Dating from 1803, the Bank of France is in many important respects analogous to the Bank of England in its organization and general public service. The public service of the bank, however, is in France relatively less important as compared with its service to the individual than in England. On the other hand, the method by which the Bank of France extends credit is quite different from that adopted by the Bank of England. Whereas in Great Britain, as already noted, the principal means of lending to the individual is the bank deposit, so that the bulk of all transactions are effected by checks, in France the bulk of the business is transacted through payments made in notes, so that the advances of the Bank of France are naturally in large measure in the note form. Its statement, therefore, shows a very large volume of notes in circulation and a relatively small volume of deposits, whereas in England before the war the total of notes outstanding was relatively small, while the volume of deposits was disproportionately large. The Bank of France has about six hundred branches scattered through the various "departments," or districts, into which France is divided, and direct discounting is carried on to a very considerable extent with the public at large. The paper discounted is small in amount and has at times run down to very low figures. The bank has been in the habit of requiring such paper, when purchased or discounted by it, to be indorsed by a banker, which in effect has made its transactions practically rest upon the footing of bankers' acceptances, or the equivalent thereof, so that the French market received the support of the Bank of France through this requirement of insurance of credit risks, even though it was true that the bank was dealing largely with the actual customers who made the paper as the result of business transactions. Partly owing to the very broad powers of the Bank of France and the habit of dealing with the public very widely, however, the development of the French credit and banking system has been on a much more limited scale than in England, relatively few banks having developed there. There existed in France before the war a certain number of deposit banks whose total deposits were less than about $12,000,000, and twelve credit institutions with deposits amounting to $5,084,000,000. These institutions had many branches scattered throughout the country and dealt largely in investment securities. Such banks, like the British joint-stock banks, rediscounted directly with the Bank of France, which in turn issued to them notes, and these notes were held by them in their vaults as a basis for their own operations. As in the case of the Bank of England, the Bank of France possessed a very decided public function and was called upon not only to receive and disburse government funds, but under the terms of its charter might be required to loan up to 200,000,000 francs (about $40,-000,000) to the state. Although the stock of the Bank of France was privately owned, the government had power to appoint its higher officers and practically to control it in essential particulars. During the war the Bank of France underwent much the same changes of function and structure as did other central banks, except that, owing to the great strain placed upon the institution, these changes were probably more far-reaching and severe than elsewhere. A great inflation took place as the result of direct discounting of government paper and the issue of notes against it and the rapid development of an adverse trade balance. Both currency and credit inflation became the rule under the French system, and while bank deposits up to the time of the armistice had grown only about 70 per cent, circulation of Bank of France notes had increased to about 37,000,000,000 francs as against some 6,000,-000,000 before the war. Withdrawal of gold, refusal to allow its exportation, widespread use of bank-note currency, and various other expedients for controlling exchange and money values were put into effect during the war. Practically all of them tended to render the banking situation more difficult and to depreciate the value of the notes and deposits of the Bank of France as stated in terms of foreign currency. Although this depreciation was for a time held in check through the adoption of a plan of stabilizing exchange, such stabilization was never very successful and was eventually discontinued a few months after the armistice. The value of the inflated notes and credits was thus left to take care of itself and has since been far below nominal parity, the franc, which was worth 19.3 cents in American money before the war, being quoted at the close of 1921 at about 7 1/2 cents in American money.