Now unnecessary.

Registration of annuities now required.

Creation of rent charges under the Statute of Uses.

(u) Stat. 53 Geo. III. c. 141, explained and amended by stats. 3 Geo. IV. c. 92, and 7 Geo. IV. c. 75, which rendered sufficient a memorial of the names of the witnesses as they appeared signed to their attest at'

(x) Stat. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 90.

(y) Stat. 18 & 19 Vict. c. 15, ss. 12, 14.

(z) Ante, pp. 83, 85, 87, 8'.).

(a) Stat. 27 Hen. VIII. c. 10, ss. 4, 5.

In ancient times it was necessary, on every grant of a rent charge, to give an express power to the grantee to distrain on the premises out of which the rent charge was to issue (e). If this power were omitted, the rent was merely a rent seek. Kent service, being an incident of tenure, might be distrained for by common right; but rent charges were matters the enforcement of which was left to depend solely on the agreement of the parties. But since a power of distress has been attached by parliament (f) to rents seck, as well as to rents service, an express power of distress is not necessary for the security of a rent charge (g). Such a power, however, is usually granted in express terms. In addition to the clause of distress, it is also usual, as a further security, to give to the grantee a power to enter on the premises after default has been made in payment for a certain number of days, and to receive the rents and profits until all the arrears of the rent charge, together with all expenses, have been duly paid.

Clause of distress.

(b) Ante, p. 153. (c) Ante, p. 155.

(d) Ante, p. 156.

Incorporeal hereditaments are the subjects of estates analogous to those which may be holden in corporeal hereditaments. If therefore a rent charge should be granted for the life of the grantee, he will possess an estate for life in the rent charge. Supposing that he should alienate this life estate to another party, without mentioning in the deed of grant the heirs of such party, the law formerly held that, in the event of the decease of the second grantee in the lifetime of the former, the rent charge became extinct for the benefit of the owner of the lands out of which it issued (A). The former grantee was not entitled because he had parted with his estate; the second grantee was dead, and his heirs were not entitled because they were not named in the grant. Under similar circumstances, we have seen (i) that, in the case of a grant of corporeal hereditaments, the first person that might happen to enter upon the premises after the decease of the second grantee had formerly a right to hold possession during the remainder of the life of the former. But rents and other incorporeal hereditaments are not in their nature the subjects of occupancy (k); they do not lie exposed to be taken possession of by the first passer-by. It was accordingly thought that the statutes, which provided a remedy in the case of lands and other corporeal hereditaments, were not applicable to the case of a rent charge, but that it became extinct as before mentioned (l). By a modern decision, however, the construction of these statutes was extended to this case also(m); and now the act for the amendment of the laws with respect to wills (n), by which these statutes have been repealed (0), permits every person to dispose by will of estates pur autre vie, whether there shall or shall not be any special occupant thereof, and whether the same shall be a corporeal or an incorporeal hereditament (p); and in case there shall be no special occupant, the estate, whether corporeal or incorporeal, shall go to the executor or administrator of the party; and coming to him, either by reason of a special occupancy, or by virtue of the act, it shall be applied and distributed in the same manner as the personal estate of the testator or intestate (q).

Power of entry.

Estate for life in a rent charge.

(e) Litt. s. 218.

(f) Stat. 4 Geo. II. c. 28, s. 5. See Johnson v. Faulkner, 2 Q. B. 925,935; Miller v. Green, 8 Bing. 92; 2 Cro. & Jerv. 142; 2 Tyr. 1.

(g) Saward v. Anstey, 2 Bing.

519; Buttery v. Robinson, 3 Bing. 392; Dodds v. Thompson, L. Rep. 1 C. P. 133.

(h) Bac. Abr. tit. Estate for Life and Occupancy (B).

A grant of an estate tail in a rent charge scarcely ever occurs in practice. But grants of rent charges for estates in fee simple are not uncommon, especially in thc towns of Liverpool and Manchester, where it is the usual practice to dispose of an estate in fee simple in lands for building purposes in consideration of a rent charge in fee simple by way of ground rent, to be granted out of the premises to the original owner. These transactions are accomplished by a conveyance from the vendor to the purchaser and his heirs, to the use that the vendor and his heirs may thereout receive the rent charge agreed on, and to the further use that, if it be not paid within so many days, the vendor and his heirs may distrain, and to the further use that, in case of non-payment within so many more days, the vendor and his heirs may enter and hold possession till all arrears and expenses are paid; and subject to the rent charge, and to the powers and remedies for securing payment thereof, to the use of the purchaser, his heirs and assigns for ever. The purchaser thus acquires an estate in fee simple in the lands, subject to a perpetual rent charge payable to the vendor, his heirs and assigns (r). It should, however, be carefully borne

The Wills Act as to estates pur autre vie.

(i) Ante, p. 20. (k) Co. Litt. 41 b, 388 a. (l) 2 Black. Com. 260. (m) Bearpark v. Hutchinson, 7 Bing. 178.

(n) 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c.26. (o) Sect. 2. (p) Sect. 3.

(q) Sect. 6; Reynolds v. Wright, 25 Beav. 100.

(r) By stat. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 83, conveyances of any kind, in consideration of an annual sum payable in perpetuity, or for any indefinite period, were subject to the following duties: -