It is sometimes stated, in general terms, that by the contract the purchaser becomes, in Equity, the owner of the property: but "this rule applies only as between the parties to the contract, and cannot be extended so as to affect the interests of others. If it could, a contract for the purchase of an equitable estate would be equivalent to a conveyance of it. Before the contract is carried into effect, the purchaser cannot, against a stranger to the contract, enforce equities attaching to the property (b);" so, notice of an incumbrance given to the purchaser before the execution of the conveyance, is effectual, although the purchase-money be actually paid (c); and the purchaser, although he may then have, or subsequently acquire, the legal estate, can, it is conceived, use it against the incumbrancer only to the extent of securing such purchase-money. His interest under the contract may, however, be charged, or assigned (d), and will be bound by a judgment (e); but the incumbrancer, assignee, or creditor, can only obtain relief, as against the vendor, on the terms of undertaking all the purchaser's liabilities under the contract (f).

Up to the time fixed for completion, the vendor is, in the absence of special stipulation, entitled to the crops, or other ordinary profits of the land; he would not, however, it is conceived, be entitled to take crops in an immature state, or otherwise than in due course of husbandry. After the time fixed for completion, and pending negotiation, he may, it appears, in due course of husbandry, cut coppice and get in crops, but the net profits "will belong to the purchaser (g).

General nature of purchaser's equitable ownership; strangers to contract not affected by-it.

Is capable of alienation.

Vendor entitled to profits, until time fixed for completion.

(b) Per Lord Cottenham, in Tas-ker v. Small, 3 M. & C. 70. (c) Wigg v. Wigg, 3 Atk. 384. (d) Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 274.

(e) Baldwin v. Belcher, 1 J. & L. 18.

(f) Dyer v. Pulteney, Barn. Ch. R. 160.

Everything, however, which forms part of the inheritance belongs to the purchaser from the date of the contract; so that he is entitled to windfalls (h), and to the produce of ordinary timber cut (i), or, it is conceived, stone or gravel quarried or dug by the vendor after the contract (j).

And any act by the vendor, which prevents his giving to the purchaser that which was, substantially, the subject-matter of the contract, renders the agreement voidable by the latter; e. g., the felling of ornamental timber (k); and, even as to ordinary timber, the authorities merely show that the fall of it may be matter for compensation; cases might, it is conceived, occur, in which the Court would relieve a purchaser on account of falls of wood, although neither planted nor left for ornament or shelter.

And since, as between the parties to the contract, the purchaser is owner of the estate, he has the benefit of any improvements to the property which may happen after the date of the contract; e. g., the dropping of lives on the purchase of a reversionary interest (l), or a suddden rise in the value of land from its being required for a public purpose (m): and must bear any loss which occurs without the fault of the vendor; e. g. the death of the cestui que vie, on the purchase of an estate for life, or a life annuity (n); or the destruction of house property by fire (o); and, as respects fire, the vendor, unless he agree that the property shall be kept insured, or, it would seem, make some proposition to the purchaser grounded upon the fact of its being insured, is not bound to keep up the insurance, or to give the purchaser notice of its having dropped (p): so, also, the purchaser of house property must make good any injury done to adjoining premises by the fall of the buildings subsequently to the contract (q).

Whether he may take crops after time fixed for, but pending completion.

Windfalls, etc, belong to purchaser from date of contract.

Material alteration of property by vendor avoids the contract; e g., a fall of ornamental timber.

Purchaser takes accidental benefits, and bears accidental losses, as in cases of or fire.

Death of tenant for life: or of cestui que vie:

(g) Poole v. Shergold, 1 Cox, 273; Sug. 819; see, as to manorial fines, on purchase of a manor, Garrick v. Lord Camden, 2 Cox, 231 (stated infra, Ch. XIX.); and Earl of Hardwicke v. Sandys, 12 Mee. & W. 761.

(h) Poole v. Shergold, ubi supra.

(i) Magennis v. Fallon, 2 Moll. 591.

(j) See Nelson v. Bridges, 2 Beav. 239.

(k) Magennis v. Fallon, ubi supra.

(l) 1 Madd. 539.

(m) 6 Ves. 352.

And where the accruing benefit is such, that, if taken by the purchaser, it would or might be irrevocably lost to the vendor, (as in the case of a vacancy occurring, pending discussions on the title to an advowson,) the purchaser claiming the benefit must accept the title (r): in Wyvill v. Bishop of Exeter (s), the right to present was altogether denied him, on the ground of his objections to the title having been frivolous; but the case seems of doubtful authority (t).

So, in the converse case of an estate being sold in consideration of a life annuity, and of the cestui que vie dying before completion, the purchaser will be entitled to a conveyance on payment of the arrears (u); it is, however, as a general rule, essential, in such a case, that he should, in the lifetime of the cestui que vie, have made, or tendered, any payment which became due during such lifetime (v); the rule, however, it is presumed, would not apply, unless a sufficient interval had elapsed between the payment becoming due and the death, to allow of payment or tender being made according to the usual course of business: the omission, in fact, must amount to laches (w): nor, on the other hand, where a payment had been previously refused or long neglected, is it likely that a Court of Equity would be satisfied with payment or tender made at a time when the cestui que vie was, to the knowledge of the purchaser, dying or dangerously ill: it was laid down, in a recent case (x), that although the Court, upon sales of property in consideration of an annuity, will enforce specific performance notwithstanding the death of the annuitant, it will inquire with some jealousy into the fairness of the transaction, and will require a clear case for specific performance under such circmnstances.

Vendor, whether bound to insure.

Restrictions on purchaser's right,- case of vacancy on sale of advowson.

Estate sold in consideration of life annuity; - purchaser is entitled to, on death of cestui que vie before con -veyance; - subject to what restrictions.

(n) Sug. 330; and see 6 Ves. 352.

(o) Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. 349.

(p) 6 Ves. 353.

(q) Skelton v. Robertson, 14 Jur. 323.

(r) Sug. 332.

(s) 1 Pri. 292.

(t) Sug. 332.

(u) Mortimer v. Capper, 1 Bro. C. C. 156

(v) Jackson v. Lever, 3 Bro. C. C.

605; Pope v. Roots, 1 Bro. P. C. 370.

We shall hereafter have occasion to consider the above rules, with reference to sales under a decree of the Court of Chancery (y).

Where a Public Company, under the usual compulsory power, contracts for the purchase of part only of the land subject to the power, this will not prevent their subsequently exercising it in respect of the residue (z).