"A conditional limitation partakes of the nature both of a condition and a remainder. It is to be observed, that at the common law, whenever either the whole fee, or a particular estate, as an estate for life, or in tail, was first limited, no condition or other quality could be annexed to this prior estate which would have the double effect of defeating the estate and passing the land to a stranger; for, as a remainder, it was void, being an abridgement or defeasance of the estate first limited; and, as a condition, it was void, as no one but the donor of the heirs could take advantage of a condition broken, and the entry of the donor or his heirs unavoidably defeated the livery, upon which the remainder depended. On these principles it was impossible, by the old law, to limit by deed, if not by will, an estate to a stranger, upon any event which went to abridge or determine an estate previously limited. But the expediency and utility of such limitations, assisted by the revolution effected in our law by the statute of Uses, at length forced them into use, in spite of the maxim of law, that a stranger cannot take advantage of a condition. These limitations are now become frequent, and their mixed nature has given them the appellation of conditional limitations; they so far partake of the nature of conditions, as they abridge or defeat the estate previously limited; and they are so far limitations, as, upon the contingency taking place, the estate passes to a stranger. Such is the limitation to A for life, in tail, or in fee, provided, that when C returns from Rome, it shall from thenceforth remain to the use of B in fee. Of late, however, it has been frequently argued, that the difference between a remainder, and what is generally understood by a conditional limitation, is merely verbal."3

3 Appendix to Coke Institutes.