A difficulty which has not infrequently arisen with reference to the amenability of articles of interstate commerce to state taxation is the question when an article may fairly be said to be in transitu and when it may be said to have obtained a taxable situs in the State. That an article actually in transit from one State to another is not taxable by a State is admitted. That an article manufactured for interstate trade and intended to be sent outside the State, but its transportation thither not yet begun, is taxable in the State where located, is equally well established.

In Brown v. Houston89 it was held that coal from another State, unsold, and for sale upon the barge upon which it had been brought, was taxable by the State. The court said: "The tax was not a tax imposed upon the coal as a foreign product, or as the product of another State than Louisiana, nor a tax imposed by reason of the coal being imported or brought into Louisiana, nor a tax imposed whilst it was in a state of transit through that State to some other place of destination. It was imposed after the coal had arrived at its destination and was put up for sale. The coal had come to its place of rest, for final disposal or use, and was a commodity in the market of New Orleans. ... It had become a part of the general mass of property in the State, and as such it was taxed for the current year, as all other property in the city of New Orleans was taxed. ... It was subjected to no discrimination in favor of goods which were the product of Louisiana, or goods which were the property of citizens of Louisiana."

The court go on to say: "When Congress shall see fit to make a regulation of the subject of property transported from one State to another, which may have the effect to give it a temporary exemption from taxation in the State to which it is transported, it will be time enough to consider any conflict that may arise be-tween such regulation and the general laws of the State."

89 114 U. S. 622; 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1091; 29 L. ed. 257.

In Coe v. Errol90 the question was as to the taxation of certain logs cut in the State and drawn to another place in the State, whence they were to be floated down stream to a place outside the State. Because of low water they had not yet started upon this interstate portion of their trip. The logs were held taxable, the court thus fixing the doctrine that articles deposited or stored at an entrepot for future interstate transportation are taxable by the State in which they are situated.

In Diamond Match Co. v. Ontonagon,91 however, it was held that logs cut and floated down a stream to a boom or sorting gap, from which they were to be shipped by rail outside the State, were, while awaiting delivery to the railroad, in transitu and not subject to state taxation.

In Kelley v. Rhoads92 it was held that sheep while being driven across the State of Wyoming, to the State of Nebraska at the rate of about nine miles a day, were exempt from taxation under a Wyoming law authorizing the taxing of live stock brought into the State for grazing purpoaog, although the sheep were permitted, incidentally, while in transit, to support themselves by grazing.93

In American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed94 the foregoing authorities are reviewed, and the doctrine declared that a State is not precluded by the Commerce Clause from imposing a manufacturer's tax upon a non-resident manufacturing corporation which has selected a city of the State as a distributing point, and engaged a local transfer company to take charge of its products when shipped to that point, assort them, store them and make delivery of them in the original packages to the firm's customers. Such goods, when stored, were declared to be no longer in transit.

90 116 U. S. 517: 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 475; 29 L. ed. 715. 91 188 U. S. 82;. 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 266; 47 L. ed. 394. 92 188 U. S. 1; 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 259; 47 L. ed. 359.

93 The court observe: "We do not deny that it may have been the plaintiff's intention not only to graze, but to fatten his sheep, while en route to Wyoming. Indeed, we may suspect it. but there is nothing in the agreed statement of facts to justify that inference."

94 192 U. S. 500; 24 Sup. Ct Rep. 365; 48 L. ed. 538.