The vicissitudes of holders of the notes of insolvent banks in the days of state banks of issue form a melancholy chapter in the history of state banks. Owing to what may be termed an inherent defect in the article, they were in a state of chronic insolvency. Sometimes the holders of their notes were given a preference upon insolvency.1 At other times they were not entitled to share in the assets because the notes were secured.2 Stockholders with bills were in the same situation as other bill holders.3 The bank was compelled in some way to redeem its notes, yet some cases permitted the notes to be charged against the bank only for the amount that was paid for them by the holder.4 If the note holder escaped this calamity he was likely to find that the assets of the bank had been appropriated by the state for trustees to administer upon. It is true that he could follow these assets into the hands of the trustees,5 and that he would not be prejudiced by the state's attempted embezzlement.6 But the notes became worthless upon insolvency. They could not be sold to debtors of the bank, because, whether transferred after insolvency or not, they were not a set-off against the assignees in insolvency7 or against the receiver, except by statbank is insolvent, his decision is conclusive.4 The bankruptcy law formerly in force did not apply to national banks 5 The power of the comptroller to appoint a receiver applies to the cases specified in the national banking law and no others.6 But the courts may appoint receivers at the suit of either the stockholders or creditors, and where a receiver has been appointed the comptroller cannot appoint another.7 A state court may appoint a receiver at the suit of a creditor, although the stockholders are applying for an appointment in the federal court.8 The appointment of the receiver by the comptroller is presumed to be made by the secretary of the treasury.9

1 Moses v. Ocoee Bank, 1 Lea, 398; Woodward v. Central Bank, 4 Ga. 323; Miller v. Andrews, 3 Cold. 380; Robinson v. Bank of Darien, 18 Ga. 65; In re Pennsylvania Bank, 39 Pa. 103. But this preference did not apply to voluntary assignments by the bank. Dobbins v. Walton, 37 Ga. 614. In another state there was no preference. Cochituate Bank v. Colt, 1 Gray, 382.

2 People v. Holmes, 3 Mich. 544. See Appeal of Hogg, 22 Pa. 479.

3 Belcher v. Willcox, 40 Ga 391. 4 Griffin v. Central Bank, 3 Ga.

371; Belcher v. Willcox, 40 Ga 391; Robson v. Benton Banking Co., 7 Sraedes & M. 724.

5Ringo v. Real Estate Bank, 13 Ark. 563.

6 Barings v. Dabney, 19 WalL 1.

7 Eastern Bank v. Capron, 22 Conn. 639; Ringo v. Biscoe, 13 Ark. 563 (see 29 Am. Law Rev. 94, 459); Northampton Bank v. Winder, 3 Clark, 284; In re White Mountain Bank, 46 N. H. 143. And compare Commercial Bank v. Thompson, 7 Smedes & M. 443; Clarke v. Hawkins, 5 R L 219; Fanners' Bank v. Willis, 7 W. Va. 31; Gee v. Bacon, 9 Ala. 699. But under statutes they were held to be a set-off against the assignee and sometimes without the aid of a statute. Robinson v. Bank of Darien, 18 Ga. 65; Morse ute. But if the note holder was indebted to the bank, by the aid of a statute he could set off the notes which he held as against the bank,8 provided he owned them at the date of insolvency, except in one state, which held that the set-off was not permissible in spite of the statute, because all creditors should be placed on an equality.9