The waiver of acceptance of paper requiring acceptance has been examined in preceding sections.1 The waiver of acceptance, it was said, does not dispense with demand of payment and notice of non-payment.2 The waiver of demand or of notice or of both is now to be considered. This waiver may be express or implied. If express it may be oral or written unless a statute prohibits oral waivers. If written, it may result from the single waiver of the party making an express waiver by himself indorsing the waiver upon the paper, or may result from the indorsement of paper containing a waiver in the form of a stipulation incorporated in the body of the paper or prefixed to a preceding indorsement, or it may result from a blank indorsement delivered to an indorsee with authority to write a written waiver above the indorsement. The oral waiver may be either express or implied. If expressly made at the time of indorsement, a sharp division in the authorities exists as to whether it is provable under the parol evidence rule. The oral waiver may be implied from acts and circumstances. A promise to pay before maturity acted upon by the holder amounts to a waiver. The obtaining by the indorser of an extension of time for the principal debtor may amount to a waiver. The exaction of full indemnity by the indorser from the maker before maturity waives notice and demand. Other circumstances or acts have the same effect. The rule of law varies as to a waiver made before or after maturity. Whether a waiver after maturity and dishonor requires a new consideration is sharply disputed. A new promise to pay after release of the indorser, if made with knowledge, or a partial payment of the paper by the indorser, or an unconditional acknowledgment of liability, may have the effect of a waiver of a notice and demand. It will thus appear that there is much analogy between the rule applicable to a waiver of demand and notice, and to what amounts to a waiver of the statute of limitations. The various divisions of the subject will be treated in what seems to be the natural order.

1 Even if a new draft for the original is given, where the original liability of the drawer has been discharged, and the drawer in giving the new draft reserves his rights, the second draft is. unenforceable against him. Benton v. Martin, 40 N. Y. 345. See & c, 31 N. Y. 382.

2 Allen v. King, 4 McLean, 128; Hal brook v. Allen, 4 Fla. 87; Man-ney v. Coit, 80 N. C. 300; Dayton v. Trull, 23 Wend. 345; Denniston v. Imbrie, 3 Wash. C. C. 396. For an exchange of checks, see Foster v. Paulk, 41 Ma 425.

3 Murphy v. Phelps, 12 Mont. 531; Stam v. Kerr, 31 Miss. 199; Phoenix

Ins. Co. v. Allen, 11 Mich 501; Ship-man v. Cook, 16 N. J. Eq. 251.

4 Jennison v. Parker, 7 Mich. 355; Whitten v. Wright, 34 Mich. 92; Foote v. Brown, 2 McLean, 369, applying the rule where a guarantor was held entitled to notice; Shriner v. Keller, 25 Pa 61; Moore v. Brun-gard, 6 Miss. 557. See Gallagher v. Roberts, 2 Wash. C. C. 191.

5 Shipman v. Cook, 16 N. J. Eq. 251. But in order to claim strict rights as indorsers, the debtor transferring the collateral must have indorsed. Boardman v. Steele, 13 Conn. 547; Van wart v. Smith, 1 Wend. 219.

1 See Sec. 209, ante.

2 English v. WalL 12 Rob. (La.) 132,