What property extendible under the new law.

Judgment an immediate charge in Equity.

(y) Chadwick v. Holt, (1856) 2 Jur. N. S. 918 ; 2G L. J. Ch. 76 ; distinguish Duke of Beaufort v. Phillips, (1847) 1 DeG. &S. 321.

(h) Garner v. Briggs, (1858) 4 Jur. N. S. 230 ; 27 L. J. Ch. 483.

(i) Ward v. Shakeshaft, (1860) 1 Dr. k S. 269, 272. But see Gibba v. Pike, (1842) 6 Jur. 465 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 257.

(k) Nortcliffe v. Warburton, (1862)

10 W. R. 635 ; 31 L. J. Ch. 777.

(l) Taylor v. Hoe, 1894, 1 Ch. 413 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 282.

(m) Lord Mansfield v. Ogle, (1859) 5 Jur. N. S. 419 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 150. And see Shaw v. Neale, (1855) 20 Beav. 157 ; 6 H. L. C. 5S1 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 563.

(n) Crowther v. C, (1856) 2 Jur N. S. 271.

The estate of a joint-tenant is extendible as against the right of a surviving joint-tenant, and not, as formerly, merely for the life of the debtor.

Estate of joint-tenant;

It also seems probable that the judgment creditor of a tenant in tail, (where there is a protector,) can take the land in execution as against the issue in tail, and that the judgment creditor of a tenant in tail, (where there is no protector,) can take the land in execution, not only as against the issue in tail, but also as against remaindermen ; and there can be no doubt as to the rights, in Equity, of a judgment creditor of a tenant in tail. Where a judgment creditor filed a bill of tenant in tail.

(o) See Sug. 14th ed. 524 ; Rolleston v. Morton, (1842) 1 D. & War. at p. 182 ; Gore v. Bowser, (1855) 3Sm. & G. 1 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 316, 440 ; and see Wallis v. Morris, (1864) 10 Jur. N. S. 741.

(p) See 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 13 ; Gore v. Bowser and Wallis v. Morris, sup.

(q) Re South, (1874) 9 Ch. 369 ; 43 L. J. Ch. 441 ; Re Harrison and

Bottomley, 1899, 1 Ch. 465 ; 68 L. J. Ch. 208.

(r) Hood-Barrs v. Cat heart, 1895, 2 Ch. 411 ; 64 L. J. Ch. 461 ; Woods v. Harrison, (1899) 43 Sol. J. 242.

(s) Hatton v. Haywood, (1874) 9 Ch. 229; 43 L. J. Ch. 372; Re Jones, (1895) W. N. 123 ; Cadogan v. Lyric Theatre, Ltd., 1894, 3 Ch. 338; 63 L. J. Ch. 775.

To Realise his charge against a tenant in tail in possession, the latter was ordered to execute a disentailing deed (t).

It also seems probable that the joint donee of a power of appointment, who is entitled to any estate or interest in default of appointment, cannot, by concurring in an exercise of the power, defeat the lien of his judgment creditor upon such estate or interest; as to do so would be to derogate from what is by the Statute made equivalent to his own personal assurance.

Joint power- how affected.

In Harris v. Davison (tt), Shad well, V.-C, with reference to s. 13 of the Judgments Act, 1838, said, that he " could not conceive any set of words better adapted to describe every possible interest in lands of every possible description ; they are as comprehensive as possible, and include lands of every tenure, except, perhaps, lands held in ancient demesne : " he then decided that a registered judgment operated as a charge upon the beneficial interest of the debtor (the grantee of a personal annuity) under a trust for sale of leaseholds for better securing the payment of the said annuity ; so, an annuity charged upon, or issuing out of' land has been held to be an interest in land within the Statute (u); a like decision was come to in Russell v. M'Culloch (x), as respects a gross sum of money secured by covenant, and by an equitable charge; and the same, it is conceived, must be the rule as to a legacy charged upon land. "Where a trust fund was invested upon mortgage, a judgment creditor of one of the beneficiaries was held entitled to a charge on the debtor's share of moneys payable out of the rents of the mortgaged property; but not on his share of the interest paid by the mortgagor under his covenant, and not taken from rents (y).

Judgment a charge on mortgage debt, annuities, etc, payable out of land.

The decision in Russell v. M'Culloch seemed to establish, in theory, the necessity of searching for judgments against a mortgagee, upon paying off or taking a transfer or release of the security - and a like necessity in the case of any dealing -with an annuity, or, it is conceived, a legacy charged on land; and it was difficult to avoid the conclusion that the same precaution ought in strictness to have been taken in paying off, or assigning, or taking a release of a registered judgment debt, it being the statutory equivalent to an equitable mortgage ; and that if judgments were found registered against a mortgagee, or against the owner of an annuity or legacy charged on land, the like searches should have been made in the names of his judgment creditors, and in like manner against their puisne judgment creditors (if any) ; and so on, in an infinite series. The practical inconveniences and absurdity of this excessive development of the doctrine laid down in Harris v. Davison, are self-evident, and were in fact the main argument adduced for disregarding that decision - a decision which, it may be remarked, seems fully warranted by the words of the Judgments Act, 1838. There being thus evidently a nodus vindice digitus, s. 11 of the Judgments Act, 1855, enacted that "where any legal or equitable estate or interest or any disposing power in or over any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, shall, under any conveyance or other instrument executed after the passing of this Act, become vested in any person as a purchaser or mortgagee for valuable consideration, such lands, tenements, or hereditaments shall not be taken in execution under any writ of elegit, or other writ of execution, to be sued upon any judgment, or any decree, order, or rule against any mortgagee or mortgagees thereof, who shall have been paid off prior to, or at the time of the execution of, such conveyance [or other instrument as aforesaid - Qy.] ; nor shall any such judgment, decree, order, or rule, or the money thereby secured, be a charge upon such lands, tenements, or hereditaments [which, or any legal or equitable estate or interest in or disposing power over which shall become - Qy.], so vested in purchasers or mortgagees, nor shall such lands, tenements, or hereditaments [which, etc. - Qy. ut ante] so vested in purchasers or mortgagees be extended or taken in execution, or rendered liable under any writ of extent, or writ of execution, or other process issued by or on behalf of her Majesty, her heirs or successors, in respect of any judgment, statute, or recognizance obtained against or entered into by, or inquisition found against, or obligation or specialty made by, or acceptance of office by any mortgagee or mortgagees, whereby he or they had, hath, or have become or shall become a debtor or accountant, or debtors or accountants to the Crown, where such mortgagee or mortgagees shall have been paid off prior to or at the time of the execution of such conveyance [or other instrument - Qy, ] as aforesaid."