If an agent in selling land adds covenants not authorized by his authority, the purchaser may enforce so much of the contract as conforms to the authority, or claim a revision of the whole, if the principal will not execute a conveyance. Venada v. Hopkins, 1 J. J. Marsh (Ky.), 285, 293. An agent who effects a sale of his principal's lands, and enters into a covenant to convey and assure the land to the purchaser, is responsible to such purchaser under such covenant. Harper v. Hampton, 1 Harr. & J. (Md.) 622. See also Sec. 76a.

The great preponderance of authority now is, that a power, without restriction, to sell and convey real estate, gives authority to the agent to deliver deeds, with general warranty, binding on the principal where, under the circumstances, this is the common and usual mode of conveying. LeRoy v. Beard, 8 How. (U. S.) 451; Peters v. Farnsworth, 15 Vt. 155; Venada v. Hopkins, 1 J. J. Marsh (Ky.), 293; Taggart v. Stanberry, 2 McLean (U. S.), 543; Schultz v. Griffin, 8 N. Y. St. 332, 24 N. E. 480. Sec. 417. (See See. 418 for authorities qualifying this doctrine.)

An agent acting under parol authority only can not bind his principal by a written covenant, under seal, signed with the name of such principal; such an instrument is not, in any sense, the deed of the principal unless delivered by him. Har-shaw v. McKesson, 65 N. C. 688.

An owner of real estate employing a broker to procure a purchaser. Held, not required to inform the broker of the existence of restrictive covenants in the chain of title. Banger v. Leo, 121 N. Y. S. 328.