There are certain cases which use language to the effect that the officers of the bank have not the right to surrender the rights of the bank on a note by statements made at the making of it. But this statement is inaccurate. In a leading case where the language is used, the judge deciding the case did not understand the point he was deciding.1 The case was one where the officers of a bank represented to an indorser or agreed with the indorser that the indorser would not be liable. The real point was that the party was seeking to contradict the effect of the written document by parol evidence. But other courts have followed this deliverance,2 and it is possible that courts may go on repeating it. The rule as to parol evidence to vary a written contract is that it is not admissible except in cases of fraud or mistake. But a representation by a bank officer that a person indorsing a note would not be liable on it is, of course, not a fraudulent representation, or a representation of a fact at all, or a representation upon which the indorser had a right to rely. Yet if at the time the indorsement is given an actual fraudulent representation is made by an officer of the bank who has the power to act in regard to the note, the bank will be responsible for the fraudulent representation.3 This is the general rule now fully established, that a corporate officer perpetrating a tort in the performance of the business of the corporation which he is qualified to perform renders the corporation liable.4

3 Bissell v. First Nat. Bank, 69 Pa. 415.

4 Kingston v. First Nat. Bank, 26 Wis. 663.

5 Pendleton v. Bank of Kentucky, 1 T. B. Mon. 171.

1 Bank of U. S. v. Dunn, 6 Pet. 51, by Justice McLean. He did not repeat this statement in Bank of Metropolis v. Jones, 8 Pet. 12.

2 Loomis v. Fay, 24 Vt 240. This case advances the theory that such an agreement would be a fraud on the bank. That is no reason for not holding the bank liable. It is liable for many acts of its agents that are a fraud upon it. Other cases put forward the theory that the other party had no right to rely upon such an agreement. That is true. But the theory of the law is that the note cannot be varied by such evidence. Other cases say that the act was beyond the scope of the officer's duty, but that is simply petitio principii. Suppose a benefit was granted to the bank for such an agreement The other cases which follow Bank of U. S. v. Dunn are Whitehall Bank v. Tis-dale, 18 Hun, 151; Mapes v. Second Nat. Bank, 80 Pa. 163; and see Comp. v. Carlisle Bank, 94 Pa. 409, which was clearly a case under parol evidence rule.