Frequently questions involving the adverse possession of real estate by one cotenant against another are presented to the legal profession. When the ancestor dies leaving several heirs-at-law, they become as to each other cotenants of the real estate left by such ancestor. The rule as laid down by the Michigan decisions on this question is as follows:

"The actual possession of a tenant in common will not be presumed as adverse to that of his cotenants, and his con-

31. "Within ten years, where the defendant claims title under a deed made by some officer of this state, or of the United States, authorized to make deeds upon the sale of lands for taxes assessed and levied within this state." Compiled Laws 1915, Section 12311.

32. Fitscher v. Olsen, 155 Mich. 320, relating to tax deed. McVicker v. Filer, 31 Mich. 304; Tull v. Wright, 37 Mich 93.

33. Donovan v. Word, 100 Mich. 605; Showers v. Robinson, 43 Mich. 502.

34. Williams v. Fox, 152 Mich. 217.

35. Marsh v. Breen Iron Co., 181 Mich. 222.

structive possession in like manner will be limited to his interest as tenant in common. The possession of one tenant in common, unless under a claim of exclusive right will not affect the rights of the cotenants. Such exclusive claims and denial of their rights should be clear and unambiguous and brought home to the knowledge of the cotenants either by express notice or by implication. And if the latter, all doubt growing out of the nature and character thereof should be against an ouster. The presumption should be that the tenant in possession respects and recognizes the rights of his cotenants, until the contrary clearly appears; that the possession is rightful, and not to the exclusion of others having equal rights." 36

"The continuous possession of a cotenant may, however, be of such a hostile character as to convert it into an ouster."

One noted text writer has laid down the rule to be as follows:

"If one tenant in common has been in possession a great number of years, without any accounting to his fellow commoners, this is proper evidence from which the jury may infer an adverse possession. In some instances, such possession has been regarded as raising a presumption of law which the jury is not at liberty to resist. An exclusive possession under a claim of title for 40 years, while the other cotenants resided in the same county and failed to assert any claim to their property, warrants the presumption of an actual ouster." 37

36. Campau v. Campau. 44 Mich. 31; Corby v. Thompson, 196 Mich. 706.

37. Freeman Cotenancy & Partition, Sec. 242. "Many of the auhtori-ties hold that an entry under a conveyance which purports to convey the entirety is equivalent to an express declaration on the part of the grantee that he enters claiming the whole to himself, and is such a disseizin as sets the statute in motion in favor of the grantee. Freem. Coten. No. 224; 11 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 1114. Other authorities hold that the statute does not begin to run until the cotenant has had notice or knowledge of the ouster. 3 Shars. & B. Lead. Cas. Real Prop., p. 121. But it is not necessary that actual notice be shown or brought home to the cotenant. It is said in Packard v. Johnson, 57 Cal. 180, that plaintiff was ousted from the point of time when he became aware of such claim, or (at the very least) from the time when, as a prudent man, reasonably attentive to his own interests, he ought to have known that his cotenant asserted an ex elusive right to the land. Which-