A suit for specific performance may now be commenced by Bill or by Claim under the orders of 22nd April 1850; these orders (y) are not compulsory, but their practical effect will, probably, be, to supersede to a considerable extent the old form of proceeding; they do not however seem to be in their present form adapted to cases involving complicated and disputed matters of fact.

Who are entitled to sue vendor, and who are proper parties to suit.

Or to suit by vendor.

Alienation of purchaser's interest by act inter vivos - who are proper parties to suit, by or against vendor.

Purchaser not to be a party if his assignee has been accepted by vendor.

Suit may now be commenced by bill or claim.

(r) Broome v. Monck, 10 Ves. 597; Buckmaster v. Harrop, 13 Ves. 456; vide supra, 125, 126 and n. (s), ibid.

(s) Townsend v. Champernowne, 9 Pri. 130.

(t) Dan. Ch. Pr. by H. 278.

(v) See Fulham x. M'Carthy, 1 II. L. C. 703, 717; Padwick v Platt, 11 Beav. 503; but see Nelthorpe v. Holgate, 1 Col. 203; Mox~ hay v. Inderwick, 11 Jur. 837.

(w) See Anon. v. Watford, 4 Russ. 372.

(x) Holden v. Hayn, 1 Mer. 47; Hall v. Laver, 3 Y. & C. 191; see Hemingway v. Fernandes, 13 Sim. 228.

(y) The effect of which is stated infra, p. 473, et seq.

Assuming that the suit be commenced by Bill; - if the bill state that the agreement was in writing, it need not allege signature (z): nor that it was duly stamped (a); nor is it clearly necessary to allege that the agreement was in writing, (supposing such to be the fact) (b); although either the writing and signature, or special circumstances taking the case out of the Statute of Frauds, must be proved at the hearing.

Where letters are relied upon, they may be stated in the bill, either as constituting the agreement, or as evidence of a parol agreement; in the latter case, it will be necessary to prove other matter sufficient to take the case out of the statute (c).

As a general rule, the bill need not state inferences or results of law arising from the facts alleged: it has, however, been held by V. C. K. Bruce in two recent cases, that where the vendor means to rely on the purchaser's waiver of his prima facie right to a marketable title, he must allege or charge such waiver; and that it is not sufficient to allege facts which, if proved, would be evidence of waiver (d): but, on the other hand, it is improper to introduce general charges or averments of waiver, etc, unsupported by a statement of the particular facts; the party ought so to frame his case upon the record, that the Court can fairly see what the case is which is to be relied on (e).

As to the form of the bill.

It need not allege signature of agreement, or writing, semble.

Letters, how to be referred to.

Inferences of law, whether to be stated.

Waiver relied on should be alleged; and facts supporting it should be stated.

(z) Rist v. Hobson, 1 S. & S. 543; Field v. Hutchinson, 1 Beav. 599.

(a) 1 Dan. Ch. Pr. by H. 347.

(6) See Spurrier v. Fitzgerald, 6 Ves. 548; 1 S. & S. 543; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr, by H. 34 7; but see Redding v. Wilkes, 3 Bro. C. C. 400.

(c) See Birce v. Bletchley, 6 Madd. 17; Skinner v. M'Douall, 2 De G. & S. 265.

(d) Clive v. Beaumont, 1 De G. & S. 397; and Gaston v. Frankum, 13 Jur. 739, V. C. K. B.

The plaintiff cannot, under the prayer for general relief, obtain a decree inconsistent with either the specific case made, or the specific relief prayed by the bill (f): for instance, a vendor who, through want of title, fails to obtain a decree for specific performance against a purchaser in possession, cannot, under the prayer for general relief, obtain an account of the rents and profits; although the defendant by his answer state his readiness to pay a fair rent (g): nor, where he fails in proving the agreement alleged by his bill, can he, in general, take a decree for performance of a different agreement admitted by the defendant's answer (h): nor can he, under the general prayer, obtain relief which, although consistent with the specific relief, is yet sustained only by allegations which have been introduced merely as showing his right to the specific relief (i): and, in general, where a bill is filed making a case of actual fraud, and such fraud is disproved or not established, the Court will not allow the bill to be used for any secondary purpose, but will dismiss it with costs (k).

Prayer for general relief, what relief can be obtained under.

(e) See Hunter v. Daniel, 4 Ha. 432.

(f) See authorities cited in the four next notes, and see Hiern v. Mill, 13 Ves. 119; Cockerell v. Dickens, 1 Mon. D. & De G. 45, 81, Priv. C.

(g) Williams v. Shaw, 3 Russ. 178, n.

(h) Legal v. Miller, 2 Ves. sen.

299; but see Mortimer v. Orchard, 2 Ves. jun. 243; and Hanbury v. Litchfield, 2 Myl. & K. 629; in which, under special circumstances, the plaintiff obtained a decree.

(i) Stevens v. Guppy, 3 Russ. 171, 185.

(k) Glascott v. Lang, 2 Ph. 310, 322; and see Wilde v. Gibson, 1 H. L. C. 021.