5. A third feature favoring monopoly is uniformity in the quality of the product furnished. It is a general truth that competition is most persistent where there is the greatest range of choice open to the customer, and consequently the most individual treatment required in the enterpriser. An artist, even a storekeeper, attracts about him a body of patrons who like his product (for the merchant's manner and method of dealing are a part of the quality of his goods), and who cannot be tempted away by slight differences in price. Rival companies in the stage of competition are seen to claim superiority for their particular goods and to improve their service in every way possible. A new telephone company, entering where a monopoly has held the field, works at once a wonderful betterment in rates, courtesy, and service. But as the product of all competitors attains the highest technical standard possible at the time, the rivalry is reduced to one of price, and it is usually a "fight to the finish."

6. A fourth feature favoring monopoly in these enterprises is the necessity of making permanent and exceptional use of the public streets and alleys. If this right were granted by a general law to every citizen, this feature would be sufficiently implied in the foregoing discussion. As it would be intolerable to allow private interests to use public property in whatever way they wished, the legislative body makes special grants in such cases in view of the circumstances. Not only is the legislature (or council, or county board of commissioners, etc.) induced by the economic difficulties to withhold a charter to a second company, but it is exposed to the greatest corrupting influences by the one already established. The knowledge of the opposition to be encountered in getting a franchise must keep competitors out, even though monopoly prices are maintained.

In view of these several features, which are so closely related that they form a common character, more or less fully shared by various industries, and especially in view of the necessity for the formal granting to them of peculiar privileges in the form of a public franchise, the public, in order to protect the general interest, is forced to undertake an exceptional control of these industries.

Franchises favor monopoly.

7. Several courses are open to the public, acting in its political capacity, to retain these monopoly advantages for the general welfare. First, it may do nothing, trusting vainly to competition to regulate the rate, or consciously leaving the result to be worked out by the monopoly principle; this is what in most cases has been done in the past in America. Second, in granting the franchise it may attempt to fix near cost the charge for the service or product, so that the franchise will be worth little or nothing. Third, it may leave the rate to be fixed by the monopoly principle, but charge for the franchise so much that the value of the monopoly is appropriated into the public treasury. Fourth, it may have public officials carry on the business, either selling the product at cost or making monopoly profits that go into the public treasury. Various combinations of these plans are followed in practice, the most common plan being the fixing of maximum rates which, with improved methods, generally become ineffective. It is difficult to fix a uniform rate that is equitable, because conditions change, and, further, because a uniform rate must be applied to all parts of the town, although the cost of service varies greatly. It is difficult to sell the franchise for near what it is worth, because of the uncertainty, of the political blackmail, and of the limited number of competent bidders. There remains only the policy of public ownership to secure the profits of monopoly to the public, either directly or in a diffused manner.

Modes of controlling public utilities.

Economic basis of public ownership.

8. Public ownership is economically justified when it secures a utility of widespread consumption, otherwise impossible, or insures the public a better quality or a lower price. The question of public ownership is not exclusively an economic question. There are incidental problems, such as its effects on enterprise and on political integrity, with which it is not possible here to deal. In the main, however, public ownership is simply a business proposition which must be justified by its economic results. In the case of a general social benefit not to be secured without public ownership, as popular education or the climatic effect of forests, the only question to answer is whether the utility is worth the cost. In the case of industries already in private hands, as waterworks, gas and electric lighting, there is needed, to make a wise decision possible, a knowledge of the effect a change to public ownership will have on value. If public officials can furnish some goods cheaper than they are furnished by private enterprise, it is because of the wide margin of monopoly profit, not because there is any magic in public ownership. The same general items of cost must be met. The first cost of the plant and the annual interest payments are much the same. Experience shows that, because of political influence, wages are likely to be higher under public ownership, but salaries of officials are higher under private ownership. On the whole, public industry in these respects probably has no advantage. Some items of cost may be less under public management. Public collection of dues along with taxes is an advantage not enjoyed by private companies. Several public officials sometimes share the same office and thus reduce expenses. In small towns the public electric lighting and waterworks have been operated more economically under one roof. Public industry does not have to meet the cost of lobbying and blackmail which are often forced upon private companies. But the greatest source of saving in public ownership is the value of monopoly privileges that, under private management, go into private pockets.

Cost under public or private ownership.

The temptation to political corruption may be more insistent when a large force of men is constantly employed, and when large supplies are constantly purchased, by public officials, but the temptation is not so strong or so centralized as it is in the granting of franchises to wealthy corporations. Public industry is weakened by the absence of certain motives to excellence that are present in private business. The income of public officials not being dependent on the economy of management, the spur and motives of competitive industry are lacking. No social discovery has made individual honesty and civic virtue useless to good government.

The decision in any specific case is one dependent on local.

conditions, and the exact limits of public ownership are not fixed. Industry is changing so rapidly that new experience is needed each year. The main outlines of public ownership, however, are now in large part determined. Some industries do well, others ill, under public management, and between these lie many debatable cases. Waterworks and probably electric lighting, because of the comparative simplicity of their operation, are more suitable for public ownership than are gas-works. No absolute line divides the one group from the other. But whatever the changes, the student of the theory of value must never overlook the fact that the increase of public ownership is altering in manifold ways the prices of goods, and is reacting also on the production, distribution, and consumption of incomes.

Character of public officials.

Limits and effects of public ownership.

Questions On Chapter 53. Public Ownership Of Industry

1. What are municipal franchises? Where are they?

2. What kinds of municipal industries have you seen in operation? How successful were they?

3. What are the main arguments for and against the city ownership and control of gas and waterworks?

4. What troubles arise from city politics?

5. Name the industries that are owned and controlled by towns and cities of which you have a personal knowledge.

6. Which of them are most satisfactory in your judgment? Which the least so?

7. What is the public sentiment in your home community as to the ownership of industries by the town or city?

8. What forms of state activity favor survival of unfit men and bad traits of character? What forms help the fittest to survive?

Note

For exhaustive and well-arranged references on all aspects of municipal control and municipal ownership see R. C. Brooks, Bibliography of Municipal Problems, pp. 157-169, in Municipal Affairs, Vol. V, No. 1 (March, 1901).