Since the rule in different jurisdictions varies under statutory enactments as to the form of an acceptance, it becomes a matter of some importance to ascertain what law governs the contract of acceptance. The general rule would be that the law of the place where the acceptance was to be made would determine the sufficiency of the acceptance.1 This would be the place where the bill is made payable.2 If the bill be accepted where payable the contract is governed by the law of that place;3 but if a bill be drawn in one place payable at another place and be accepted in the former place, it has been held that the acceptance is governed by the law of the former place.4 This ruling seems questionable because the acceptance made the bill the acceptor's promissory note payable at the place where the bill was payable. If it is a promise to accept which is in question, and the agreement is to accept bills at a certain place, the law governing the promise would be the law of the place where it was agreed to accept cannot be considered in any way prejudiced on any theory of the nature of their conditional obligation.

1 Hunt v. Standart, 15 Ind. 33; Frazier v. Warfield, 9 Smedes & M. 220; Bright v. Judson, 47 Barb. 29; Garretson v. North Atchison Bank, 47 Fed. R. 867; Lonsdale y. Lafayette Bank, 18 Ohio, 126. What the court decides in this case is right, but its reasons are wrong. The point was made that the contract was governed by the law of Louisiana, and that law not being proven no recovery could be had. The court accepts this proposition with childlike confidence, and decides that the Ohio law governs. It ought to have said that the foreign law not being proven it would be presumed to be the same as the law of Ohio. Mason v. Dousay, 35 I1L 424

There is one extraordinary opinion by Justice Hunt (Scudder v. Union Nat. Bank, 91 U. S. 406) which is absolutely incomprehensible, but apparently it contradicts the above rule. The opinion, however, contradicts itself.

2 If the bill were not expressly made payable somewhere it would be the address of the drawee if the bill gave an address; otherwise it would be his actual address. Suppose, however, the drawee had a place of business in New York, but a residence in New Jersey. It would seem that the place of actual acceptance would govern. Worcester Bank v. Wells, 8 Met 107; Kelly v. Smith, 1 Met. (Ky.) 313.

3 See cases cited in note 1, supra.

4 Scudder v. Union Nat Bank, 91 U. S.406.

the bills;5 but if the agreement to accept bills to be drawn be made generally, although the drafts were payable in another state than the one wherein the agreement was made, it seems that the law of the state wherein the agreement was made governs the transaction.6