Where an option is given upon land and duly converted into a binding contract by acceptance in accordance with its provisions, specific performance thereof can be enforced.56

52. Sixta v. Ontonagon Valley Land Co., 157 Wis. 293, 147 N. W. 1042; Johnson v. Trippe, 33 Fed. 530; See James, on Option Contracts, Sec. 1101; Castle Creek Water Co. v. City of Aspen, 146 Fed. 8.

53. Roper v. Milburn, 93 Neb. 809, 142 N. W. 792, Ann Cases 1914, B. 1225.

54. George v. Shuman, 202 Mich. 241; Sixta v. Ontonagon Valley Land Co., 157 Wise. 293, 147 N. W. 1042.

55. Pearson v. Home, 139 Ga. 453, 77 S. E. 387.

56. Rude v. Levy, 43 Colo. 482, 96 Pac. 560, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 91, 27 Am. St. Reps. 123; Rease v. Kittle, 56 W. Va. 269, 49 S. E. 150; Smith v. Bangham, 156 Calif. 359, 104 Pac. 689, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 522; Agar v. Streeter, 183 Mich. 600, 150 N. W. 160, L. R. A. 1915, D. 196; Mier v. Hadden, 148 Mich. 488, 111 N. W. 1040, 118 Am. St. Reps. 586, 12 Ann. Cases 88; Black v. Maddox, 104 Ga. 157; George v. Shuman, 202 Mich. 241.

There are a few cases that refuse specific performance on the ground of lack of mutuality of obligation, but in these cases the option was not supported by valuable consideration, and consequently nothing more than a continuing offer subject to withdrawal at any time before acceptance,57 but although not supported by valuable consideration, such a purported option if accepted before withdrawal creates a mutually binding contract of sale, and there seems to be no sound reason why specific performance should be denied, and the following cases support this theory.58

The right to specifically enforce an option after the purchase of real estate being within the legal discretion of the court, specific performance may be refused when the transaction is tainted with fraud or procured by overreaching.59