(p) N. E. R. Co. v. Hastings (Lord), 1900, A. C. 260; 69 L. J. Ch. 516.

(q) Major v. Ward, (1847) 5 Ha. at p. 604; 12 Jur. 473.

(r) 8. C, 12 Jur. 476. And see Garrard v. Tuck, (1849) 8 C. B. at p. 248; 18 L. J. C. P. 338. As to identity of lands of ecclesiastical and collegiate corporations, see Eccl. Corp. Act, 1832; of enfranchised copyholds, see 4 & 5 Vict. c. 35, s. 21; and 15 & 16 Vict. c. 51, s. 24; both repealed by Copyhold Act, 1894, 8. 100, see provisions of that Act generally; and ss. 61 - 63; and of lands charged with tithe-commutation rent-charge, see Tithe Act, 1837, s. 9.

Seisin may be presumed from the fact of possession (t), or from facts which tend to show that the ancestor or testator acted as if he were the owner of the premises, e.g., the production of leases which he has granted and which have been followed by possession or payment of rent (u); or of a grant of an annuity by a person in possession, and which states that A. B. is the legal owner of the fee(v); or the production of receipts for rent given to persons who are proved aliunde (e.g., by the production of land tax assessments, entries in parochial rate-books, &c), to have been in the occupation of the premises; or by the declarations of such occupiers that they held of the party in question. It has been suggested (that mere personal occupation, though sufficient to raise a presumption of title in ejectment (x), does not have that effect as between vendor and purchaser (y). In the case of a lease dated in 1832, operating at Common Law, upon which was the usual endorsement of livery of seisin, the validity of the livery was presumed (z).

Of seisin.

Strips of waste lying beside an ancient highway or a river are, together with the soil to the middle of the way or river, presumed to belong to the owner of the adjoining inclosed lands (a). This presumption, however, seems to arise only as between such owner and the lord of the manor, and does not apply as between parties deriving title through different; conveyances from a former owner of both the inclosed and waste land (b); and, even as against the lord of the manor, though it is not essential that the encroachment should be contiguous to, or have any direct communication with, the adjoining enclosed lands (c), yet the presumption may be rebutted by the circumstance of the strip communicating with a common or other large piece of waste (d), or by the fact that other strips, lying along the same highway but not necessarily adjoining the locus in quo (e), are held adversely to the landowner (f).

As respects strips of waste.

(s) Cited Hub. on Ev. 465. (t) Taylor, 11th ed. 469.

(u) See Clarkson v. Woodhottse, (1782) 5 T. E. 412, n.; 3 Doug. 189; White v. Lisle, (1819) 4 Mad. 214; Welcome v. Upton, (1840) 6 Ml. & W. 536; 9 L. J. N. S. Ex. 154; Foljambe v. Smith's Tadcaster Brew. Co., (1904) 73 L. J. Ch. ,722; Van Diemen's Land Co. v. Marine Board of Table Cape, 1906, A. C. 92.

(v) Doe v. Coulthred, (1837) 7 A. & E. 235; 7 L. J.n. S. Q. B. 52.

(x) Doe v. Pen/old, (1838) 8 C. & P. 536.

(y) Hub. on Ev. 131; Bulley v. B., (1874) 9 Ch. 739; 44 L. J. Ch. 79. But see Taylor, 11th ed. p. 469.

(z) Eccl. Commrs. v. Treemer, 1893, 1 Ch. 166, 172; 62 L. J. Ch. 119.

(a) Steel v. Prickett, (1817) 2 Stark. 463; Simpson v. Dendy, (1860) 8 C. B. X. S. 433; affd. 7 Jur. N. S. 1058; Doe v. Pearsey, (1827) 7 B. & C.

The presumption, it appears, does not arise where the highway is modern, as, e.g., where made under the General Inclosure Act (g), nor in the case of land merely intended to be dedicated as a highway (h). Where under earlier Inclosure Acts allotments have been made to the lord and to commoners in satisfaction of former rights, and roads set out, the presumption is that the soil in such roads passes to the adjoining allottees (i). Prima facie, the public are entitled to the highway between the fences, and not to the metalled part only (k), but such presumption may be rebutted by the surrounding circumstances (l); the presumption does not apply in the case of a public footpath (m). Nor does it apply in a case where a road and the disputed pieces lie between hedges which have not been planted as a boundary but have grown up naturally (n).

304, 306; Micklethwait v. Newlay Bridge Co., (1886) 33 Ch. D. 133; 55 L. T. 336; and see Central London Ry. v. City of London Land Tax Commrs., 1911, 2 Ch. 467, 474.

(b) White v. Hill, (1844) 6 Q. B. 487; 14 L. J. Q. B. 79.

(c) Earl of Lisburn v. Davis, (1866) L. E. 1 C. P. 259; 35 L. J. C. P. 193; and sup. p. 166.

(d) Grose v. West, (1816) 7 Taun. 39; Plumbley v. Lock, (1903) 67 J. P. 237; 1 L. G. R. 54.

(e) Bendy v. Simpson, (1856) 18 C. B. 831; 2 Jur. N. S. 642, in the Ex. Ch. As to the weight of the evidence relating to other strips, see Leeke v. Portsmouth Corp., (1912) 107 L. T. 260.

(f) Doe v. Sampson, (1847) 4 C. B. 267; Taylor, 11th ed. p. 125.

(g) R. v. Hatfield, (1835) 4 A. & E. 156; R. v. Edmonton, (1831) 1 M. & Rob. 24; R. v. Wright, (1832) 3 B. & Ad. 681. Cf. Simoox v. Yardley U. D. C, (1905) 69 J. P. 66. See as to what evidence will rebut the presumption, Gery v. Redman, (1875) 1 Q. B. D. 161; 45 L. J. Q. B. 267.

(A) Leigh v. Jack, (1879) 5 Ex. D. 264, 273; 49 L. J. Ex. 220.

(i) Haigh v. West, 1893, 2 Q. B. 19; 62 L. J. Q. B. 532; Neavcrson v. Peterboro Rur. Council, 1902, 1 Ch. 557; 71 L. J. Ch. 378.

Accretions to riparian property, caused by the gradual action of the stream, follow in title the adjoining land (a). Conversely, land gradually encroached upon by water ceases to belong to the former owner (p); and the rule is the same whether the soil of the bed of the river is or is not vested in the riparian owners (q).

Accretions to riparian land.

A ditch lying on one side of a hedge or bank is presumed to belong to the owner of the hedge or bank, and the hedge or bank to the owner of the enclosure on whose side the ditch is not (r); but where there is a ditch on both sides of a hedge, there is no presumption as to the ownership of the hedge (s). In the case of a dividing wall, it is presumed to be built on the properties of both the adjoining owners (t). A conveyance of land described as bounded by the "seashore," although it does not pass the land to the foreshore prevents the vendor from denying that such land was anything else than "seashore" (u).