(d) Sug. 1062; but where land was recovered in ejectment, the solicitor of the defendant was held bound in equity to state to whom he had on behalf of his client delivered the title deeds; Banner v. Jackson, 1 De G. & S. 472.

(e) Chant v. Brown, 7 Ha. 79.

(f) Holmes v. Baddeley, 1 Ph. 476; and see earlier cases there cited.

(g) See Pearse v. Pearse, 1 De G. & S. 12; Herring v. Clobery, 1 Ph. 91; Holmes v. Baddeley, ib. 476; Lord Walsingham v. Goodricke, 3 instance, he will be bound by a trust, or incumbrance, or by any agreement respecting the estate of which he has notice and which would have bound the estate in the hands of the vendor (k).

Ha. 122; Reece v. Trye, 9 Beav. 316; Penruddock v. Hammond, 11 Beav. 59, 61; but see Beadon v. King, 13 Jur. 550, V. C. E.; as to cases of fraud, see Foiled v. Jefferies, 13 Jur. 465; on appeal, 972; Reynell v. Sprye, 11 Beav. 618; the mere connection of the documents with the Acts impeached by the bill is no ground for their production, S. C. on appeal.

(h) Reynell v. Sprye, 10 Beav. 51.

(i) Sug. 1031; Taylor v. Stibbert, 2 Ves. jun. 439.

The consideration of how far the purchaser is bound by notice of an executory or executed agreement, which is, either wholly or in part, void or voidable, gives rise to questions of greater difficulty.

Where A., seised in fee, in consideration of his son's marriage settled the estate on himself for life, with remainder to his son for life, with the usual limitations in strict settlement on his son's issue, with remainder to himself (A.) in fee: and with power for A. to lease, and with his son to sell the estate; and A. agreed to grant a lease exceeding the power; and then A. and the son, sold the estate, the purchaser, who had notice of the agreement, was compelled to perform it at the suit of the intended lessee (l); Lord Roslyn thought that A.'s agreement bound the estate except as against the son and other remaindermen claiming under the settlement, and that the sale took the estate out of the settlement and left it indefeasibly impressed with the agreement (m). Lord Redesdale has expressed an opinion that the purchaser, except to the extent of A.'s life estate and remainder in fee, ought not to have been bound (n): Sir E. Sugden seems to consider (o) that the decision can be supported on the ground that the purchaser was bound to indemnify the vendor against his liability to damages under the contract, and refers to a case (p) where a copyholder having granted a lease renewable with the Lord's licence, and the Lord having, in the name of a trustee, purchased the copyhold interest with notice of the lease, and having refused to renew, a bill was filed by the lessee for specific performance, and Lord Eldon directed a case to be submitted to the Common Pleas as to whether damages could be recovered by the lessee upon the lessor's covenants, and upon receiving an opinion in the negative dismissed the bill; this, however, can scarcely be considered a decision: and it may be doubted whether the vendor's right to an indemnity (supposing it to exist) can give to the lessee a better hold upon the estate than he originally possessed.

Notice of void or voidable estates, agreements, etc., how far binding.

Purchaser from tenant for life and remainderman held bound to give effect to agreement by the former for grant of unauthorized lease: sed qu.

(k) See Dowell v. Dew, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 345.

(l) Taylor v. Stibbert, 2 Ves. jun. 437.

(m) See p. 442.

(n) See 2 Scho. & Lef. 599, and Harrisson v. Duignan, 2 Dru. & War. 304.

(o) Sug. 1033.

(p) Lufkin v. Nunn, 11 Ves. 170.

And it has been held that a purchaser who buys expressly subject to a partial interest which has no existence (q) or is voidable (r), cannot dispute the right of the party in whose favour the reservation is made; and it has even been held in Ireland (s) that where an estate is sold subject to void or voidable leases the vendor may set them aside for his own benefit, upon securing to the purchaser the payment of the rents and performance of the covenants; but the point is treated as doubtful by Sir E. Sugden (t); although, he judicially admits that "if a man buys an estate subject to an incumbrance, and it turns out that it is not a valid incumbrance, yet he may so buy it as not to leave him the power to impeach it" (u).

Purchaser buys expressly subject to nonexistent or voidable interest, bound thereby.

(q) Prettyman's case, cited in Walton v. Earl Stanford, 2 Vern. 279; but the rule seems to be otherwise at law, see Doe v. Archer, 1 Bos. & P. 531; so where a mortgage to A. falsely recited an equitable charge in favour of B. and such charge was subsequently created by the owner of the equity of redemption, it was held that A. must stand as first incumbrancer; Frazer v. Jones, 5 Ha. 475; affirmed,

12 Jur. 443.

(r) See Neild's case, cited 1 Moll. 453; and see Leader v. Ahearne, 2 Con. & L. 534.

(s) Maguire v. Armstrong, 2 B. & B. 538, 548.

(t) Sug. 1034.

(u) Ll. & G. tern. Sug. 215, 216; Woods. Marquis of Londonderry, 10 Beav. 465.

In the case last referred to (w) where the vendors attempted to set aside leases for their own benefit without the consent of the purchaser of the reversion, Sugden, C, held that they had no such equity, and could not impeach the leases unless they could also impeach the sale of the reversion (a?): this decision was reversed by Plunket, C.; he considered Maguire v. Armstrong an authority, and as founded on the clearest principles of common sense; he however went on to observe (y), that "the purchaser had a right to be secured in his rents by proper covenants in any new leases; this was done in Maguire v. Armstrong;" thus admitting the right of the purchaser to have as good a security as he had under the original leases; - and not adverting to the impossibility of determining the relative values of covenants by the lessees and covenants by the vendors (z): now Maguire v. Armstrong seems to be no authority for disregarding this difference, for the Court there appears (a) to have recognized the purchaser's right to have as good a security as he before had for the rents and covenants, and to have founded its decision upon the assumption (which seems to have been acquiesced in by the plaintiff) that, in the particular case before the Court, the covenants of the defendant might be considered equivalent to the covenants of the lessees. An appeal to the Lords from Lord Plunkett's decision went off upon another point (b).