[Page 103] In some unions there are systems of rating which closely resemble grouping according to competency. Several unions allow young men just out of apprenticeship to work for three or six months or a year at specified rates lower than the regular minimum. Permission to work at a lower rate is granted to young journeymen who have just finished their apprenticeship more frequently by the metal-trades and railroad-shop unions than by the building-trades unions. . . .

[Page 105] Nearly all unions permit members who have become unable to command the minimum rate because of old age or physical infirmity to work for what they can get. There are a few time-working unions which have no rule to this effect, because the nature of the work is such that experience offsets the loss of physical vigor, or because physical vigor counts for so much in the work that old men are not wanted by the employers even at lower rates. Some local unions which have both piece-price lists and time rates, as in a few of the Granite Cutters' branches, provide that old men employed by the hour or day shall be paid according to what their work averages by the piece bill. Some other local unions stipulate that the wages of the exempted men shall be agreed upon by a union committee in conference with the employer. In very few local unions does the number of exempted men exceed five per cent of the membership, and the exemption is made on a much more ascertainable basis than competency. . . .

Wages and efficiency in time work [Page 114]. Very little seems to be known as to the differences in efficiency among men engaged in the same kind of work. It is safe to assume, however, that they are not reflected in time-working trades with any exactness by the wages paid, even where there is no union minimum. When the union confines its action in wage rating to the establishment of a single minimum rate for members engaged in the same kind of work, it is obvious that the adjustment of individual earnings to individual capacity is not as likely to be secured as under the piece-rate system. Even where the union does not discourage large outputs, the time wages of the better men do not exceed the minimum in the same proportion that the men show efficiency above the average. It is safe to state that generally when men whose earning capacity is above that of the average journeyman are left dependent upon individual bargaining for wages above the minimum, they do not receive additional wages commensurate with their superior capacity.

Of most time-working unions it can be said, however, that the variations in efficiency within the membership are not as wide as among men in the same trades outside the union. The mere insistence on a minimum rate which is intended to be almost as much, if not as much, as the average member can successfully demand, necessarily excludes from the union men much below the average of competency. Such men cannot obtain regular employment at the union rate, and it is consequently useless for them to retain union membership.

Union tests of competency. But time-working unions do not rely solely upon a high minimum to keep their membership clear of men considerably below the average in competency. Practically all of the skilled trades require that candidates for membership must prove their competency or be vouched for as competent by members who have worked with them. Where the testimony of members on the same "job" is accepted as sufficient evidence of competency the test is practically reduced to ability to secure employment at the minimum rate. In a number of unions, however, as, for instance, the Plumbers, the Electrical Workers, the Stereotypers and Electrotypers, and the Bricklayers, the candidate must prove his competency by passing a serious examination set by a special board or committee. Finally, many time-working unions attempt to insure that the membership shall be recruited from competent journeymen by recognizing a normal method of learning the trade under union auspices. The apprenticeship regulations of the unions are directed in large part to this end, as are the provisions made by a number of unions for advancement from the status of helper to that of journeyman after a given number of years under instruction in the former capacity.

Minimum as a maximum. The maintenance of a minimum rate by a union also in another way tends to make wages uniform. The fact that a given rate is the "union" rate, and as such becomes the center of attention and the subject of negotiation and even of conflict - this makes it the presumptive rate. Moreover, many employers who are brought with much reluctance to agree to observe the minimum look upon the minimum as a "lump" rate which they have agreed to pay the union for the labor of its members. These employers often take the ground that they should not be expected or can not afford to pay the better men more than the minimum, because they are compelled to pay the union rate to many men w:ho are not worth it. The provisions in agreements noted above for equal increases for all the men are evidences of this feeling. The union officials assert that some employers' associations have a rule against paying men more than the minimum. There is, of course, a greater likelihood of united action against the payment of differential wages when the minimum is established by agreement of the union and the employers as a body.

Competition above minimum. The same forces that lead to the payment of wages above the average rate where there is no union minimum, however, often operate to cause the payment of wages above the union minimum, even though their effectiveness is reduced by the union regulations noted above. The chief of these forces is, of course, competition. Employers are often compelled to comply with the demands of the more efficient men for higher wages in order to retain them. There are many employers, too, who pay the better men more than the minimum, as a matter of course, as compensation for superior service and as an inducement to the men to put forth their best efforts.1

In any attempt to estimate the extent to which men receive wages above the minimum on account of superior efficiency, it is important to bear in mind that the minimum in different scales may stand in very different relation to the modal or predominant wage. The proportion of men receiving more than the union minimum in a trade is frequently large because the competitive wage has increased since the minimum was established. Where the minimum is established by an agreement it is customary to make it binding for a specified period, and if in that time the competitive wage for men increases considerably the employers will frequently offer wages above the minimum to men of no more than average competency. Sometimes the union refrains from raising the minimum when an increased demand for men would make that possible. In 1906 the secretary of the Bricklayers' and Masons' Union cautioned the local unions against putting up the rate when the demand is brisk to a point at which it can be permanently maintained only by throwing some members out