We have seen that under competitive conditions the laborer tends to get his marginal product. He may, however, fail to get this amount because he is a weaker bargainer than his employer. His weakness as a bargainer may arise from his ignorance of the value of his labor or from a timidity which prevents him from asking as much as he would receive if he had the courage to ask. Or it may arise from the fact that he is in want and is compelled to accept whatever terms are offered to him to supply his present need. As an individual the laborer is thus at a disadvantage in dealing with his employer.

But when the workers organize and deal collectively with employers many of these disadvantages disappear for the reason that the representatives of the laborers learn to know the conditions of production as well as the employer does, and to develop a skill in bargaining equal to that of the employer himself. Also where there are out-of-work benefits furnished by the labor organization the laborer is not compelled to accept work upon exceptionally disadvantageous terms. Where the workers bargain collectively, therefore, they are likely to receive more nearly the marginal product of labor than where they are compelled to bargain individually. Where particular groups of laborers are strongly organized and are able to prevent other laborers from joining their ranks, they may indeed be able to establish a monopoly of the supply of their particular kind of labor and thus be in a position to receive more for their work than what their marginal product under conditions of competition would be.