The existing registry acts purport to render any deed, affecting either the legal or equitable estate, void as against a purchaser or mortgagee claiming under an instrument of an earlier date of registration: at Law, notwithstanding notice, mere priority of registration absolutely determines the right to the property as between parties claiming under or against defects in Fines or Recoveries, or in Sales of Land Tax, or against lis pendens, or against unregistered deeds in Register Counties, prior registration conclusive at Law but not in Equity.

(e) See Whitworth v. Gaugain, 1 Ph. 728, and cases there cited.

(f) See sects. from 4 to 12.

(g) See sects. 2 and 3; Doe v. Price, 16 M. & W. 603.

(h) Sect. 1; see sect. 3.

(i) See sect. 12.

(k) See sects. from 22 to 26; Doe v. Phillips, 4 Per. & Dav. 562; and see as to sales by rector for redemption of land-tax, Doe v. Woodward, 1 Exch. R. 273. adverse registered instruments purporting to pass the legal estate (l): but, in Equity, registration is no protection against an unregistered assurance of which the party claiming under the registered instrument had notice prior to the completion of his purchase or security (m): nor does registration of an equitable incumbrance prevent the person who then has, or subsequently acquires, the legal estate, from using it for the protection of any equitable interest which he may acquire in the property without notice of the registered incumbrance (n): and a purchaser advancing his money and taking a conveyance without notice of a prior deed which has been imperfectly registered, may, upon acquiring notice of it, register his own deed, and so gain priority (o).

With the probable exception of a purchaser claiming under a devisee where the will has not been registered within the period prescribed by the Acts - in which case it seems doubtful whether a registered conveyance for value by the heir will not displace the registered title of the purchaser from the devisee (p); subject, of course, to the equitable doctrine of notice, - it may be laid down, as a general rule, that a purchaser can be evicted under the registration Acts, only by a person claiming under an instrument executed by the party under whom the two adverse titles are derived or parties taking under him by act in Law, and registered prior to the registration of the document which forms the root of the purchaser's adverse title; for instance, if A. convey first to B. who does not register, and then to C. who does not register, and then C. convey to D. who registers, D. acquires no title against B. unless he can procure a conveyance from A. to C. to be duly registered (q); which would, it is conceived, be impracticable if A. and the witnesses attesting his execution of his original conveyance to C. were dead (r); so, where a lease is unregistered, no statutory title is acquired against the owner of the reversion by registering an assignment of the lease (s); but if A. (a woman), after conveying to B., marry, and her husband convey the estate which he takes in jure mariti to C. who registers before B.'s conveyance is registered, C. thereby acquires priority, (as intimated by the terms of the above proposition) (t): and the same rule would, it appears, prevail, if A., after conveying to B., were to die intestate, and her heir at law were to convey to C, who were to register before any registration by B. (u).

Purchaser's title how impeachable under Register Acts.

(l) Doe v. Allsop, 5 B. & Al. 142.

(m) Cheval v. Nichols, Stra. 664; Le Neve v. Le Neve, 3 Atk. 646'; see p. 651; Tunstall v. Trappes, Gosling's case, 3 Sim. 301; and see Davis v. Earl of Strathmore, 16 Ves. 419. The present Registration Commissioners recommend (see 1st Report) that priority of registration shall always give priority of title to a person claiming for valuable consideration under an assurance obtained without fraud; notwithstanding he may have notice of the prior unregistered instrument: the great difficulty seems to be, to distinguish between actual notice and actual fraud.

(n) See Morecock v. Dickins, Amb. 678; Bedford v. Bacchus, ib. 680, cited; Wrightson v. Hudson, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 609.

(o) Essex v. Baugh, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 620.

(p) See an article, 14 Jur. pt. 2, p. 267.

So, if A. convey to B., who does not register, and then B. convey to D., who registers merely his own conveyance, and then A. convey to C, who registers, D., it is conceived, has no title as against C. and parties claiming under him; for the registered conveyance to C. displaces B.'s title under his unregistered conveyance; and this being gone the conveyance to D. goes with it: and in such a case a person searching the register would have no reason to suppose that the property conveyed by B. to D. had ever been held by A.; nor, as respects parties claiming under C, would it make any difference that the assurances by C. were unregistered (w).

(q) Jack v. Armstrong, 1 Hud. & Bro. 727.

(r) S. ft, and Essex v. Baugh, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 620; vide supra, 319, 320, as to the necessity for the memorial being attested by a witness to the execution of the deed by the grantor.

(s) Honeycomb v. Waldron, 2 Stra. 1064; and see Battersby v. Rochfort, 2 J. & L. 431.

(t) See Warburton v. Loveland, 2 Dow. & C. 480.

(u) See S. C.

We have already referred to the provisions in the 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74 as to the priorities of parties claiming under disentailing assurances, both of freeholds and copyholds (x).