1. A competitive producer gets the highest price that will permit him to dispose of his product. The enterpriser seeks to get the highest price for his product that the market will afford. His ability to continue making a profit at a lower price does not induce him to reduce the price unless the reduction is to his interest. The ordinary competing manufacturer is limited in his price by two things: first, his customers may cease to buy such articles entirely and may substitute other goods if the price is too high; secondly, they may buy of other sellers. Between his wish to keep the price up, and the customer's wish to buy as cheaply as he can, the price is fixed at a point where there is no inducement for others to come in and reduce his sales, or for him to seek a better market. There may be under these conditions a potential but very limited monopoly power. The sole druggist in a small town might occasionally get extortionate prices from particular customers in times of dire need, but he would thus drive away much of his custom, and would tempt a fairer and less grasping competitor to come in. Thus, when men and capital are free to come and go, there results an average or normal return for ability and agents of a certain grade. Prices come to equilibrium where) each is selling his total product.

2. Where a monopoly exists to a greater or less degree, there is less reason to fear loss of custom to competitors. The degree of control determines the fear of competitors. If the control is slight, a very small rise of price will bring in competitors. The monopoly profits in this case either must be very small or they will be very brief. Those outside, controlling a large supply, will be tempted by large profits to market it at once and to increase it as fast as possible. Even where a large part of the supply is under one control, the fear of substitution puts a limit on the price demanded. If the control were extended to all wealth, the monopolist would be the absolute despot of the lives of his fellows. But as things are, the monopolist aims, just as the competitor does, to get the price that gives the maximum gain. The monopolist, however, is in a more or less favored position, as he can raise his price considerably before losing the most of his customers. Much depends on whether the costs increase or decrease as output grows. Where a large increase in output greatly decreases the cost, lower price may leave a larger margin between the cost and the selling price. A general monopoly price is therefore not an unlimited price. It is higher than the competitive price if the same cost of production is maintained. It may conceivably be lower than the former competitive price if the economies of combination greatly reduce the cost and justify a large increase of the output.

Monopoly's greater control of price.

Discriminating monopoly rates.

3. A monopoly often seeks to avoid a general market price, and it adjusts its charge in each small market separately. This is a most important aspect of the monopoly problem and a most important modification of the principle just stated. A market price is the expression of the least urgent demand that aids in carrying off a given supply. It is a maxim that there can be but one price at a time in a given market. The baker ordinarily sells the loaf at the same price to every one buying a given quantity. If he had a monopoly of the bread-supply, however, he might deal with each customer separately, ascertain, by personal inquiry into the lives of the citizens and by the aid of a force of detectives, just how much each could or would pay rather than do without bread. The policy of varying prices is thus followed by monopolies, though usually in a less inquisitorial way, to enable them to get the highest possible returns. Under the name of "charging what the traffic will bear," it is practiced by the railroads as local and personal discrimination. The endurance of some communities and of some individuals being greater than that of others, the burden is adjusted to the back, being made not as light but as heavy as each can be forced to bear.

Low rates to destroy competitors.

Large monopolies dealing in commodities use an adaptation of this method to kill off small competitors who, within a certain district, sell at less than the monopoly price. Prices are suddenly reduced in that community below cost until, the small competitor being ruined, the monopoly rate is reestablished perhaps higher than before. Fear of suffering a like fate prevents others from attempting competition even when prices offer a great attraction and give a high monopoly profit.

The profits of monopoly can be explained by the ordinary laws of value, yet evidently they form a peculiar economic and social problem. They appear to be due not to the services of the enterpriser in increasing production, but to his success in limiting it. There is, therefore, an antisocial element in them not found in the profits of ordinary industry. This deserves further and closer study.

The source of monopolistic profits.

Questions On Chapter 33. Monopoly Profits

1. How is the blacksmith free to compete with the physician and how not? In what sense have we assumed that oompetition exists?

2. Is there competition between the owner of good land and the owner of poor land?,

3. Has the owner of a poor gold-mine a monopoly? Has the owner of a rich mine a monopoly?

4. Does the ownership of land give a monopoly? The ownership of a horse?

5. In what sense is a street-railway a monopoly? What is the value of its franchise?

6. Why does the public consent to grant patents or public franchises?

7. If one company controlled all the petroleum in the world, what would it consider in fixing the selling price?

8. Why will railroads issue commutation tickets?

Note

Of the very large recent literature bearing on monopoly and trusts may be mentioned as especially useful: J. B. Clark, Control of Trusts; R. T. Ely, Monopolies and Trusts; J. W. Jenks, The Trust Problem (a summary by the expert for the Industrial Commission); J. E. le Rossignol, Monopolies, Past and Present; Report of the Chicago Conference on Trusts, 1899; Report of the United States Industrial Commission, 19 vols., 1900-2 (a mine of information).