In deducing title to chattel interests Probate must be seen to have been granted by proper Court.

Will need not be proved in equity.

Documents not part of the title must sometimes be produced as negative evidence.

(p) Williams v. Bland, 2 Coll. 575.

(q) Sug. 464.

(r) Grove v. Bastard, 2 Ph. 619.

(s) 2 Ha. 260.

(t) Cited, 1 Hayes, Conv. 573.

In many cases, however, where the possession has been consistent with the prima facie title, presumption may supply deficiencies in proof of the existence, or due execution, of material instruments (u): the principle in the case of deeds, (and which, in general, seems equally applicable to other instruments operating inter vivos,) being this, viz., that where there has been long enjoyment of any right which could have had no lawful origin except by deed, there, in favour of such enjoyment, all necessary deeds may be presumed, if there be nothing to negative such presumption (v): for instance, a grant from the Crown of an Ad-vowson (excepted in a former grant under general words) has been presumed as against a purchaser, after an uninterrupted possession evidenced by title deeds for 133 years and three presentations' (w); so, a reconveyance of the legal estate from trustees has been presumed, the property having for 110 years been dealt with without reference to its remaining outstanding, although the enjoyment was consistent with the supposition of such being the case (x); so, where copyholds were devised to trustees, upon trust to pay testator's debts, funeral expenses, two annuities, and a legacy, and then to convey the premises to T. W.; and T. W. was admitted in 1771, and a party claiming under him accepted an enfranchisement in 1791, the validity of which was considered to depend upon the regularity of T. W.'s admittance, a prior surrender by the trustees to the use of T. W. was presumed as between vendor and purchaser (y); so, payment of a mortgage debt, and a reconveyance of the legal estate, have been presumed after an interval of eighty years, the mortgage not being subsequently mentioned in the title deeds, and the mortgage deeds having for twenty-five years been in the possession of the vendor and his ancestors, during which period no claim, it was alleged, had been made for principal or interest (z): so, after forty years' possession of copyholds under a will, a surrender to the use of the will was presumed in an early case (a); so, the enfranchisement of a copyhold has, after an enjoyment of 160 years, been presumed even against the Crown (b): so, in the general, it will be presumed that mesne assignments of attendant terms have been regularly made (c).

Deficiencies in proof of documents, how far supplied by presumption.

General rule.

Presumption of grant from Crown.

Of reconveyance of legal estate.

Of copyhold surrender.

(u) See Chalmer v. Bradley, 1 Jac. & W. 63.

0) Lyon v. Reed, 13 Mee. & W. 285, 303; approved in Creagh v. Blood, 3 J. & L. 133: and see Monck v. Huskisson, 1 Sim. 285; Att.-Gen. v. Fishmongers' Company, 5 Myl. & Cr. see p. 25; and see early cases collected in Read v. Brookman, 3 Durn. & E. 151.

(w) Gibson v. Clark, 1 Jac. & W. 159.

(x) Hillary v. Waller, 12 Ves. 239; and see Emery v. Grocock, 6 Madd. 54; and Noel v. Bewley, 3 Sim. 103.

So, the grant of an easement will be presumed after twenty years' enjoyment (d); but, to raise such presumption, it is necessary to show, not only enjoyment, but that the party to whom the grant is attributed had power to make it (e).

01 payment of mortgage, and of reconveyance.

Of surrender to use of will.

Of enfranchisement.

Of mesne assignments of Terms.

Of grant of easement.

(y) Wilson v. Allen, 1 Jac. & W. 614.

(z) Cooke v. Soltau, 2 Sim. & St. 154; but the lapse of 46 years from the death of a Testator, and of 39 years from the last notice of legacies charged by his Will, has been held insufficient to warrant a presumption of their payment: see Shields v. Rice, 3 Jur. 950.

(a) Lyford v. Coward, 1 Vern. 195.

(b) Roe v. Ireland, 11 East, 280.

(c) Earl v. Baxter, 2 W. Bla. 1228. As to presuming the surrender of satisfied terms for years, see Sug. Appendix, 26; and Garrard v. Tuck, 13 Jur. 871, C. P. The late Act of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 112, has deprived the doctrine of much of its practical importance: it must, however, be remembered, that the Act is not of universal application, supra, p. 137; and that where it applies, a vendor must still show in whom old terms, supposed to have been destroyed by the Act, were vested on the day when it came into operation, and that they were then attendant on the inheritance; so that the doctrine above referred to, of presuming the existence of mesne assignments, is still of practical moment.

(d) See Darwin v. Upton, cited 3 Durn. & E. 159; and later cases-cited in 4 Jarm. Conv. 151.

(e) Barker v. Richardson. 1 B. &

So, the formalities of a deed are readily presumed; for instance, sealing and delivery will be presumed from proof of signing, and the whole will (if the deed comes from proper custody) be presumed after 30 years without any proof at all (/); or within that time from proof of a deceased subscribing witness's handwriting (g); so, in a modern case, the House of Lords held that a parchment writing, purporting to be the first skin of an Indenture consisting originally of two or more skins, and severed by a sharp instrument, but which came from the proper custody, was properly received in evidence in ejectment; and that the mutilation of a deed forms an objection rather to the value than to the admissibility of the evidence (h): so, livery of seisin will be presumed after twenty years' consistent possession (i); so it will be presumed that persons who have executed an award under the general Inclosure Act were regularly appointed and took the necessary oaths (j); so, it will be presumed that an instrument, duly executed and which is lost, was also duly stamped (k), unless the particular circumstances of the case forbid such a conclusion; as where the instrument has been fraudulently destroyed by the party chargeable thereon, and it can be shown to have been unstamped when it came into his possession (l); so also that stamps, the amount of which is obliterated, were of the right amount (m); but the Courts will not presume that forms have been complied with, which the Legislature, upon grounds of general policy, has made essential to the validity of an instrument; as, for instance, the enrolment under the Statute of Charitable Uses of the conveyance of an estate to trustees for a charity (n).