The acceptance of the drawee is, nothing further appearing, an admission that the drawee has funds of the drawer to the amount of the bill.1 As to the holder this presumption from the admission is absolute.2 And as between the acceptor and drawer and indorsers, the natural presumption from the drawing of a bill of exchange or order for money is that the drawee is indebted to the drawer,3 and if the bill or order is accepted the presumption is that the drawee or acceptor has funds of the drawer,4 and if the bill or order is paid the inference is that it was paid by the drawee or acceptor out of his indebtedness to the drawer.5 But as between the drawer and acceptor and indorsers the fact may be shown to rebut the presumption,6 and thus it may be made to appear that the acceptor was in fact an accommodation acceptor as to the drawer7 or as to an indorser, or that the drawer was an accommodation drawer for an indorser, or that one indorser was an accommodation indorser as to another indorser.8

13 Diversey v. Moor, 22 III 331.

14 In re Babcock, 3 Story, 393; Wilson v. Isbell, 45 Ala. 142; Anderson v. Anderson, 4 Dana, 352; Cronise v. Kellogg, 20 III 11; Nowak v. Excelsior Stone Co., 78 111. 307.

15 Ashton v. Reeves, 3 Phila. 339. This does not affect the rights of the acceptor as against the drawer, but the drawer is never responsible to the acceptor in the capacity of acceptor. The case of Canadian Bank v. Coumbe, 47 Mich. 358, without any apparent reflection holds that if the holder knows the drawer to be a surety he must act accordingly, but the cases in the preceding note expressly rule the contrary. See also Bradford v. Hubbard, 8 Pick. 155.

16 Canadian Bank v. Coumbe, 47 Mich. 358; Child v. Eureka Powder Works, 44 N. H. 354.

17 Greene v. Duncan, 37 S. C. 239; but see Richardson v. Carpenter, 40 N. Y. 660, and Kemble v. Lull, 3 McLean, 272, which says the acceptance of an order conditional upon the presence of funds is an admission of funds.

18 Bacon v. Bates, 53 Vt. 30; Grant v. Wood, 12 Gray, 220.

19 Gerard v. La Coste, 1 Dall. 194.

1 Gillilan v. Myers, 31 I11. 525; Raborg v. Peyton, 2 Wheat 385. The saint; is true of an order. See note

17 to last section.

The acceptance of a bill or order admits the genuineness of the signature of the drawer, but it does not admit the genuineness of any other signature upon the bill or of the contents of the instrument.9 The rule as to the acceptance or payment of checks is the same.10 If the bill be payable to the drawer's own order the rule is the same.11 Hence if the acceptor pays to an innocent indorsee the bill upon a forged indorsement he will be liable to the true owner of the bill,12 and he may compel the person to whom he paid to repay the amount to him; but otherwise, if he pay to the lawful holder of the bill, he cannot compel repayment unless the holder was a party to some fraud or was guilty of negligence amounting to fraud.13 The same rule applies to the acceptor supra protest.14 But it is conceivable that the acceptor of the bill may mislead a person by his acceptance. Suppose a bill were presented to the drawee, and the drawee had within his knowledge an easy means of ascertaining the forgery of an indorsees name or an alteration in the amount of the bill, and should still negligently accept the bill, and upon the strength of the acceptance some third party, a bank, for example, should without negligence take the bill for value, would the acceptor be liable to such party, or if he paid such party would he be estopped from claiming the money back? A court of high authority has held that if the acceptor is a bank it would be held for its negligence, and there is no reason why the rule should not be applied to any other acceptor.15

2 See note 1 to last section.

3 Bradley v. McClellan, 3 Yerg. 301; Adams v. Darby, 28 Mo. 162; Alvord v. Baker, 9 Wend. 323.

4Byrd v. Bertrand, 7 Ark. 321; Parks v. Nichols, 20 Bradw. 143; Byrne v. Schwing, 6 B. Mon. 199; First Nat. Bank v. Moss, 41 La. Ann. 227.

5Healy v. Gilman, 1 Bosw. 235; and see the cases in the last note.

6 Alvord v. Baker, 9 Wend. 323.

7 Trego v. Lowry, 8 Neb. 238; Thurnian v. Van Brunt, 19 Barb. 409.

8 See note 16 to last section. 9White v. Continental Nat.

Bank, 64 N. Y. 316; First Nat. Bank v. Ricker, 71 111. 439; and see Sec. 154, ante, as to forgeries in checks. But a bank is bound to know whether its own bills have been fraudulently raised. United States Bank v. Bank of Georgia, 10 Wheat. 333. In this case Story, J., does not seem to understand that there is a difference between alteration of the amount and forgery of the bank's signature.

10 See Sec. 154, ante.

11 Williams v. Drexel, 14 Md. 566.

12 Dick v. Leverich, 11 La. 573; Jackson v. Commercial Bank, 2 Rob. (La.) 128.