Practically every one of our tariff laws has been the result of compromise. Protection cannot escape being sectional, or even local, in any country; and in a government like ours, where each lawmaker represents the interests of a single district, localism is an exceedingly strong force. Each lawmaker very naturally feels the necessity of conserving the interests of his own constituents. Accordingly, he is strongly tempted to vote for an entire tariff law which favors his district, even though he be decidedly opposed to nine-tenths of its provisions. The legislative history of any important tariff law bears out this statement. It has frequently occurred that a bill passing one House has been subjected to hundreds of amendments in the other.

It is but fair to say that Congress has made some attempts to get at all the facts in the case of protection. In 1882 that body provided for a Tariff Commission and granted it power to examine witnesses for and against the protective policy. The people placed little confidence in the good intentions of the Commission, since, unfortunately, its chairman happened to be interested in the wool industry. Again, in 1909 a second commission, called a Tariff Board, was authorized. This Board survived but a few years. In 1914 Congress provided for a third commission, which, on account of the high personnel of its membership, is likely to have the moral support of the people. It must be kept in mind, however, since Congress cannot delegate its legislative powers, that the best any tariff board or commission can hope to do is to arrive at some definite conclusion fortified by unanswerable facts that will appeal to the good sense of Congress and the people.