The chief criticisms that have been brought against the constitution of the board are: that appointment thereto is owing to government officials rather than to banks, and therefore the board is too open to political influence; that it has too few bankers and too many without banking knowledge and experience, an equipment required for only two of the seven; that it is too powerful and arbitrary; and finally that the Comptroller should not be a member of the board. The political menace is undoubtedly the board's greatest danger, but so far in its history no charges of a political nature have been alleged against it, and the country has been fortunate in having some expert bankers and financiers as members. The contention that the Comptroller should not be a member of the board is debatable because it is he who links the supervision of the national banks as such with the general supervision of the whole system, including federal reserve, national, and member state banks and trust companies. It is also probably well to have the Secretary of the Treasury a member because of the paramount importance of government finance in its relation to banks and banking; indeed, to separate the Treasury and the board would lead to contrariety of purposes and consequent difficulties. Some prominent bankers have complained of the dominance of the Treasury in the financial policy and conduct of the board; but this dominance is largely accidental and temporary, arising out of the exigencies of war finance.