§ 2. Cognitive Aspect of the Conception of the Self — Under the concept of the Self as expressed in the word "I" is included in systematic unity the lifehistory of the individual, past, present, and future, as it appears to himself and to others; together with all its possible or imaginary developments. We have already described the way in which this complex ideal construction grows up. We have now to point out that its evolution accounts for the origin of Will in the strict sense of the word, as implying deliberation and choice.

Voluntary action is to be sharply discriminated from impulsive action, and deliberation from conflict of impulsive tendencies. The difference is, that in impulse action follows the isolated cognitive tendency; whereas in voluntary decision special conations and their ends are first considered in their relation to the total system of tendencies included in the conception of the Self. When two disconnected impulses simultaneously prompt to incompatible courses of action, if the conception of Self does not come into play, one interferes with the other in a quasimechanical way. There is merely a trial of brute strength between them. Instances are sometimes found in young children and animals. The characteristic expression of their mental state is a sort of oscillation between two modes of action, each of which is begun in turn and then gives place to the other. "When a young child suddenly comes face to face with a strange dog, the impulse towards and the impulse away from . . . are realised in quick succession. The child goes up to the dog, runs back to its father, approaches the dog again, and so on." Professor Titchener tells us that "in face of the two impulses, (1) to shut a door on the right hand, and (2) to seat himself at his typewritertable on the left," he actually began "a righthand movement towards the door and then all at once "slued round" to the typewriter, without having closed it." All of us can no doubt recall similar experiences.

Deliberation in no way resembles this alternate jerking in opposite directions, as if pulled by a string, and the decision which follows it is not a mere triumph in strength of one isolated impulse over another. Voluntary action does not follow either of the conflicting tendencies, as such ; it follows our preference of the one to the other. It is the conception of the Self as agent which makes the difference. The alternative is not "this" or "that," but "shall I do this" or "shall 1 do that?" Each line of action with its results is considered not in isolation but as part of the ideally constructed whole for which the word "I " stands. The impulse of the present moment belongs to the Self of the present moment ; but this is only a transient phase of the total Self. If the impulse is realised the completed action will take its place as a component part of the lifehistory of the individual. He may live to regret it. In his present mood, with bottle and glass before him, he may desire to get drunk ; but sobriety may have been the habit and principle of a lifetime.

* Titchener, Primer of Psychology, p. 246. Ibid., p. 247.

If he yields to temptation, the remembrance of the act will stand out in painful conflict with his normal tendencies. He will be unable to think of it without a pang. This incompatibility between the normal Self and the present impulse, if vividly enough realised at the moment of temptation, will restrain him from drinking. If it is not sufficient, further developments of the conception of Self may be more efficacious. He may think of himself as churchwarden or elder; he may think of the ideal aspirations of his better moments; he may call to mind the thought of himself as reflected in other minds, — the dead friend who expected so much from him, and who would be so shocked at his lapse, — the talk of the general public conceived as pitying, contemptuous, or malicious. He may even consider how he would like to look back to such an episode on his deathbed. Obviously, this detailed development of what is included in the man's conception of himself as a whole, might go on interminably. As a matter of fact, it is possible that it would not be needed at all. He might simply say, "What! I do such a thing? How could the thought ever have occurred to me?" In this case the mere concept of the Self in its vague totality without detailed development would be sufficient to produce a decision. The thought of getting drunk attracts the man; but the thought of his getting drunk repels, so as to give rise to instant rejection of the suggested course of action.