His position would be the more intolerable if he were treated as India was as regards her army, and, after having been compelled against his wish to join the partnership, he is forced to continue it whether he desires to do so or not. In 1861 the English and Indian armies were amalgamated in direct opposition to the strongly-expressed remonstrances of Lord Canning, who was then Viceroy, and of almost every Indian statesman of authority and experience. The Council of the Secretary of State unanimously objected to it, but they were informed that although they could, of course, exercise their right of protest, it would be time wasted, for the amalgamation of the two armies had been made a Cabinet question and was an accomplished fact.

1 See Budget Speech of Sir John Strachey, Calcutta, March, 1879.

The description just given of the consequences which may occur if two individuals share the cost of joint housekeeping, fails fully to indicate the position of India with regard to army expenditure. Not only has she been compelled to enter into partnership with England, but, the partnership having been once established, she is obliged to contribute her share towards the expenses of many costly arrangements, as to the adoption of which she was not even consulted. Thus, a few years since, the system of short service was introduced. Under the arrangement which previously prevailed, a man was enlisted for twenty-one years, during twelve of which he served with the colours. Now, the enlistment is for twelve years; there is only six years' service with the colours; for the remaining six he passes into the reserve. Whatever may be urged in favour of this new arrangement, it is obvious that short service may produce very different consequences to India and England respectively. For instance, the cost of transporting troops from England to India is an important item in the military expenditure of the latter country, and it is evident that the shorter the term of service, the more frequently will troops have to be sent from England to India, and back again from India to England, with the result of very materially adding to the charge for transport.

This charge has to be borne entirely by India, and does not in the slightest degree affect England. Again, it may very possibly happen that six years' service in England may be sufficient to enable a man to pass into the reserve as a thoroughly trained soldier; if, however, the great majority of those who have completed six years' service in India do not remain there, but return to England, India will have scarcely any reserve of well-trained troops, and the larger part of her European forces will consist of young soldiers, who have not been long enough in the country to become either properly trained or properly acclimatised. From these and other considerations which might be mentioned, it is at once evident that although the system of short service may be a good arrangement for England, it does not necessarily follow that the system is calculated to promote either the economy or the efficiency of the military organisation of India. The interests of India, however, in this matter were so entirely ignored or lost sight of by the English Government that it appears from official evidence given before a committee of the House of Commons, that there is no record to show that when the short service system was adopted, those who were responsible for the government of India were even consulted on the subject.1

1 See evidence given by Sir Thomas Pears, late Secretary of the Military Department at the Indian Office, before the East India Finance Committee, 1874, p. 53.

When it is proved, as it repeatedly has been before parliamentary and departmental committees, that India has at the present time to pay at least twice as much for her recruits as she would have to pay if she could obtain them for herself, and when it is pointed out how costly to her in various other ways is the army partnership which has been established between her and England, it is usually urged that the general interests of England and the rest of the Empire render the maintenance of this partnership necessary. Thus it is said, "If England and India both competed in the English labour market for recruits, various inconveniences might arise." In the days of the Company, India had a European army of her own, and although she obtained her recruits at an extremely cheap rate, yet service in the Company's European army was always eagerly sought after. India, if she were again permitted to recruit for herself, might make service in her army so attractive, that, to the disadvantage of England, she would draw away some of the best recruits.

But, if for any such reasons as these, it is necessary to make India compulsorily share in the costly military organisation of England, the greatest care should be taken not to throw upon her any charge which she would not have to bear if she were allowed to obtain recruits on her own terms, and make her own arrangemerits with the officers she employed. There is too much ground for the suspicion that an exactly opposite course is now often followed, for facts may be mentioned which seem to show that the large amount which India in some instances pays, diminishes the amount which England would otherwise have to give for services which she receives. Thus, before a Committee of the House of Commons which sat in 1877, it was stated that although the pay of the private soldier and the non-commissioned officer is the same in India as in England, yet the commissioned officers are much more highly paid when serving in the former country than in the latter. An official return was laid before the Committee by which it was shown that the pay of officers of the higher ranks is "at least three times as much in India as in England." l The unhealthiness of the Indian climate cannot be pleaded as a sufficient reason why this higher rate of pay should be given to officers of the English army serving in India; the climate is not worse for them than it is for the private soldier or the non-commissioned officer, and their pay is the same in India as in England. India is not a worse place for an English officer to live in than Sierra Leone or Canton: if he. is stationed at these places his pay is provided by the English taxpayer, and the amount he receives is almost precisely the same as if he were serving in England. It may no doubt be contended that the aggregate remuneration which an officer of the British army receives for service in England and in India admits of no reduction, and that, as he is certainly not overpaid, if he were to receive less in India it would be necessary to give him more in England; but even if this were fully admitted, it would only supply one more unanswerable argument to show that, when the respective financial interests of England and India are in question, sufficient care is not taken to give adequate protection to India.

1 See Report of the Army (Royal Artillery and Engineer Officers') Arrears of Pay Committee, 1877, p. 72.