Since 1867 she has had to bear the severe strain of successive famines; and in 1867 there seemed to be no probability that her finances would be crippled by that depreciation of silver which has been said by one who spoke with the authority of a Finance Minister "to cast a grave shadow on the future of Indian finance." 1 In case it may be objected that these opinions of Lord Lawrence and his Council were expressed before the publication of the memorandum of Sir Henry Rawlinson, who throughout has been the most influential advocate of a "forward" policy, it may be well to point out that after this memorandum had been submitted to all the highest authorities in India, there is not a single word to be found in any of the minutes which they wrote upon it, which can be interpreted as the expression of a more favourable opinion of the financial results which would be produced by advancing the frontier into Afghanistan. Thus Sir R. H. Davies, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjaub, says: "Sir H. Rawlinson's proposals would again plunge us into the ever-shifting sands of Central Asian intrigue at a cost which we cannot afford." Sir Richard Temple, who has filled many influential positions in India, says: "Under Providence we are trustees for the public funds of India, and we are responsible for the careful application of them.

When there are so many objects of certain usefulness and necessity within India itself on which to spend this money, it is a grave thing to expend such money in foreign regions on objects of doubtful expediency." 1 The very evil which Sir R. Temple thus anticipated has actually come to pass; for as Governor of Bombay he has himself been obliged, under the financial pressure caused by the military expenditure in Afghanistan, to peremptorily order that all public works, nay, even all repairs except those which are absolutely necessary, should be stopped in that Presidency.

1 See speech of Sir W. Hub at Calcutta, April 10, 1876.

In order to obtain as distinct an idea as possible of the consequences which may be produced on the financial condition of India by carrying out this "forward" frontier policy, it will be desirable to refer to some estimates which have been made of its cost by those most competent to form an opinion. The late Lord Sandhurst, who was scarcely less distinguished as a financier than as a soldier, writing in 1875, declared that the occupation of the advanced positions which it is proposed should be held beyond our present frontier, would require an addition to the strength both of the European and native army in India which would permanently increase her military expenditure by more than 3,000,000l. a year. One of the very highest of Indian military authorities, Sir Henry Norman, has lately declared that if the advance were confined simply to the occupation of Koorrum, Jellalabad or Daka, and Candahar, at least thirteen or fourteen thousand additional troops would be required, one-third of whom would have to be British, and that their cost would be 1,000,000/. per annum; this sum, moreover, is independent of the large amount that would have to be expended on fortifications and other military works, and also in subsidising the hill tribes.

It is, however, scarcely necessary to refer even to such high authorities as those just quoted. It can no longer be regarded as a matter of surmise that the frontier policy, which is now being pursued in India, will make a most serious permanent addition to her military expenditure. Less than a month had elapsed from the time our troops had crossed the frontier when it was announced that it had been decided to increase the native army by 15,000 men, or about 12 per cent. There is no point connected with the government of India on which there is greater unanimity of opinion than that it would not be prudent to add to the number of the native army without proportionately increasing the strength of the European army. An increase of 12 per cent. in the European and native army will certainly involve a cost of not less than 1,500,000l. a year. It would therefore appear that two powerful agencies will be brought simultaneously into operation most seriously to augment the military expenditure of India. In the first place, as Sir John Strachey has pointed out, the army, from administrative causes, is becoming more costly in proportion to its numbers; and, in the second place, the policy which is now being pursued is necessitating a very material addition to the strength of the army.

The extremely grave consequences involved in such an increase of military expenditure will be shown when considering whether, in the present financial condition of India, there is any probability that such new charges can be met, without imposing taxes intolerably burdensome to the people, or accumulating an indebtedness which will augment the taxation that will ultimately have to be imposed.

1 See Afghan Papers, 1878.