The first and original liability of a stockholder is that upon his stock subscription, to pay the full amount subscribed. But in addition to this liability various statutes have added an additional liability to stockholders for debts of the corporation. It is, of course, a matter of common legal knowledge that no liability upon a stockholder as such, except for the stock subscription, exists at common law. But as a general rule statutes have imposed additional liabilities upon bank stockholders. And these statutes will doubtless be held to apply to all corporations with banking powers, whether they are named banks or trust companies, but the double liability would only apply to that part of their business transactions which was that of a bank. Sometimes the stockholders of the bank are made liable for its debts upon insolvency or dissolution. In one instance found in State Savings Batik v. Foster, 76 N. W. R. 499 (Mich.), the stock liability is for depositors, but not other creditors. At other times they are made liable to a certain amount for debts contracted while they were stockholders, regardless of a transfer. By other statutes the stockholders existing at the time suit is brought are made liable. In some instances both the stockholders when the debt was contracted, and those existing at the time suit is brought, are made liable. There have been in times past statutes imposing on stockholders in state banks of issue a particular liability upon the circulating notes of the bank. Under our national banking system the notes of national banks are fully secured. But the stockholders of national banks are made liable for an amount equal to the amount of their stock in addition to the stock subscription for the debts of the bank. This is the common form of liability for bank shareholders. Only those who are stockholders at the time when insolvency impends are liable under the national bank act. There are yet other statutes which make stockholders liable for certain acts of the corporation, which liability is something in the nature of a penalty. It is not the purpose of the writer to examine this subject minutely, for it is so complicated with general corporation law that it would swell this chapter beyond reasonable limits. The subject has been fully treated by excellent authorities.1

7 See Gray, Restraints on Alienation, sec. 105 et seq.

8 If this device was taken merely to destroy the alienability, no court ought to enforce it.

1 Winter v. Baldwin, 89 Ala. 483. Compare as to the general right to inspect, Hatch v. City Bank, 1 Rob. (La.) 470; Cockburn v. Union Bank 13 La. Ann. 289.

2 Reese v. Bank of Mont. Co., 31 Pa. 78; Manderson v. Comm. Bank, 28 Pa. 379; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18-How. 331.

3 Quincy v. Steel, 120 U. S. 245; Dimpfell v. Railroad Co., 110 U. S. 211.

4 See Albert v. State, 65 Ind. 413 ; Wiltz v. Peters, 4 La. Ann. 339.