It is difficult to formulate any hard and fast rules which control courts of equity in granting relief from forfeiture in land contract cases, as the courts do not seem to be moved so much by any general principles of equity jurisprudence as by the equities of the particular case before the court. Generally speaking, it may be said that where the forfeiture of the land contract would result in a substantial loss to the vendee and the vendor's position has not materially changed by reason of or since the forfeiture of the contract and the vendee's laches are not particularly great, the vendee will be granted relief from the forfeiture if he pays into court all arrearages on the contract together with interest thereon. Thus where a vendee had been in arrears under a land contract which provided for a forfeiture upon nonpayment for a period of one year or more, and had never tendered or offered to pay the sum called for by the contract, the court in order to prevent serious loss to the vendee permitted him to redeem from the forfeiture 1 where there was litiga tion concerning a title and the plaintiff did not keep up the payments during the time the litigation was in progress, the court likewise permitted the vendee to redeem from a forfeiture of the contract.2 Where the plaintiff paid only a portion of the purchase price but remained in possession of the property and made valuable improvements for eleven years, and paid the taxes, the court permitted the defendant to be relieved from the forfeiture upon condition that he would pay the entire purchase price, the costs of the action plus fifty dollars.3 Where the plaintiff became in arrears on a land contract which contained a clause permitting the contract to be forfeited for nonpayment, and providing that time should be the very essence of the contract, the court permitted the defendant to redeem from the forfeiture and used the following language:

"The fact that complainant's rights under the contract were subject to forfeiture at law, and the defendant's entry was lawful does not finally determine the rights of the parties. It is the province of the court of equity to grant relief in just such cases." 4

In another case the court used as its criterion for granting relief from the forfeiture that it would be unjust and oppressive to allow the forfeiture to stand and would work no injustice to the defendant to permit a redemption.5

In another case where the vendee assigned a contract which contained a provision permitting the forfeiture thereof, upon assignment the court relieved the vendee from the forfeiture in this case upon the principle that the covenant against the assignment was for the purpose of permitting the vendor to choose his own tenant and that this object was not interfered with in this case.6 On the other hand, the courts have in a

1. Lozon v. McKay, 203 Mich. 364.

2. Bugaski v. Sinka. 200 Mich. 418.

3. Cornell v. Norton, 188 Mich. 187.

4. John v. McNeal, 167 Mich. 148.

5. Stickney v. Parmenter, 35 Mich. 237.

6. McDonald v. Andrews, 199 Mich. 161.

number of instances7 sustained a forfeiture of contracts where the equity of the vendee in the contract is not substantial and to permit the forfeiture did not shock the sense of justice. As previously stated, however, the practitioner will find the statement of general principles of very little value in relation to cases of this character and will find it necessary to examine the adjudicated cases in order to determine what facts have moved the court to withhold or grant relief from forfeiture, and for that reason there has been added to this chapter a collection of substantially all the cases involving forfeiture which have ever been decided by the Michigan Supreme Court. See Secs. 174 to 182.