The vendee's right to rescind because the vendor gave a secret commission to the vendee's agent is not affected by the fact that a part of the commission paid by the vendor to the vendee's agent was for services previously rendered by such agent in former transactions. Lightcap v. Nicola, 34 Pa. Super. Ct. 189. See also Sec. 559.

"Where the discovery of fraud in a contract for the purchase of land is not made by the vendee until after suit has been brought for the purchase money, the vendee has the right to set up the fraud as ground for rescission and as a defense to the suit, and he may do this where there is a delay of nearly two and a half months after the discovery of the fraud, if there has been no such change in the meantime as to make the rescission inequitable. Id. Compare Sec. 572.

Where a real estate broker fraudulently induces his principal to trade property on a valuation of $4,400 and sells it for $5,750, in an action by the principal against the broker for the difference, the latter could not recoup the amount of expenses incurred in making the sale, nor a portion of the price paid one who was associated with him in the fraud. Van Baulte v. Epstein, 202 Mo. 173, 99 S. W. 1077; Great Western Gold Co. v. Chambers (Cal. Sup. '09), 101 P. 6.

In an action to recover on a contract for commissions for a sale of real estate, in which defendant alleged that the contract was procured through fraud, and after plaintiff had negotiated the sale, the burden of proof was on defendant. Stein v. Whitney, 23 Ky. L. R. 2179, 66 S. W. 820. Contra, Hanna v. Haynes, 42 Wash. 284, 84 P. 861.

A broker employed to purchase land, who conceals from the principal the fact that the vendor will pay the broker a commission on making a sale, has the burden of proving perfect fairness in the transaction, and, in the absence of satisfactory proof, equity will consider him as guilty of constructive fraud. Hanna v. Haynes, 42 Wash. 284, 84 P. 861. Compare Stein v. Whitney, 23 Ky. L. R. 2179, 66 S. W. 820.

An innocent vendor can not be sued in tort for the fraud of his agent in effecting a sale; in such a case the vendee may rescind the contract and reclaim the money paid, and if not repaid, may sue the vendor in assumpsit for it, or he may sue the agent for the deceit. Kennedy v. McKay, 43 N. J. L. 288. A recovery in an action by a principal against a broker for fraudulently representing that the worthless property on which the loan was made was good security, is not affected by the question whether he shared the money with or delivered any part of it to the pretended borrower. Rubens v. Mead, 121 Cal. 17, 53 P. 432; Van Raulte v. Epstein, 202 Mo. 173, 99 S. W. 1077, supra.

Although the owner of the land neither authorized another to sell it for him, nor has authorized the false representation made in the course of the sale, yet if such owner accepts the proceeds of the transaction, he ratifies the acts of his agent, and may be held liable for the fraud practiced by the latter. Krunner v. Beach, 25 Hun (N. Y.), 293. See Sec. 24.

The rule of law forbidding the admission of evidence of an oral agreement made prior to or contemporaneously with a written agreement, does not preclude the admission of evidence tending to show that the written agreement in question was fraudulently obtained, or that it resulted from accident or mutual mistake. Culp v. Powell, 68 Mo. App. 238.

It is immaterial whether the design is fraudulent or not, a sale by an agent of his own property to his principal can be set aside by the latter on discovery of the facts. Bain v. Brown, 56 N. Y. 285; Kutz v. Fisher, 8 Kan. 90; Ackenburg v. McCool, 36 Ind. 473. See also Sec. 389b.

Where the assignee of a purchaser of land from a broker sued the principal for breach of contract, defendant could not impeach the contract, on the ground that it was not signed by the principal, and for fraud, without pleading such defense. Kurinsky v. Lynch, 201 Mass. 28, 87 N. E. 70.

Fraud of a broker forfeiting his commission in representing adverse interests may never be presumed, but must be found from substantial evidence. Maddux v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 171 S. W. 669, 186 Mo. App. 138.