"Each of these three banks had been in peril in 1847, and though by the assistance of the Bank of England they were enabled to surmount it, they fell on the next occasion of severe commercial pressure, under circumstances still more injurious both to their own proprietors and to the public. Two bill-broking houses in London suspended payment in 1847, both afterwards resumed business. In 1857 both suspended again. The liabilities of one house in 1847 were, in round numbers, 2,683,000, with a capital of 180,000; the liabilities of the same house in 1857 were 5,300,000, the capital much smaller, probably not more than one-fourth of what it was in 1847. The liabilities of the other firm were between .3,000,000 and 4,000,000 at each period of stoppage, with a capital not exceeding 45,000.

"These five houses contributed more than any others to the commercial disaster and discredit of 1857. It is impossible for your committee to attribute the failure of such establishments to any other cause than to their own inherent unsoundness, the natural, the inevitable result of their oxen misconduct.

"Thus we have traced a system under which extensive fictitious credits have been created by means of accommodation bills and open credits, great facilities for which have been afforded by the practice of joint-stock country banks discounting such bills, and rediscounting them with the bill brokers in the London market, upon the credit of the bank alone, without reference to the quality of the bills otherwise. The rediscounter relies on the belief that if the bank suspend and the bills are not met at maturity, he will obtain from the Bank of England such immediate assistance as will save him from the consequences. Thus, Mr. Dixon states, 'In incidental conversation about the whole affair, one of the bill brokers made the remark that if it had not been for Sir Robert Peel's Act the Borough Bank need not have suspended. In reply to that I said, that whatever might be the merits of Sir Robert

Peel's Act, for my own part, I would not have been willing to lift a finger to assist the Borough Bank through its difficulties, if the so doing had involved the continuance of such a wretched system of business as had been practised; and I said, if I had only known half as much of the proceedings of the Borough Bank while I was a director (referring to the time previous to the 1st of August, when I became a managing director) as you must have known, by seeing a great many of the bills of the Borough Bank discounted, you would never have caught me being a shareholder;' the rejoinder to which was,' Nor would you have caught me being a shareholder; it was very well for me to discount the bills, but I would not have been a shareholder either.'"

The foregoing disclosures are as beacon lights to warn against the dangers of the rocks and shoals and quicksands which beset the track of modern adventurers in search of the Golden Fleece. Disclosures of the kind could be multiplied almost ad infinitum. But, once the gold-fever sets in, it rages until the moment of the crisis. And what follows then? We cannot answer the query better than by quoting from her " History of the Thirty Years' Peace," Miss Martineau's description of the consequences resulting from the terrible panic of 1825 :-

"There are many now living," wrote that talented lady in 1846, "who remember that year with bitter pain. They saw parents grow white-haired in a week's time; lovers parted on the eve of marriage; light-hearted girls sent forth from home as governesses or sempstresses; governesses, too old for new situations, going actually into the workhouse; rural gentry quitting their lands; and whole families relinquishing every prospect in life, and standing as bare under the storm as Lear and his strange comrades upon the heath!"

Must these vicissitudes continue J A recent writer on the subject1 remarks-

"If crises must work their will when they arise, how are they to be prevented in the future i The problem is difficult, yet not absolutely insoluble. The difficulty lies more in moral than in physical or trade forces: it is the want of knowledge, and still more of observation and reflection, which generates real crises......Crisis is not merely another word for poverty. If the diminution of wealth is met by wise curtailment of speculation even in its legitimate form, property may dwindle, but the convulsions peculiar to a crisis will not be developed. Then, again, if farmers never drained except with the surplus of a good harvest, if manufacturers never built new mills except out of realized profits, if goods were not produced except under a very strong presumption that they were in demand, if bankers never lent except upon solid and realizable security, no crisis would ever desolate the world. Traders and bankers, like sailors, have a difficult task in predicting the coming weather; and, like sailors, they must try to acquire the sailor's eye-the faculty of discerning small signs and judging their significance accordingly. The vital point is that they should notice the right things, the causes which are at work in brewing mischief. They must be studied at their origin. The difference between the intelligent merchant or banker, and the unintelligent, lies in the ability to understand the forces which make deposits and their withdrawals great or small-in the skill rerum cognoscere causas. This is a wide study beyond doubt. It is easier, no doubt, to float down the stream as it runs in the present, to make profits and to let to-morrow take its chance, or to set up some empirical rule, some high-sounding jargon, without stop-

1 Mr. Bonamy Price, in No. CVI. of the " North British Review." ping to inquire whether it possesses the reality as well as the look of knowledge. But if men choose to let their actions be guided by such methods, they must look out for crises-sharp, sudden, and overwhelming crises. The responsibility weighs heaviest upon banks, not upon the Bank of England only, as some proclaim, but upon all bankers collectively. Everything depends on the sagacity and prudence they bring to bear on the loans they grant. The periodical recurrence of these convulsions seems to indicate that prudence lasts a year or two after disaster has punished folly; care and caution are developed in all commercial classes; and the energy and industry of the people restore the losses incurred. Prosperity follows; prudence gradually disappears; then heedlessness encourages every kind of enterprise; and again the thunder and lightning avenge forgotten virtue."