The Freudian doctrines include principles, mechanisms, and applications. Each is entitled to appraisal on its own merits, though the structure stands as a whole. In the first division, the exploration of the subconscious, the distinction between logical thinking in terms of reality and fantasy as pleasurable wish-thinking, the keystone position of the affective life, the importance of childhood experiences, the far-reaching determinations of the sexual life, fit in with the progressive trends of modern psychology, as well as with the close parallelism of normal and abnormal manifestations. The mechanisms of repression, substitutional outlets, compensations, rationalizations, fixations - all leading to the concept of the complex with its emotionalized force - have been fairly well incorporated into a motivation psychology.1 In the applications, psychoanalysis overshadows all else. Its value depends intimately upon the perspective of principles and the wisdom and tact of the practitioner. The Freudian clue to character analysis, the possibility of a psychobiography, the emphasis upon the proper psychic weaning of children to and beyond adolescence, the Freudian factor in the psychoneuroses, however treated, apart from the interpretations of dreams, trance states, and lapses, indicate the possibilities of the Freundian instrumental aids.

But approached closely, the weaknesses of the construction are conspicuous; and one can sympathize with Dunlap's classification of the entire system as unscientific and mystic, while declining to agree with his dismissal of it on that ground. Had Freud been content to indicate the generic plot of the human drama, he would have remained on safer ground. He proceeded to outline its details. Sex played the leading role and dominated the minor parts as well. There developed the "family romance" 1 See L. T. Troland, "Fundamentals of Human Motivation,"D. Van Nostrand Company Inc., New York, 1928.

in which parent-child relation leads to tangled complexes; genital details, sexual threats, traumas, perversions, invade the normal course. As a consequence the psychoanalytic procedure makes later neuroses the issues of such incidents and seeks their unmasking. Both as principle and practice, this phase may be rejected as a speculative and a cultist development, unfortunately appealing to a popular vogue, and catered to by disciples lacking a sober logical training. There remains a core of doctrine that, once separated from its extravagant deductions, may be assimilated with progressive psychology. As for the treatment of mental disorder, a sound psychiatry is not disturbed by a school of practitioners claiming exclusive jurisdiction in the name of an innovator in one branch.

The correction of the Freudian doctrine has proceeded by way of rival dissensions. Jung is clearly the master mind in the psychoanalytic movement, and is sensitive to its philosophical and cultural implications. He introduced an experimental technique in the detection of complexes by delayed, peculiar, and distorted associations; he set forth that the will to power and self-expression is a far more pervasive and dominant motive than sex alone. He is devoted to symbolism even more than Freud, but defends it as a literary embodiment of psychic elaboration. The effect on practice is not distinctive, though it leads to a more liberal diagnosis. Alfred Adler finds a single clue to life adjustment in the avoidance of an inferiority feeling. A dominant mechanism is compensation. He advocates an acceptable form of psychoanalysis, since adjustment proceeds in terms of the total personality. Jung calls his system "analytical," Adler styles his method "individual" psychology. The intelligibility of the Adlerian procedure brings it nearer to the common-sense approach, but adds little to its scientific status. It readily falls to the level of an eclectic, somewhat evangelical guidance.

The permanent value of Freudianism in the renaissance of psychology is not clear. It has contributed a new vocabulary to general usage, has influenced literature and morals and conversation, has reinterpreted social prejudices and personal failings. Its scientific status can hardly be appraised until the cultist phases of the movement have disappeared.1 Freud himself, in his later years, has turned to still more speculative formulations of the hidden depths of the personality, speaking of the super-ego and the "Id" and even of a meta-psychology embracing the system of strivings of which the complexities of life consist. But whether a structure or a superstructure, this interpretation of human motivation and personality must make terms with the psycho-biological foundations. Dr. Rivers is almost the only one who has attempted to determine the evolutionary significance of that stupendous growth from primitive instincts to the elaborately rationalized emotional conflicts which characterizes the modern mind, often to its undoing.

It is because we live in an increasingly complicated world and have become mind-conscious in desirable and undesirable ways, that the Freudian type of psychology has made such a wide appeal. The problems of emotional and intellectual adjustment have become acute; we seek happiness by tortuous routes. The big brain has unbalanced its subordinate yet more fundamental partners in an integrated enterprise.

With as many ill from mental disturbances as from all bodily ailments combined, the safeguarding of the mental economy by intimate knowledge of the higher motivation 1 Fortunately there has appeared, at this critical juncture, a most discerning critique of the movement: "The Structure and Meaning of Psychoanalysis," by William Healey, Augusta F. Bronner, and Anna Mae Bowers, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1930. For the first time there is available a systematic account, with an able interpretative comment, of the significance of the entire movement following upon the epochal innovations of Freud. routes will remain an essential part of education and social direction. That conviction has found expression in the world-wide movement for mental hygiene. Suddenly the human scene has become a clinic, and sick humanity - the mentally lame, halt, and blind - groping their way uncertainly in a world too complex for their limited powers of adjustment, cry out for relief. To answer this appeal exceeds the combined resources of the psychologist and psychiatrist, aided by law, church, and social institutions. We seem to be living in a psychoneurotic as well as a psychological age.