§ 8. Volition and Bodily Activity. — A voluntary decision is normally followed by action which carries or tends to carry it into effect. Setting aside for the present the case of voluntary attention, where the will merely determines the direction of thought, we have here to consider the relation between volition and bodily movement.

Motor efficacy is not essential to the state of voluntary decision as a psychical fact. "The question as to the nature of a certain mode of consciousness, is quite independent of the question whether or not this mode of consciousness will be followed by a certain train of occurrences in the organism and in the environment. If I will to produce an explosion by applying a lighted match to gunpowder, my volition is none the less a volition because in the course of its execution the match goes out or the powder proves to be damp. Similarly the volition is none the less a volition if it turns out that my muscular apparatus refuses to act, or acts in a way contrary to my intention. The connexion between certain modes of consciousness and corresponding movements of the limbs is necessary to the maintenance of our existence; but it does not enter into the constitution of the conscious state which precedes the executive series of occurrences. When the conscious state is one of volition, it is necessary that the subject should look forward to the bodily movements, either as practically certain or at least as possible. A belief of this kind is an essential ingredient of the voluntary attitude. But the existence of the belief is in itself sufficient. Its truth or falsehood is a matter of indifference. In a precisely analogous way we must, in determining to produce a gunpowder explosion, assume that the powder is or may be dry enough to take fire. But it is by no means necessary that the gunpowder in point of fact should be dry." *

* Article by author on "Voluntary Action," Mind, n.s., vol. v., No. 19, p. 365.

Normally, however, volition is followed by corresponding movements. How does this take place ? Professor James has supplied wiiat appears to be a satisfactory answer to this question. The passage of volition into movement is according to him a special case of the general tendency of ideas to act themselves out. The mere representation of an action tends to give rise to the action itself, and will do so in the absence of interfering conditions. "Try to feel as if you were crooking your finger, whilst keeping it straight. In a minute it will fairly tingle with the imaginary change of position ; yet it will not sensibly move, because its not really moving is also a part of what you have in mind. Drop this idea, think of the movement purely and simply, with all brakes off, and, presto ! it takes place with no effort at all."

It very frequently happens that ideas pass into action without preceding volition. "Whilst talking I become conscious of a pin on the floor or of some dust on my sleeve. Without interrupting the conversation I brush away the dust or pick up the pin. I make no express resolve, but the mere perception of the object and the fleeting notion of the act seem of themselves to bring the latter about."* Experiences of this kind are very common. We have already had occasion to dwell on the tendency of ideas to express themselves in imitative gestures; and in that connexion we adduced other evidence to show that ideas tend to act themselves out in proportion to their vividness and dominance in consciousness.

We now turn to the special case of volition. Volition is normally followed by movement, because the voluntary decision gives to the representation of the act decided on a settled predominance in consciousness as against the representations of alternative courses. This is Professor James's account of the matter, but it seems possible to push analysis somewhat further, so as to show how the predominance arises. During the process of deliberation, the subject is as yet uncertain what he is going to do. Incompatible courses of action are ideally represented as possible alternatives. With the voluntary decision comes the belief that one of them is to be carried out to the exclusion of the others. It is this belief which gives to the idea of the action the predominance leading to its execution. This is perhaps best illustrated by what takes place in the hypnotic state. It is well known that the hypnotised subject responds passively to all kinds of suggestions from the hypnotiser. Within certain limits it is only necessary to suggest the idea of an action or group of actions to bring about performance. "Tell the patient that he cannot open his eyes or his mouth, cannot unclasp his hands and he will immediately be smitten with absolute impotence in these regards."* Tell him that he is a pig or a lion or a baby or Julius Caesar, and he will proceed to enact the part. "Subjects in this condition will receive and execute suggestions of crime, and act out a theft, forgery, arson, or murder." Now though the suggestion of the mere idea tends to have this effect more or less, yet the result can be produced with far more certainty and conspicuousness, when the operator imposes on his patient a belief that he is such and such a person, or that he is going to do such and such a thing. Hence suggestions mainly take the form of assertions, such as, You will do this, You will not do that. When the patient has once adopted the belief that he is going to act in a certain manner, the ideas of alternative courses are suppressed, and the action follows.

It seems probable that the predominance which voluntary decision gives to the idea of a line of action is essentially connected with the belief that this is the line which we are going to follow out, to the exclusion of other alternatives.

* Op. cit., vol. ii., p. 603. Ibid., p. 605.