contract which a court of equity will enforce.
In Rosenbaum v. Tyszka, 192 Mich. 457. Plaintiff brought a bill to enforce the specific performance of the following written agreement which he contends is a contract for the conveyance of land:
"Detroit, Mich., May 29, 1915. Received of Sam and Bella Rosenbaum twenty-five and no/100 dollars, as deposit on house located at 1415 Chene Street, purchase price $3,450. One thousand will be paid before June 15, 1915. Balance $300 and interest. (Signed) Kornelia Tyszka."
Defendants refused to convey and set up a defense to this bill the allegation that the alleged contract upon which the bill was predicated was not sufficient under the statute of frauds to bind the defendants to make the sale.
Held: This alleged contract is not sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds. In order for a preliminary agreement to convey land to be sufficient under the statute, the parties, property, consideration, terms, and time of performance must be clearly stated. The above writing does not contain the terms and the time of performance is not stated. Consequently, specific performance of such an agreement will not be enforced.
Adler v. Katus, 190 Mich. 86. In this case the plaintiff brought suit to recover the money he had paid down under the terms of the following written contract of sale of real property, the agreement being signed by one of the joint owners of the property and also by him for the other joint owner, although the latter had never authorized such signature:
"Received from Hyman Adler the sum of five hundred ($500) dollars to apply on the purchase money to the amount of twelve thousand five hundred dollars for the following described property, to wit: Lot numbered eighty nine (89), plat of part of P. C. 181, north of Jefferson Avenue, Antoine Rivard farm, subdivided into lots 1841, said lot being situate on the northwest corner of Macomb and Rivard streets, having a frontage of fifty feet on Macomb street and one hundred five (105) feet along the west line of Rivard street to a public alley; the remainder of the purchase money to amount to twelve thousand dollars to be paid as follows: Two thousand ($2,000) dollars upon delivery of property by land contract and a certified abstract of title for examination on or before September 1, 1914, provided papers are completed by that date, and the remaining ten thousand dollars in quarterly payments of two hundred fifty ($250) dollars or more, payments to include principal and interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum.
 
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