6. With one bank of issue the reactions of the Foreign Exchanges would produce great and universal distress, and yet not accomplish that constant conformity between the London and country circulation which is sought to be attained.-" Do you conceive that such a change as has been contemplated, namely, the abolition of country bank notes, would produce any effect upon the foreign exchanges?".... "The effect upon the foreign exchanges would depend upon the principle upon which the single bank of issue was conducted. If conducted merely by issuing gold for notes and notes for gold, I consider that when the foreign exchanges were favourable, and brought in a large amount of gold, then there would be a large amount of notes put into circulation. I think that was the case in 1837 and 1838, although the Bank of England did not issue to such an extent as, upon the principle assumed, this one bank of issue would be compelled to do. I consider that thus this large amount of notes put into circulation against the importation of gold would reduce the rate of interest, would excite speculation, and lead to foreign investments; that a reaction would then take place, and the amount of contraction would be very considerable, so as to produce very great distress."

Now, whether you have different banks, or whether you have only one bank, if there is a certain amount of circulation in the country, and a certain amount in London, and the Bank of England, or the central bank, purchase a large amount of bullion in London, that immediately disturbs the proportion that existed between the London circulation and the country circulation; and, on the other hand, if there is a demand for bullion to go abroad, and bullion is sold at the central office, that will contract the circulation, and contract it much more than it could be immediately contracted in the country. If, therefore, the liability to a disproportion in amount between the country and the London circulation is a defect in the existing system, it is a defect which the establishment of only one bank of issue will not remedy."

7. The establishment of one bank of issue would embarrass the fiscal operations of the Government.-" I may now state, with reference to the payment of the public dividends, that the Bank of England advances loans in December, before the dividends are paid, which loans are discharged after the dividends are paid, and thus the fluctuation in the currency is very considerably diminished from what it otherwise would be. Now, if we had a bank that could not do this, if the currency were issued upon what have been called currency principles, then the Chancellor of the Exchequer must have the whole amount of the January dividends in his strong room before he could pay those dividends. Out of the circulation of England and Wales, consisting of about £28,000,000, you must collect eight millions and a half, and lock them up in the custody of the Government previously to the payment of the dividends; then you pay out in a mass these eight millions and a half, and that in a state of contracted currency; and thus you go on, four times in the year, producing the most violent and most extravagant fluctuations : whereas now, by the excellent plan adopted by the Bank of England in issuing her notes before the payment of the dividends, by means of loans, which are discharged after the payment of the dividends, notwithstanding you pay eight millions and a half of dividends, you produce a fluctuation in the currency of only two millions and a half."

8. The principle of one hank of issue cannot he applied to the various currencies of the United Kingdom.-" What is the general conclusion which you propose to draw from the tables you have put in?" . . . , "The general conclusion I would draw is, that the Bank of England is governed by certain laws which do not apply to the country circulation; that the country circulation of England is also governed by laws peculiar to itself; that the circulation of Ireland is also governed by laws peculiar to itself; that the circulation of Scotland is also governed by laws peculiar to itself; that those respective circulations are all governed by uniform laws, as is shown by their arriving at nearly the same point at the same period of the year; and, therefore, that you cannot introduce any system by which all those various circulations, governed by different laws, can be amalgamated into one system; that such a system would be at variance with itself, and would tend to destroy that beautiful system of country banking which now exists in this country-a system which has tended very much to the prosperity of this country, which, by receiving the surplus capital of different districts, and giving out the capital for the encouragement of trade, calls forth all the natural resources of the country, and puts into motion the industry of the nation, and at the same time supplies a circulation which expands and contracts in each district according as it is required by the trade or agriculture of the district. Those expansions or contractions take place at different periods of the year in different districts; the circulation expands when the wants of trade require it, and when no longer wanted it again returns; and I think this beautiful system, in the language of the resolutions passed by the deputies from the joint-stock banks, 'has greatly promoted, the agriculture, trade, mining, and general industry of the nation, and that equal advantages cannot be produced by one bank of issue.' "

We shall conclude this section by copying the correspondence between the First Lord of the Treasury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Bank of England respecting the suspension of the Act of 1844 :-

" Downing Street, Oct. 25th, 1847.

" Gentlemen,

"Her Majesty's Government have seen with the deepest regret the pressure which has existed for some weeks upon the commercial interests of the country, and that this pressure has been aggravated by a want of that confidence which is necessary for carrying on the ordinary dealings of trade.